



# Bonn's Nuclear Arms Pool

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Background Facts

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# **Bonn's Nuclear Arms Pool**

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**Aims**

**Methods**

**Background Facts**

**National Council of the National Front  
of Democratic Germany**

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
of the German Democratic Republic**

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## Preface

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An international press conference was held in Berlin, capital of the German Democratic Republic, on January 15, 1969, during which world public opinion was informed of the motives, the background, and the present stage of the West German government's undercover preparations for producing their own nuclear weapons. The press conference sponsored by the GDR Foreign Ministry and the National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany, proved through comprehensive factual material that the nuclear weapon strategy has become the fundamental element of the Bonn government's military conception and of the West German military leaders.

Those sitting in the Presidium of the press conference included:

Professor Max Steenbeck, Chairman of the GDR's Research Council, Professor at Jena's Friedrich Schiller University, member of the GDR's Academy of Sciences, and corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.

Professor Rudolf Arzinger, President of the Society for International Law and Director of the International Law Institute at Karl-Marx-University, Leipzig.

Dr. Bock, departmental head in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR.

Sitting in the Presidium were also scientists and engineers who until very recently worked in West Germany's nuclear research and development and have asked the GDR for asylum for reasons of conscience. They are:

The diplomaed physicist Herbert Patzelt—he studied physics from 1952 to 1958. After receiving his diploma in 1958 he worked from 1959 to 1964 as a scientific officer with the Geesthacht Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipping and Shipbuilding. Afterwards, until 1966, he worked with the Society for Nuclear Research in Karlsruhe, at the literature department of its nuclear research centre in the town. From

1966 until his coming to the GDR last November he was a scientific expert with the Executive Board for Disseminating Knowledge of the Commission of the European Communities (formerly EURATOM) in Brussels and Luxemburg.

The diplomaed physicist Klaus Breuer who studied physics from 1956 to 1961 and took his Doctor's Degree in 1965 at the Institute for Nuclear Physics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University (Frankfurt on Main) in the field of nuclear physics. Afterwards, until his coming to the GDR last August he was a scientific officer at the same institute. During this period he became acquainted with the research problems of the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich, and other scientific establishments of the West German Federal Republic.

The physicist Hans Wiecezorek—he was an executive and security officer at the laboratory of Professor Berthold in Wildbad (Black Forest) and came to the GDR last September. He worked in the spheres of the use of radioactive material and the determination of radioactive radiation. In his activities he had scientific and commercial relations with 38 countries including the United States, South Africa, Great Britain, France, and Canada as well as with numerous institutions in the West German Federal Republic.

The international press conference was furthermore attended by:

Professor Peter Möbius, an internationally renowned theoretical physicist who in recent years worked in the spheres of elementary particle and nuclear physics. The most important stations of his scientific career were: the Nils-Bohr Institute in Copenhagen, the Institute for Theoretical Physics of Vienna University (1964–1966), afterwards a guest professor at Lund (Sweden), the Karlsruhe Institute for Theoretical Physics. He came to the GDR in December 1968.

Dr. Ehrenfried Petras—an internationally-noted microbiologist who made sensational revelations on the development of bacteriological and chemical aggressive weapons for the West German forces at an international press conference in the GDR Foreign Ministry last December 6th. Dr. Petras moved to the GDR in November 1968.

Dr. Gerd Stiller—a diplomaed physicist. He studied physics at Freiburg University from 1951 to 1957 and at the faculty of mathematics and natural sciences of Heidelberg University from 1957 to 1959. In the same year he took his Doctor's degree and from 1960 to 1962 he was a scientific officer at the Max Planck Institute (Heidelberg) in the field of low-energy physics.

The engineer Hermann Steffen—he is a specialist in the field of jet-engine building and worked for several years, until coming to the GDR last year, with the leading West German jet-engine firm MAN at Munich. He worked there on the development and production of jet-engines for supersonic fighter bombers designed to be nuclear weapon carriers.

Participating in the press conference were many West German, West Berlin and foreign journalists coming among other countries from Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, India, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Kuwait, Austria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Republic.

The following documentation, statements and excerpts from replies given to journalists break down the wall behind which the aggressive circles of West German monopoly capital are trying to conceal their war preparations. From the international press conference in the capital of the GDR the urgent appeal went out to the international public to do everything possible to timely prevent a new edition of the German imperialists' big power aspirations. A decisive precondition is: The government of the West German Federal Republic must sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—without all reservations and conditions!



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## Bonn's Nuclear Arms Pool

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### Statement by Professor Dr. Max Steenbeck, Chairman of the GDR Research Council

Since the terrible effects of nuclear weapons were demonstrated in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the passionate discussions about the nuclear menace with its possible horrifying consequences have never come to a halt. It is self-explanatory that the natural scientists, and in particular the physicists are often asked how this danger can be warded off.

Only a few months ago, at an international press conference on September 25, 1958, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR submitted a scientifically and technically substantiated expert opinion of physicists from our Republic, which explains why it is necessary for both German states to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons. This expert opinion which I helped to draft and signed, shows by clearly proven facts, which can easily be checked, that the development of nuclear engineering in the West German Federal Republic is directed at creating a fully self-sufficient system of scientific and technical facilities which would be required for an independent, though only limited production of nuclear weapons. It was not claimed that this production was already under way.

Today, the National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR submit a further document to the public, which gives organisational and personal data connected with this development and proves why it is particularly important for the Federal Republic to join the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty which the GDR did as one of the first countries.

This time I did not participate in compiling the material submitted; that is why I gladly take the opportunity given by this press conference to make some supplementary remarks from the point of view of a natural scientist. It is true that the arguments of a natural scientist are not identical with those of a lawyer or a politician. But today a natural scientist can no longer live in an ivory tower to evade his political responsibility. If I have learned anything from my experience, then it is the knowledge that guilt does not

only result from having done something, but still more often from having failed to do something. This refers by no means only to our professional work and also includes self-education. This is true of all people, but especially German scientists should take this to heart on account of our historical experience. Many are doing so now—also in West Germany; especially recently there were clear examples of such an attitude, as we shall also see today. But I do not want to speak for these now. I rather believe that I represent the attitude of all scientists of the GDR towards the problem discussed here. Today I am not speaking as the Chairman of the Research Council of the GDR, but because in my work I was for a certain time more openly confronted with these problems than other people. A practical example will make sufficiently clear what is demanded of everybody, namely to make up his mind.

In the last phase of the war, I was the head of one of the works of the Siemens trust and as all physicists I knew that it was possible in principle to release the energy of the uranium atoms by means of a chain reaction in an explosion of unimaginable magnitude. When I then heard in an internment camp that this had actually happened in Hiroshima, this shock led to my decision to do everything in my power to prevent such a thing happening again—if I should ever again have such an opportunity. I saw only one way of doing this: the only imaginable enemy would have to be able to hit back with the same weapon. Like a number of other German scientists I took part in the work on the problem of the separation of uranium isotopes, which is so important for achieving this purpose, as head of a group comprising Soviet and German scientific workers in the Soviet Union. My group developed a gas ultra-centrifuge with a performance that had not been achieved anywhere else before. Our work admittedly did not make a decisive contribution to the known result nor has it ever stepped the line between the peaceful and military use of nuclear energy; but the fact that a nuclear war has not been unleashed—up till now at least—makes me feel justified in my personal decision taken at the time, which might as well have been completely different.

Before our return to Germany we worked in other fields for some time, so that we did not know the latest

developments in our former speciality. That is why expressly no pledge of secrecy was imposed on us, so it was completely up to us to decide in which part of Germany we wished to live. Two of my collaborators of that time went to the Federal Republic and continued their work on the gas ultra-centrifuge, first with DEGUSSA and later in Jülich. I personally even assisted them in settling down there; because then—more than twelve years ago—it was unimaginable to me that anywhere in Germany the danger could arise of nuclear physics being pursued for military purposes. The patent for the centrifuge which we had filed with the approval of the competent government authorities of the GDR, in the Federal Republic, the USA and other states, and which showed that we were at least ten years ahead of the West, was however declared a state secret by the Federal Government in 1960, at the instigation of the USA—whereupon the DEGUSSA shares went up rapidly. Since then I have naturally not had any relevant contact with my old friends, but I can deduce very well from reports in the West German press how far secret developments have progressed.

I myself decided to settle in the GDR. The imminent remilitarization of the Federal Republic—and above all the way in which it was motivated—considerably influenced this decision.

At first I set up and led a team of scientists for the construction of our nuclear power station and over and above that did everything possible in order to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Thus the first issue of our journal *Kernenergie*, which was founded by the Office for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Engineering of the GDR in 1958 carried a personal obligation of the publishers, which I drafted and which says that now and in all their future work they would not participate in any place of the globe in any work intended for the military use of nuclear energy. This clear obligation was taken as an occasion by the American "Society for Social Responsibility in Science", of which Einstein also was a member, to dedicate its first annual tribute to a scientist in 1964 to my person. The press in West Germany and West Berlin reported on this with headlines that in my opinion seem to be typical of them:

"Praise from USA for (Soviet) Zone Professor" (*Die Welt*)

"US Tribute to German Scientist" (*Der Tagesspiegel*)

I know very well, and should like to stress this here, that the vast majority of West German scientists disapprove of the use of nuclear energy for war purposes and above all reject any German participation in such activity. Many of the scientists mentioned in the document submitted today are very well known to me personally and about most of them I can say with certainty that they only want the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and that they believe they are working for such a purpose. But what they are overlooking is the fact that they will be ruthlessly pushed aside as soon as high-level politics interferes to prepare or even proceed to the military application of their results; then these people will not be needed any longer, or they will be forced to carry out work against their will, for which the

legal conditions have in the meantime already been established.

I know, furthermore, that many a West German scientist might again consider it his "patriotic" duty in a case of "external emergency"—even if provoked by the policy of his own country—to do something of what he still disapproves today. To believe that the decision of conscience of the individual without participation in the real power of the state can alter anything with regard to the existing danger, is an intellectual, possibly honest attitude, but in any case it is a gladly accepted self-deception about the significance of the individual in present-day society. That West Germany is seriously envisaging possibilities for its independent military use of nuclear energy is borne out by a number of projects which would be meaningless for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy on a commercial basis, but which are indispensable if a certain (independence) in the military field is being sought.

Let me quote some examples:

1. West Germany is exploiting a poor uranium deposit on its own territory and constructing or operating its own processing plant, though it has no chance of competing with world market prices.
2. It is constructing its own processing plant for fuel elements which are needed for the production of plutonium. This plant, which is uneconomical in size and outdated in technology, will be the second in West Germany, the first which is located in Mol (and which is working under capacity) being placed under the authority of Euratom. The new installation would suffice for the separation of plutonium obtained in the reactors which the Federal Republic has designed and constructed on its own. These reactors are supplied with natural uranium, which is not subjected to any control and therefore can also be produced in the Federal Republic. If engineering factors are favourable it will be possible to obtain a quantity of bomb-type plutonium per year which will be sufficient for several Nagasaki-type bombs.
3. It is planned to set up isotope separation plants, allegedly for the purpose of producing enriched uranium for the operation of reactors. From the economical point of view, it is pointless to build such an expensive plant for the purpose mentioned, because in ten years fast breeders will be operated in power reactors run on an economic basis without enriched uranium. The existing separation plants (e.g. in the USA), originally built for military purposes, are no longer working at full capacity because of the nuclear arms potential now attained by the great nuclear powers. For this reason a sufficient quantity of enriched uranium for peaceful use is now available, which is, however, submitted to control.
4. A centrifugation plant such as has been constructed in West Germany allows to obtain bomb-clean plutonium from the plutonium normally used for reactors. The separation of this plutonium—in a quantity needed for one Nagasaki-type bomb per year—necessitates only a small amount of electric energy (unlike uranium isotope separation plants)



comparable to the electricity required by a modern block of flats.

5. It is known that for many years to come the nuclear propulsion of merchant vessels will remain uneconomical and that the radioactive contamination of the seas or ports in case of a disaster can hardly be precluded. Nuclear propulsion is of interest only if other than economic purposes are decisive. This applies to ice-breakers, which the Federal Republic is certainly not going to build, and men-of-war, mainly submarines.

These measures and procedures allow the Federal Republic to readapt existing or planned installations for military purposes within a short period. The investments required are relatively low, scientists, technicians and engineers having the necessary qualification are available. The material presented at this press conference shows that the number of people engaged in nuclear research in West Germany is five times as high as is needed for the continuous production of nuclear weapons according to an expert statement of the United Nations. As a matter of course every state making peaceful use of nuclear energy will obtain results that may also be used for military purposes, but there are also particular techniques which even before reaching the level of nuclear arms production are only suitable for use in the military field.

If the Federal Republic considers suspicion to be unjustified, why does it not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty? Such a step would demonstrate its peaceful intentions much better than its signature under the Paris Treaties which admittedly have left open a number of military possibilities.

To substantiate its refusal to sign the treaty, the Federal Government claims that the "discriminatory" control measures envisaged by the treaty would hinder the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. In fact, the control measures only refer to the duty of reporting on the existence of fissile material if a certain limit has been reached. Below this limit it is even possible to run pilot plants without any control. The Federal Government's misgivings over the loss of the monopolies' competitive power must be attributed to a motive resulting from the capitalist economic structure.

As a socialist state the GDR has no ambitions of the independent peaceful utilization of atomic energy. We cannot—nor do we want to—commit industrial and scientific capacities to the development of an independent nuclear industry. We have no intention of setting up isotope separation plants with gas centrifuges or other equipment nor do we want to deal independently with the reprocessing of nuclear fuels. Our declared aim is to cooperate closely with the Soviet Union, to coordinate our scientific and economic potential in all fields. We do not want world-wide competition, but extensive cooperation.

The fact that under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty the military use of atomic energy will be reduced thus removing a major obstacle of cooperation, will only benefit the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. This had to be admitted even by the West German Foreign Minister, Herr Willy Brandt, who declared

during a cabinet meeting in Bonn at the end of last year that countries with advanced nuclear research and engineering such as Australia, Italy and Japan who had already signed the treaty or were going to sign it would certainly not take this step if it ran counter to their own economic interests. Certainly these countries were just as clever as the Federal Republic, he said. The argument put forward by the Bonn Government that controls would be unnecessary for the Federal Republic since the West German nuclear industry was already supervised by Euratom does not hold good. The so-called voluntary self-control within the framework of Euratom is unacceptable because it is ineffective towards West Germany as the economically strongest member state. It is admitted even in the Federal Republic that stipulations are applied very generously and that an even greater scope of action is desired there.

Historical experience has shown that German imperialism has to be subdued before it is too late. Nobody can escape this responsibility. We as German scientists who lived to see how the genius of German science was misused for preparing and unleashing two World Wars, have the duty to emphasize over and over again that the West German Federal Republic is creating conditions allowing it to launch the production of nuclear weapons at any moment. We are witnessing with growing concern how the scientific, technical, financial and personal prerequisites for the production of nuclear arms are being created in the Federal Republic, while there is no effective international control.

We therefore highly appreciate the sense of responsibility shown by West German scientists such as the "Göttinger 18" and by men like Dr. Petras, Herr Patzelt and Professor Möbius who turned their back on the Bonn system which may at any time abuse science for new aggressions and war crimes. Ever more scientists realize that peace and security in Europe call for a radical change in Bonn's policy, a binding political commitment to peace. They demand

- the unconditional signing and ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
- the immediate and unconditional cessation of any development work on nuclear, biological and chemical mass destruction weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles
- the pledge of the Bonn Government to give up its policy aimed at changing the status quo and at revising the existing frontiers.

As regards the last mentioned demand you may object that a physicist is no more competent than anybody else. This is true because a scientist is an ordinary human being. Science is becoming a productive force, and as a result, scientists are being integrated into the production process of society like all other citizens. I know this very well from my work in the Research Council.

But nobody can challenge the fact that all the demands raised form a whole. For this reason I support these demands not only with my factual knowledge in my particular field, but with all my knowledge and all my experience. *Dixi et animan salvavi!*

**Statement by Herr Herbert Patzelt,  
B.Sc. phys., former scientific officer  
for the  
West German Atomic Industry**

In my television interview on December 9, 1969, I pointed out that I would give more detailed information on the West German nuclear research programme and its military application at a later date. Allow me now to acquaint you with some facts that became known to me during my work in a number of research institutes in the Federal Republic.

From 1959 to 1964, I worked for the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping at Geesthacht. The Society's alleged mission is to build and operate nuclear-propelled merchant vessels. But I soon found out that in this particular field the Federal Republic uses nuclear energy for military purposes. As early as 1961, the MAN company carried out shielding tests for a horizontal type pressurized water reactor in collaboration with the reactor station at Geesthacht.

While the company made an official statement saying that the reactor was scheduled to be used in mines as a low-power atomic energy plant, staff members of MAN openly declared that it was to be employed as a submarine reactor developed under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Defence. The activities at Geesthacht also received financial support from Euratom under special agreements.

At the same time I learned that the Bundeswehr (armed forces) leadership had ignored the restrictions imposed on it by the West European Union by commissioning the construction of a 1,000-ton nuclear submarine.

The Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, where I was active in the field of documentation on transuranium and fast breeders, is largely utilized for the military application of nuclear research work. In the early 1960's it began to collect and evaluate all available data on transuranium arranging it in the so-called plutonium card index. At the same time it prepared documentations on special fields like fast breeders, reactor safety, maximum flux reactors, as well as fast critical and subcritical assemblies.

**Statement by Dr. Klaus Breuer,  
B.Sc. phys., formerly at the Institute  
for Nuclear Physics  
at the University of Frankfurt/Main**

On account of my scientific work at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt on Main and the resulting scientific contacts with the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich and other institutes in the Federal Republic I gained an insight into the efforts made by the Federal

The material was then sifted by specialists in the Bundeswehr, particularly with regard to cross sections and critical masses. In this connection I should like to emphasize that some of the higher actinides are suitable for use as extremely small nuclear bursting charges. In its efforts to produce its own fissile material for nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic fully turns to account the possibilities arising from its membership in Euratom. This became clearly evident to me during my work as scientific adviser to the executive board for the "Propagation of Knowledge" of the Commission of European Communities (formerly Euratom) in Brussels and Luxembourg. Let me quote only two examples:

It is known that the Federal Republic has assigned substantial means and scientific potential for the construction of a natural uranium-fuelled, heavy-water-moderated reactor as is borne out by the multi-purpose reactor in operation at Karlsruhe. Multi-reactors are well-suited for the production of bomb-clean plutonium, in particular because of their burn-up.

Great importance was attached to one of my last missions at Euratom, which consisted in collecting all available patents relating to the production of heavy water and to hydrogen isotope separation for the Euratom cabinet headed by Herr Hellwig, the West German representative. It was commissioned by the Ministry of Scientific Research of the Federal Republic. At the same time there was an investigation of the employment of tritium for neutron sources, which was sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Defense.

I have often been tormented by the thought that we might experience again what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when hundreds of thousands perished in a nuclear holocaust. The knowledge that the Federal Government in Bonn would not only accept such a thing happening again, but is actively helping to prepare it—how else can its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty be interpreted—obliged me to leave the Federal Republic, so as not to become guilty. I am convinced that such an abuse of science is completely out of the question in the German Democratic Republic.

Government to create the prerequisites for its own production of nuclear weapons.

On the one hand these efforts consist in gaining direct possession of an uncontrollable amount of fissile uranium or plutonium, suitable for military use by means of isotope separation. It is noteworthy that even now these developments are being carried out under the strictest secrecy and security measures and therefore little has become known about this to the public.

The work on these problems, which started very early in the Federal Republic, has been directed and financed by the state.



This applies in particular to the:

centrifugation process  
nozzle process  
gaseous diffusion process.

The activities in this field, which began already during the time of fascism, have been stepped up by different institutions in the Federal Republic since 1957. These include the DEGUSSA in Frankfurt on Main, centres in Kiel under Professor Martin, in Aachen under Professor Beyerle, under Professor Groth in Bonn, and in Karlsruhe under Professor Becker, as well as at the Gute Hoffnungshütte in Sterkrade.

In 1960 the Federal Government decreed strict security measures for the centrifugation process and in 1964, with the foundation of the Society for Nuclear Engineering, the work was concentrated in the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich.

The development of the other two processes mentioned above is systematically continued. The nozzle process, which was developed under the direction of Professor Becker in Karlsruhe has reached such an advanced stage that it was possible to take a technical separating unit into operation. It is now possible to produce 280 kilogram of highly enriched uranium per year.

Although an investigation conducted by Professor Becker made it quite clear that the costs for producing uranium 235 are substantially higher than in the USA, they are not prepared to stop pushing this project ahead on their own. The Federal Government plans to set up a pilot plant with gas centrifuges by 1969. It intends to equip this plant with several thousand centrifuges arranged in series connection.

The Federal Government has placed orders for the design of the plant already in 1968. The design allows for the installation to be enlarged into a large-size plant with approximately one hundred thousand centrifuges.

It is indicative of the import of this project that its scope is kept strictly secret even from the USA.

### **Statement by the physicist, Herr Hans Wiczorek, former security officer for the West German firm of Berthold**

Many years of work in industrial enterprises of the Federal Republic allowed me to gain an insight into the development and present level of nuclear engineering. Allow me to deal with some major problems I was confronted with in the Federal Republic and in a number of other countries:

1. The development of nuclear industry in the Federal Republic.
2. The oft-praised control of fissile material.
3. The thriving cooperation with South Africa.
4. The intensive efforts made by the Federal Republic to obtain independence in the nuclear field.

In order to distract public attention from this project and to turn to account the experience of other countries at the same time, opportunities for cooperation with Britain and the Netherlands or with France are still being utilized. It was even attempted, via the West German embassy in Japan to determine and utilize the technical level Japan has attained in this field.

You will have gathered from the facts I mentioned that the nuclear research programme of the Federal Republic is directed at becoming independent in the field of supply with enriched uranium within a short time by employing all available means and by utilizing all the opportunities offered. Even today it is obvious that sufficient stockpiles of fissile material will be available soon for military use.

These developments should not leave a single scientist in the Federal Republic unconcerned. Many scientists in the Federal Republic who belong to the older generation have already gone through such a development once before and had to experience a rude awakening in 1945.

German industrialists and leading military circles have always understood just how to camouflage the real aims of their research and development projects, which they claim are solely intended for peaceful purposes. This can be done very easily in the field of nuclear research.

Each scientist working in the Federal Republic today should be anxious to realize the correlations and consequences of this development and draw his conclusions in accordance with his obligation to work for the welfare of society.

For me the step taken by Dr. Petras, Professor Möbius and Herr Patzelt appears to be the correct way of helping check this disastrous development.

I believe that my coming to the German Democratic Republic is also such a contribution. Moreover, I consider it necessary for the international public to be informed about these developments in the Federal Republic.

5. The Federal Republic's concept of the future research activities of Euratom.

The order in which I enumerated these problems has nothing to do with their importance.

The time available does not permit me to deal with these extensive and complex issues in every detail and with the necessary thoroughness. Instead please let me call your attention to some, in my opinion significant facts.

I should like to shed some light on those enterprises which have not been in the public eye so far, though their research activities and their products are immensely important for nuclear warfare. They include the firm of Friesecke and Höpfner in Erlangen, the Total KG at Ladenburg on the Neckar, and the Laboratory of Professor R. Berthold at Wildbad in the Black Forest. At present efforts are being made to bring about a merger of the enterprises active in this

field with a view to concentrating research and production capacities. Such a merger would lead to a greater wealth of ideas, to a more rational use of technological know-how, and to a deepening of relations with the Bundeswehr, which find their expression in the supply of sophisticated equipment for their nuclear war concept.

The Federal Republic is constantly seeking to hoodwink world public opinion by asserting that the use of fissile material for military purposes is impossible for the simple reason that all such material is submitted to a stringent control by the competent federal authorities, the *Länder* and other member states of Euratom. At first sight, this argument seems to be very plausible, all the more so since the Federal Republic has to obtain permission for the use of fissile material, which is given only after stiff examinations and then has to report in detail on its utilization. The trouble, however, is that the examination is limited to a formal check on the reports and figures submitted.

I know this procedure from my own work as security officer at the Berthold Co. I was one of the few persons in the Federal Republic who had been authorized to deal with plutonium, so I know that it is rather easy to outwit the supervisors. It is even possible to obtain plutonium "on the quiet", without Government permission. These facts show the doubtfulness of the supervision by such states who, like the United States, have made available fissile material to the Federal Republic. As a result several kilograms of enriched uranium 235 and plutonium 239 have disappeared under mysterious circumstances at the Karlsruhe centre up to 1968.

Through my work in the laboratory of Professor Berthold I had close contacts with the Atomic Energy Board of South Africa, which gave me an idea of the co-operation between the Federal Republic and South Africa in the nuclear engineering field, and also for military purposes.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the Federal Republic is increasingly replacing Britain as an importer of all sorts of nuclear equipment. At a dinner given at the Hanover Fair on May 1, 1968, Gerald Weil, a leading South African exporter in this field, told me that Britain was pushed aside because she had reservations about apartheid and because the South Africans did not want her to see through their game. The Federal Republic, however, was regarded as a trustworthy and fair partner. I was also informed—under the seal of secrecy—that one of the biggest projects of Professor Berthold's laboratory ( $\alpha$ -aerosol monitors) was intended for a military installation in South Africa.

When I had direct contact with South Africa, I had a telephone conversation with the Atomic Energy Board of South Africa in Johannesburg practically every week—I particularly noted that the men on the other end of the line were Germans, who by the way

spoke with a distinct South German accent. I, too, had an offer to work in South Africa from July 1st, 1969.

A further problem which is immensely significant for the realization of the efforts made by the Federal Republic to gain a maximum of independence in atomic armaments, is research work on material which would no longer be supplied to the Federal Republic by her NATO partners, if she did not sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and would then have to be procured elsewhere. With regard to the technology of ultra-centrifuges, this is true of fluorine compounds and neutron sources as ignition charges for nuclear arms.

The efforts of the Federal Republic also find their expression in the proposals of the Federal Republic about the future research activities of the organisation hitherto known as Euratom. According to the opinion expressed by the Federal Republic, three focal points should be given special consideration:

1. Power reactors with priority given to fast breeders and for the time being to high temperature, particularly heavy water reactors.
2. Long-term supply with uranium.
3. Investigation of the problem of an isotope separation plant.

These proposals are made in a letter sent by the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) to the members of the working group for nuclear matters on March 25, 1968.

There exist only few branches of science in which there is only one step from good to evil, from blessing to cursing, as is the case in nuclear physics or in bacteriology and chemistry. Even for an expert with many years of professional experience it is often very difficult to decide whether the project on which he is working serves a peaceful or a criminal military aim. The responsibility for the results of his work and their employment lies all the same with the scientist or the technical expert himself, for only he can calculate the possible consequences of the results of his work. And the scientist will always be able to meet this responsibility if he constantly examines the policy carried out by the state in which he is working.

It must be stated in all clearness that the Federal Government has, up till now, refused to join the nuclear non-proliferation treaty under very flimsy pretexts, nor has it any intention of signing this treaty. For a scientist who knows the situation in the Federal Republic from his own experience and activity, this attitude can only mean that the Federal Government does not want to block the road leading to the possession of its own nuclear weapons.

The German Democratic Republic was one of the first states to sign the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. As every scientist here, I therefore also know perfectly well what purpose my work will serve.



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# Nuclear Weapons, Aims and Means of Bonn's Policy

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## Barrage Against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

In the course of this century, Europe has experienced two devastating wars which were launched from German soil. Although the scars have not yet been healed, the ruling circles of the West German Federal Republic are preparing another plot against peace in Europe.

One of the paramount tasks of the present period for the safeguarding of peace in Europe is to prevent West Germany from being armed with nuclear weapons and, in this context, to put into effect the world-wide treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, also and particularly regarding the Federal Republic.

The signatories of the Warsaw Pact stated already in their Bucharest "Declaration on the Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe" in July 1966:

"In view of the dangers arising to peace in Europe as a result of the craving of the West German Federal Republic for nuclear weapons, the member-states must do everything in their power to exclude the possibility that the West German Federal Republic obtains access to nuclear weapons in any way whatever—directly or indirectly through groups of states in exclusive disposal or in any way of co-disposal over such weapons. The future of the European and not only the European peoples will to a great extent, depend on how this issue is decided."<sup>(1)</sup>

Three months later the General Assembly of the United Nations called, in its Resolution 2149 (XXI) of November 4, 1966, on all states "to undertake all necessary steps to facilitate and realize the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and "to refrain from any action which could serve the proliferation of nuclear weapons or hamper the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons".<sup>(2)</sup>

The Federal Government obstructs this call by every means. The West-German NATO-representative Grewe stated on January 24, 1967, before the West German "Society for Foreign-Policy":

"Nations without a production of nuclear weapons of their own will not be able to keep abreast in their scientific-technological development with those which develop and produce their own nuclear weapons."<sup>(3)</sup>

The issue is therefore an autonomous *production* of nuclear weapons which Bonn would not like to have blocked by the Non-proliferation Treaty. This is precisely the reason for Franz-Josef Strauss' appalling statement that the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was "another Versailles and one of cosmic dimensions at that".<sup>(4)</sup> He declared openly that he is "a foe of this treaty".<sup>(5)</sup>

In the course of the campaign, which was staged by the Bonn government during the subsequent months against the conclusion of the Non-proliferation Treaty and against its being signed by the Federal Government and other states, West German politicians mustered a wide assortment of "objections" and alleged "defects" of the UN-document. In the first place, it was said that a "European nuclear fighting force" was of "vital interest", then they discovered problems in the "scientific-technological", and "security sphere", subsequently they came up with the "control-issue" and the "linking of the non-proliferation with disarmament" and finally raised the issue of "termination of the treaty" and a "revision-clause". Along the fact of the continuous change of their allegations up to their turning into the opposite demonstrated that Bonn's only purpose was to thwart the conclusion of the treaty and, when this was no longer possible, to justify the Federal Government's refusal to sign it. Thus Herr Birrenbach, as the spokesman of the CDU-CSU parliamentary group, alleged during the Bundestag debate of April 27, 1967:

"The renunciation of nuclear weapons as well as of the right to collective nuclear self-defence means for

(1) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin July 9, 1966

(2) UNO Balance 66/67, Berlin 1967, p. 143

(3) *Die Welt*, Hamburg Jan. 28, 1967

(4) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, Feb. 20, 1967

(5) *ibid.*

the non-nuclear states an equally significant and permanent loss of autonomous security.”(6)

In August 1967, Federal Chancellor Kiesinger, accompanied by his Social-Democratic Foreign Minister, travelled to the USA in order to continue the policy of his government against the Non-proliferation Treaty. On that occasion, Herr Brandt declared, on August 15, 1967 in talks with US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that the West German government “adhered to its objections against the draft treaty under discussion.”(7)

Bonn’s destructive attitude towards the Non-proliferation Treaty changed, in the recent past, to a blunt rejection, after the XXII UN-General Assembly had recommended the acceptance of the Treaty by an overwhelming majority and approximately eighty states had already signed the Treaty since July 1, 1968. The signing of the Non-proliferation Treaty by the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the first possible day—just as the signing by the other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty—was linked with the expectation that the Federal Government, too, would sign that international treaty “without delay and depreciating reservations.”(8)

This step undertaken by the GDR government was a great contribution towards consolidating peace and security in Europe and, over and beyond, throughout the world. It was an expression of the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, the socialist state of the German Nation, and an expression of the conformity of her policy with the basic purposes and aims of the United Nations and international law.

All the more shameful are the events which took place during those weeks in the other, the imperialist German state. After a few tactical arguments within the monopoly bourgeoisie the following picture emerged late in July:

“At a special session of the Bundestag Committee for Foreign Affairs the fact emerged last Monday that obviously a majority in Bonn does not yet regard the presently available interpretation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, signed so far by seventy states as sufficient to induce the Federal Republic to sign the Treaty. Foreign Minister Brandt, too, will make further efforts at the Conference of the non-nuclear powers in Geneva to safeguard the (West) German interests in the crucial fields of the peaceful use of atomic energy as well as our security and of maintaining possibilities and chances for European cooperation.”(9)

According to instructions, Herr Brandt tried with might and main, both at the above-mentioned Geneva Conference and later, to set up an international fronde of

the so-called nuclear threshold-powers against the Non-proliferation Treaty.

At the end of September 1968, the Presidium of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group decided that at the present time the Non-proliferation Treaty could not be signed by the Federal Republic. Richard Stüdklen, the Chairman of the CSU Provincial Group in Bonn, substantiated this decision by stating that the Federal Republic must “keep open the chance for a Europe which is capable of self-defence.” By such a “Europe” the federal government means a Western Europe, equipped with nuclear weapons under West German hegemony and direct West German authority to employ such nuclear devices.

On October 29, 1968 the official West German news-agency DPA reported: “The Foreign Office in Bonn is anxious to enter into a new phase of German foreign policy in which the cooperation with have-not countries with the same ideas irrespective of their affiliation is to be strengthened. According to the latest information from well-informed quarters in Bonn, this ‘new partnership’ is to include the group of Latin-American countries and states such as Japan, India or even neutral Sweden.”

In the service of that “new phase” of Bonn’s expansionist policy and policy of obstruction against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and his Foreign Minister Brandt indulged, between August and October 1968, in hectic tours which took them to several continents. All of these facts demonstrate that West German imperialism, by gravely misjudging the international balance of power and the historic hopelessness of its expansionist drive, is now resorting to the methods of an all-embracing international conspiracy in order to turn back the hands of time. The striving for autonomous access to nuclear weapons plays a primary part in this megalomaniac-chauvinist programme of expansion. In this conjunction it is well worth recalling the fact that approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads are stored on West German territory. No one can deny that this fact aggravates tensions in Europe and seriously threatens the security of the European peoples, particularly the population of West Germany itself.

In the West German Federal Republic there are the scientific-technological and personal prerequisites for the initiation of the production of nuclear weapons. At present, more than 10,000 scientists, technicians and engineers are employed in West Germany’s nuclear research. An expert report of UNO estimates the requirement of highly-skilled personnel for a continual production of nuclear weapons at about 1,300 engineers and 500 scientists. The same report assesses the costs for a “small” atomic fighting force (100 nuclear blasting charges and corresponding carrier devices, jet-propelled bombers and medium-range missiles) at approximately 1,700 million dollars for ten years, i.e. 170 million dollars per year. Already in 1967, the West German government spent some 150 million dollars on nuclear research and engineering.

(6) Deutscher Bundestag in the period before the 6. parliamentary elections, 106 Session, Bonn July 24, 1967, Page 4947 and following page.

(7) German Press Agency, Aug. 18, 1967

(8) Statement by the GDR Foreign Minister, Otto Winzer on his visit in Moscow, *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin July 2, 1968.

(9) *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, July 30, 1968.



## CDU-Programme on a "New Order" in Europe

### Entwurf für Europa

Already in his book *The Grand Design*, published in 1965, the unofficial platform of the Kiesinger government, the then CSU Chairman and present Finance Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, left no doubt that the strategic aim of the West German state-monopoly capitalism—a third attempt at giving Europe a 'New Order' in the imperialist direction—is to be kept alive but to be achieved by new, more flexible methods. Strauss writes: "The issue is, both through influence on these countries (meaning the socialist countries of Europe, the publisher) as well as by means of tough negotiations with Moscow to ensure by a cumbersome process that those countries become component parts of Europe in the first place at least in the sense as expressed by our term 'intermediate Europe' . . . It must be our task to create a belt between Russia and Western Europe . . ." (10) According to Herr Strauss, that "re-structured" Europe is to extend "from the Atlantic to the Bug-river and to the Black Sea." (11)

In Strauss' second book *Herausforderung und Antwort – Ein Programm für Europa (Challenge and Answer, A Programme for Europe)*, published in 1968, the revanchist basic line of that "European variant" of Bonn's expansionist policy is manifested still more ludicrously:

"A Europe which is to become the greater fatherland for the German nation will not be permitted to end either at the Elbe or the Oder rivers . . . Only those who are able to live and work where his forefathers had their homes will be able to recognize his fatherland in this Europe." (12)

In this way, Herr Strauss provided the basic outline for the Action Program of the CDU as adopted by the CDU Federal Party Congress which was, illegally, held in West Berlin on November 4 to 7, 1968. This Action Programme (13) contains once again the old phased plan of expansion and revenge which has already failed several times:

(10) F. J. Strauss, *Entwurf für Europa*, 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1966, p. 46 and 55.

(11) *ibid.* 83.

(12) F. J. Strauss, *Herausforderung und Antwort. Ein Programm für Europa*, Stuttgart 1968, p. 124.

(13) Quoted from "Deutsches Monatsblatt", Bonn Nov. 1968, No. 11, Supplement.

First stage: Annexation of West Berlin as a "Land of the Federal Republic."

Second stage: Incorporation of the GDR: "The political and social order of the Federal Republic must be understood as a pan-German task."

Third stage: Revision of the Oder-Neisse line: "The German eastern border can only be contractually fixed by way of a peace-treaty."

In this way, the CDU's Action Programme perpetuates the official government's claim to the frontiers of 1937 and assures to continue to represent the "rights" of "millions of expellees and refugees."

Already at the CSU-Party Congress, held on July 12-13, 1968 in Munich, Kiesinger had summarized the nature of this revenge-seeking programme in three sentences:

"The fact by which the position of the Federal Republic differs from that of other countries, is that we must overcome what is known as the 'status quo'. This means that it is our obligatory task to overcome the status quo. This does not apply to other countries." (14)

Now that this concept of overcoming the status quo in Europe failed on August 21, 1968 through the vigilance of the community of socialist countries, these crusaders against the East, who were caught red-handed, are foaming at their mouths. Faced with the shambles of their "new eastern policy", the mark under which they try to sell their tactics of penetrating the Socialist countries and of creeping counter-revolution, they have, by no means, grasped the idea how hopeless and abortive their endeavours are of ever being able to upset the status quo in Europe in their favour. The immediate reaction of the present rulers of West Germany to their defeat was, on the contrary, an aggravation of the international situation through the blunt refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and a stepped-up arms drive combined with an unbridled anti-Communist campaign. The Bonn government, in close complicity with US-imperialism, attributed crucial significance to the continued extension of the aggressive NATO alliance as the main military means for future interference in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries.

(14) Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn July 18, 1968.

## NATO-Strategy against Peace and Security

At the NATO Council Meeting of November 15 and 16, 1968 which had been prematurely convened in Brussels, the West German and US politicians jointly tried to enforce the aggravated course of intensified

armament, militant anti-Communism and of upsetting the status quo in Europe.

West German war minister Schröder announced in Brussels an additional increase of Bonn's military budget by 2,500 million marks up to 1972 beyond the increase which had already been planned.

The troop strength of the Bundeswehr will, according to Herr Schröder, be strengthened and the fire

power increased. Herr Schröder once again advocated the "forward strategy" which is to be applied against the socialist countries in an "offensive and flexible" manner. He called for a shortening of the period which is stipulated in the operation plans of NATO up to the application of nuclear weapons. If the need arises, "demonstrative nuclear blows" are to be released over the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean.

We should not imagine that these are just figments of the diseased mind of an outsider. This is in fact the attitude of the Bonn government including its Social Democratic ministers. Willy Brandt stated expressly that he fully and completely agrees with Herr Schröder's statements.

Increased costs of rearmament are also to be demanded, to a considerable extent, of the other NATO-partners.

The provision of financial means is to be stipulated at the beginning of the year in the "NATO-Armed Forces Plan for 1969 to 1973."

This means that rearmament is to be accelerated and that the peoples have to foot the bill. To what end? The purpose of it all is indicated in the communiqué of the NATO Council Meeting. Many times reference is made to the events in the CSSR. The tactics of creeping counter-revolution finally failed to lead to success. That is why it is now to be combined obviously more strongly with the methods of threat and blackmail. Over and beyond, the main thrust is directed against the GDR. Bonn has always regarded NATO as the power reserve of its revanchist policy. With the support of the USA, Bonn has once more been able to nail down its NATO-allies to its expansionist policy against the GDR. NATO is to contribute towards the "solution of the German problem", so they say, but of course in the spirit of Bonn's expansionist aspirations. Consequently Bonn causes the representatives of the NATO-States to sign on the dotted line: "Their governments do not recognize the GDR." (15)

(15) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nov. 18, 1968.

## Thousands of Millions for Rearmament

In connection with the aggravation of the aggressive efforts of NATO we must also view the establishment of an international arms trust of the most aggressive monopoly groups supporting NATO. Already in May 1968 the representatives of the armament industries of the NATO countries conducted for the first time, preparatory negotiations.

Subsequently in October 1968, the permanent NATO Council decided to set up the so-called NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), which consists of leading armament trusts. The appointment of its members was to take place still in 1968 so that the first discussion could be held early in 1969.

Each country is allowed to appoint no more than

None of this will deter the GDR from developing her socialist system, from blossoming and burgeoning. But one can nevertheless read black on white in the communiqué that NATO is not, contrary to any asseverations, an alliance for the defence of the NATO countries. To bind oneself not to recognize the GDR and thereby to accept Bonn's pretension to sole representation means to go beyond the limits of NATO and to try and change the status quo. The NATO-states thereby harness themselves to the cart of Bonn's revanchist policy. They fight, certainly some of them reluctantly, against European security under the command of Washington and Bonn.

All the same, the West German imperialists are by no means satisfied with the results of the NATO Council Meeting. Their thinking centres around access to nuclear weapons. In order to be able to threaten and blackmail in the spirit of their policy against the East, they are anxious to have a finger on the trigger of atomic weapons. This aim of Bonn's policy was, among other articles, expressed in the leader written by Adelbert Weinstein in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of November 18, 1968. The author of that article is happy about the "firm language" and the inclusion of Bonn's revanchist aims into the communiqué and adds: "The alliance functions politically." But even after the Brussels resolutions he is not satisfied with the military strength made available for the realization of Bonn's aims.

"NATO" he writes, "has neither direct disposal over atomic weapons nor can it employ a sufficient number of conventional divisions." What hurts him most is the first point: "No European has any influence on political determination which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons."

In this spirit the CDU Party Congress also demanded not only to strengthen NATO as a whole at an accelerated rate but also to create a "European nucleus of NATO." This nucleus is to possess European atomic weapons the employment of which would be essentially decided in Bonn.

four representatives of industry and two government officials. In conformity with the Federal Association of West German Industry (BDI) and the federal government the West German representatives have been appointed. The circle of the concerns in question roughly coincides with the "Committee for Economic Questions of Defence" of the BDI which comprises, among others: the IG-Farben successor concerns, Flick, AEG Telefunken, Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG, Klöckner, Rheinische Stahlwerke, Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke and Deutsche Erdöl AG.

Already during the period of planning, the monopolies are to be included in the strategic and tactical variants, to assert their claims and to mediate their experience. The first exchange of experiences provided NATO, according to reports published on October 15, 1968 in the Düsseldorf *Handelsblatt*, the



mouthpiece of West German big industry, "valuable new ideas out of the treasure house of experiences made particularly by big industry. In this scheme, new knowledge acquired in the USA plays a part."

Such a close link between the imperialist military bloc and the most powerful arms trusts ushers in a new stage. NATO is to obtain immediately an economic basis through the trusts which are most urgently pressing for aggressive aims.

Federal Finance Minister Strauss tries in his book *Challenge and Answer—A Programme for Europe* to justify the intensified war preparations of the Bonn militarists by adducing "scientific" and "national economic" arguments. He maintains that technical-industrial progress has, after all, invariably sprung from a marriage "concluded between the military and natural science."

Onesidedly concerned with the interests of monopoly capital, Strauss adds: "The tremendous financial and intellectual efforts made for military research and development have always paid high dividends for the national economy." (16)

On September 5, 1968 the Bonn Cabinet passed the budget bill for 1969: the budget of the war ministry was increased by 750 million marks to 18,800 million marks." If we add the expenses for the Berlin Aid, (2,560 million marks) to the over-all costs of military

(16) F. J. Strauss, *Herausforderung und Antwort*, *ibid.* p. 159.

and civil defence (19,860 million marks) we arrive at a defence budget of 22,430 million marks or 27.2 per cent of the 1969 federal budget." (17)

The gigantic amount of more 103 thousand million marks is envisaged for the 5 years between 1968 and 1972 for the budget items defence, defence expenditure and civil defence. This amount does not include the likewise rapidly growing expenses for military research and development, particularly in the field of nuclear research and rocketry.

These data are already out of date. Schröder has been granted a warrant ("Reservation clause") to enable him to increase armament expenditure beyond the budget figures at any time. (18)

This increase has already been set into force for 1969. There is talk of 3 thousands million marks, including 2 thousand million for the "currency compensation" and arms purchases in the USA and 1 thousand million for new arms expenditure in West Germany itself. This is exactly the amount which Federal Finance Minister Strauss is taking out of the pockets of the West German consumers as "export tax" in connection with the imperialist currency crisis of November last. A further additional increase for the years 1970-1972 has been promised by Schröder at the NATO Council Meeting in Brussels.

(17) *Die Welt*, Hamburg, Sept. 6, 1968

(18) *Der Tagesspiegel*, West Berlin, Sept. 6, 1968

## Atomic Complicity Outside NATO

The federal government spares no efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons within the NATO alliance. That is why the West German government demands of its NATO partners "equal rights" regarding the possession of and command over these means of mass extermination. In addition, Bonn has for years been intensifying its cooperation with the Israeli and South African atomic industry in order to prepare in this way the starting of its own and joint production of atomic weapons. Thus the representative of West German monopoly capital, former Federal Chancellor Erhard, demonstratively paid a visit during his stay in Israel in November 1967 to the Chaim Weizmann Institute, the scientific centre of West German-Israeli atomic weapons research in Rehovot which is mainly financed by West German monopoly groups including the Fritz Thyssen foundation and the Volkswagen foundation. The research results of this institute are, on a contractual basis, at the disposal of West German nuclear research. CDU Bundestag deputy and special emissary of the federal government in foreign political questions Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, patron of this institute in his capacity as representative of the Thyssen Trust had, by the way, been a well-known SA thug at Jewish pogroms during the Nazi era. However, this has obviously not deterred the present Israeli government from collaborating with the exponents of West German imperialism in preparing new war crimes.

In order to accelerate the joint nuclear research for military purposes the Chaim Weizmann Institute was closely linked with West German Max Planck Institutes of various faculties, including the Max Planck Institute for nuclear physics in Heidelberg. Prof. Gentner, the head of this institute, is at the same time chairman of the German-Israeli "steering committee" which works out research programmes for several years ahead and coordinates and supervises work.

These military highly significant research contracts are, for the sake of camouflage, concluded and implemented not at government level but by "Minerva", subsidiary company of the Max Planck Society for the Promotion of Institutes in other Countries. The *New York Times* reported on March 15, 1965 that the relatively large reactor of Dimona (some 19 miles South-East of Bersheba in the Negev desert) could be used for the production of plutonium for nuclear arms. *Die Welt* of June 3, 1967 commented that Israel would be able to "build missiles with atomic warheads within a relatively short time of 5 to 10 years."

By granting atomic "development aid" to the aggressor state of Israel, West German monopoly capital pursues a two-fold aim: Firstly to camouflage its own atomic ambitions and preparations for an autonomous production of nuclear weapons and secondly because Israel in the Near East and South Africa on the African continent are in the key positions of the neo-colonialist policy of West German and US-imperialism. By way of the aggressor state of Israel and

the fascist racist regime in South Africa, the West German trusts are anxious to increase their pressure against the anti-imperialist national liberation movement of the Arab and African peoples. In addition, South Africa has considerable uranium deposits in the mining of which West German trusts such as Siemens and Krupp are interested for the material safeguarding of their own production of nuclear weapons.

That is why Professor Heinz Goeschel, the director of the Siemens Trusts in charge of atomic matters and at the same time member of the West German Atomic Commission and the Presidium of the Atomic Forum of the West German industry, stayed, early in 1967, in Pretoria in order to negotiate not only on continued collaboration between West Germany and South Africa on the atomic sector but also on the regular supply

of South African uranium for the nuclear reactor in Obrigheim on the Neckar, in the construction of which the Siemens Trust played a major part.

In view of this development the official "South African Digest" of March 23, 1967 thanked the Kiesinger-Strauss government for the "ever closer cooperation" and particularly "for the training of South African nuclear scientists and technologists in West Germany."

All these efforts made by the Kiesinger-Strauss government to gain access to nuclear weapons and to attain power or co-disposal over the employment of these means of mass destruction are in gross contradiction to the aspirations of the peoples and the United Nations Organization for the consolidation of world peace and international security.



# Nuclear Arms Strategy—Basic Element of the Military Concept of the West German Government and the Bundeswehr Command

## The Function of Nuclear Arms in the Military Concept of Bonn

If the power and expansionist policy of the West German Government is generally based on the striving to possess nuclear arms, the nuclear arms strategy forms the basic element of its military concept. It is the core of the official West German war doctrine, in particular of the aggressive "forward-strategy". The nuclear arms strategy in this connection envisages the use of nuclear arms not only in the strategic domain, but also in the operative and even in the tactical sphere.

A. Dalma, a then intimate friend of Strauss, had stated as far back as in May 1964, in the journal *Wehrkunde*, that the Bundeswehr leaders considered the stationing of nuclear arms in (West)Germany, the "participation in deciding and holding responsibility for the elaboration of nuclear defence strategy... and in giving the order to set them off in operation, or maybe even the part-ownership or ownership of nuclear arms to be tasks of primary importance." (19)

In December 1966 war minister Schröder correspondingly demanded a "specific influence on the decision on the release of nuclear arms" and "the nuclear alliance policy (of NATO) by the participation in the elaboration of directives, plans, programmes and procedures concerning the employment of nuclear arms, including the strategic weapons not assigned to the alliance." (20)

The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General U. de Maizière, clearly stated: "Atomic weapons stand in the centre of all strategic, operative and tactical considerations." (21)

In the command instructions of the most important section of the Bundeswehr—the army—which came into force in 1962, these weapons were described as the "most important means of combat in the hands of the military leadership". (22)

In those same Instructions the anticipated aim was mentioned, that "a certain number of nuclear explosives" should be released "for independent use" at all levels, down to the "task force leader" (from the brigade commander upwards). (23)

The details concerning the function of nuclear weapons are determined by the nature of the "forward-strategy", which envisages a broad spectrum of forms of war and escalation. Nuclear arms stand in the centre of all considerations and military planning of the Bundeswehr leaders at all levels. Nuclear arms are assigned the following functional spheres within the framework of that strategy, here to begin with generally outlined:

- nuclear arms are intended to serve Bonn as an instrument of political and military coercion in regard to the Socialist states of Europe in a provoked situation of tension—but also in regard to the NATO partners;
- nuclear arms are regarded by Bonn as the decisive system of weapons for use in a surprise "limited Blitz"-war started against the GDR or other states of the socialist world system in Europe;
- Bonn regards nuclear arms as the "fuse" for releasing the mechanism of military "escalation" and for involving other NATO states in the conflict provoked by Bonn;
- nuclear arms, finally are considered by Bonn as means for a possible participation in a "general strategic atomic blow" by the USA, which would remain "the decisive element, even in the strategy of flexible réponse." (24)

This multiple political and military function of nuclear arms under the management of the politicians of revenge in Bonn and in particular under the command of the generals of the Bundeswehr was indicated in the West German instructions on "Troop Leadership" as follows: "atomic weapons give greater freedom, independence and flexibility to the leadership and thus allow them greater freedom of action. Crises could come about more easily, but could also

(19) A. Dalma "Die Entspannungspolitik in Mitteleuropa" in *Wehrkunde*, Munich, vol. 5, 1964, p. 239

(20) DPA, Dec. 14, 1966

(21) U. de Maizière "Konzeption des Heeres" in *Wehrtechnische Monatshefte* (Frankfurt/Main, vol. 5/6 1965, p. 2)

(22) HDV 100/1, fig. 21

(23) HDV 100/1, fig. 139

(24) NATO-Brief, Cologne, vol. 2, 1968

be dealt with more promptly, since atomic weapons are capable of altering the situation as quickly as lightning owing to their annihilating effect.”(25)

This envisaged function of nuclear arms within the scope of the “forward-strategy” determines the present development of the Bundeswehr as a kind of “multiple-purpose army”. The focal point, now as before, is the “atomic component”. It was entirely in this spirit, that CDU deputy Baron von Wrangel stated in

the West German Federal Parliament on April 4, 1968, that the “atomic component” of the Bundeswehr was the “basis, upon which alone the Federal Republic could conduct its policy at all”. War minister Schröder had previously demanded a “balanced conventional and nuclear armament” for the Bundeswehr, emphasising: “we cannot renounce nuclear carriers.”(26)

(26) Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, No. 69, Bonn, June 30, 1967

(25) HDV 100/1

## “Flexible Reaction” and Nuclear Arms

The nuclear arms strategy of the Bundeswehr leaders was laid down in detail at the end of 1967 within the framework of the NATO-Directive MC 14/3 for the coming five years, up to 1972.

That Directive replaced the document MC 70—adopted in 1956 and several times modified since then—and the unofficial strategic document MC 100/1 of 1964. In this way the American and West German representatives managed to enforce in the NATO the strategic concept for Europe—the “flexible reaction”—which at present corresponds to the American global strategy. This strategic concept represents an attempt to get out of the retreat situation, in which imperialism has been placed as a result of the changed international balance of power, by means of more variable forms and more many-sided methods of military aggression. The socialist states are to be defeated gradually and in parts, following a corresponding political and “psychological” preliminary campaign, without the need for the imperialist states to anticipate the risk of a general nuclear rocket war. The communiqué of the NATO Conference in Brussels ambiguously states under fig. 12: “This concept, by which the strategy of NATO is adapted to the present political, military and technological developments, is based on a flexible and balanced scale of appropriate conventional and nuclear reactions”, to be applied “in the spirit of the forward-defence”.(27) This concept of military strategy of NATO, above all permeated with West German ideas, is characterized by two essential features.

Firstly it envisages the preparation and conduct of wars in Central and Eastern Europe, with many variants. The scale ranges from the provocation of “crises”, “preliminary periods of warning”, to the technique of unleashing war, up to the planned military escalation. This comprises the stepladder from the demonstration of military power—recently also of nuclear military power—to a war which, to begin with is to be “a limited conventional war”—which might in certain circumstances be a “dead pledge operation”—up to the “limited atomic” and finally the “general

nuclear rocket war”. In conformity with the West German “forward strategy”, particular value is attributed to the preparation of a limited conventional Blitz-war and its rapid extension by means of “selective” employment of nuclear arms. That is the military component of the sole representation claim of Bonn and the “new eastern policy”.

Secondly—above all—the document MC 14/3 in essence took into consideration the demands of the Bundeswehr leaders concerning the use of nuclear arms. This is reflected in the three established phases of military escalation.

Accordingly, conventional forces are at first to conduct attacks at points of concentration during the *first phase*, which may be preceded by individual “nuclear demonstrative blows”. The conventional phase of escalation is stated not “altogether to exclude the ‘selective’, i.e. the dosed use of atomic weapons”.

The *second phase* comprises the “‘conscious escalation’, the previously planned blows with tactical nuclear arms, programmed in detail” against targets in the Socialist states—in particular on the territory of the GDR.

The *third phase*, finally, contains the “general atomic blow, which would introduce a nuclear war of greater dimensions”(28).

The military leaders in Bonn above all interpreted this plan of phased escalation in the spirit of their ideas on the nuclear arms strategy in Europe. This concerned their demand, that nuclear arms should not be used as late as in the second phase of the escalation. In a West German press report it was stated in this connection, that even during the first phase “atomic weapons might be chosen. This was expressly mentioned in the texts, thanks to the effort made by the Federal Minister of Defence, Schröder, at the NATO Conference”.(29) They associated a further demand, raised for many years, with the latter: the lowering of the “atomic threshold”—i.e. the use of nuclear arms at an early stage. Brigadier General Schmückle bluntly stated that the “simplest solution” would be the “lowering of the nuclear threshold”.(30)

(28) *Die Welt*, Hamburg, Dec. 14, 1967

(29) *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Feb. 13, 1968

(30) *Wehrkunde*, Munich, vol. 11, 1967, p. 564

(27) *ibid.* No. 149, Dec. 16, 1967



The Bundeswehr leaders are clearly concerned in the first place to ensure, that the first phase of the escalation, which corresponds to their ideas of a "local representative war", should not exclusively be confined to conventional offensive operations, but that the possibility should also be given for a "local atomic representative war". In other words, the West German point of view was for the most part imposed in regard to the further revalorisation of the "local" atomic surprise attack by leaving open the "choice of weapons" and the possibility of the use of nuclear arms at an early stage. Analyses of recent NATO and Bundeswehr manoeuvres showed that tactical nuclear arms are to be used as a rule by not later than three days after the beginning of a local war of aggression. Summing up, war minister Schröder concluded: "Scaring, flexible reaction and forward defence (forward strategy—the Ed.) are the foundations of our strategic concept. This coincides with the strategic concept of NATO". (31)

## The Next Step: A Greater Share in Nuclear Arms Control

The Bundeswehr leaders are now basing increased demands for participating in the decision of the nuclear strategy and in the control of American nuclear warheads already stored in West Germany, on the military strategy of NATO. The detailed demands of this indirect way to the control of nuclear arms had already been outlined in March 1966 by the previous West German war minister von Hassel:

"What we want is an early, a continuous, an active participation in the process of planning . . . that we should be able to participate in formulating the basic principles of the planned objectives, including the determination of priorities; that we should be able to participate in formulating the basic principles of the process of determining the specific objectives of the different armament systems; that we should take part in establishing the principles governing the choice of targets for selective operations and in deciding on the use of nuclear arms altogether. This comprises the criteria on the questions whether (nuclear) arms are to be used, when they are to be used, how they are to be used and what they are to be used with." (32)

The fact that the militarists in Bonn were quite obviously thinking of war—namely of the first phase of their expansionist programme—the liquidation by force of the GDR—was revealed by Springer's paper *Die Welt* of December 13, 1967:

"In this connection it is of great significance for the federal government, that it should be able to participate in the decisions concerning the use of atomic weapons from German territory and on

It cannot be overlooked that this concept of military strategy, here only briefly outlined, directly fits in with the global strategy of the USA and the corresponding "Concept for Europe" of the West German government. This concept is to ensure the freedom of action necessary for changing the status quo by means of military force to the advantage of West German monopoly capitalism, using nuclear arms in a war unleashed in Europe on the basis of manipulated 'crises', in a general political climate considered by imperialism to be favourable—as Schröder put it. It is obvious that a concept of this kind—regardless of its unrealistic nature and the speculative initial values—must increase the danger of war on our continent. It is clear, that this danger would increase considerably, if the generals in Bonn were to succeed in obtaining possession of tactical nuclear arms.

(31) Bulletin of the Press and Information office of the Federal Government, No. 69, Bonn, June 30, 1967

German territory." That intention was revealed even more clearly by Kiesinger's leading expert on military policy in the Federal Chancery, K. Seemann. He demanded in connection with the use of tactical atomic weapons, that "the battlefield should be sought on the territory of the adversary". (33)

This offers some kind of a survey of the plans of the West German militarists in the event that they should succeed in obtaining *direct* control of their own nuclear arms. It is at least the same which they wish to achieve even today, by means of the *indirect* participation in control—even in the face of resistance on the part of individual NATO partners.

The Bundeswehr leaders are concerned, from the military point of view about:

- 1 – the possibility to participate in decisions on the selection of targets, the fixing of targets and the strength of detonation for nuclear arms attacks in Central and Eastern Europe—both for 'demonstrative blows' and for 'programmed blows';
- 2 – to participate in decisions concerning the time and sequence of the nuclear arms attacks;
- 3 – releasing the 'escalation rhythm' for a nuclear war and thereby shortening that rhythm;
- 4 – keeping the 'atomic threshold' in Europe low—in certain conditions even at zero for the 'hour X'.

With a view to coming closer to the attainment of these aims, the Bundeswehr leaders are striving for the occupation of further operative key positions in NATO staffs by generals and officers of the Bundeswehr. They are demanding that the USA should shorten the transfer process of American nuclear ammunition to the approximately 850 carrier means available in the Bundeswehr, and to change the 'two-key system' in favour of the direct control of the depot by the Bundeswehr. Finally they have envisaged in

(32) Interview with the Hessian radio on March, 1966

(33) *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, Frankfurt/Main, vol. 2, 1967, p. 69



their "Plan C", covering the period up to 1972 for the increased readiness of the Bundeswehr for aggression, that the Bundeswehr should be entirely equipped with modern nuclear arms carriers of all tactical and operative categories.

War minister Schröder emphatically underlined, speaking in the Federal Parliament, the principle of the direct participation of the Bundeswehr in the 'tactical atomic forces' of the coalition, confirmed by the NATO Council: "The (West) German forces, having the same mission in the same operative region, should be equipped with the same weapons as the allied troops. The presence of American troops in (West) Germany and the storage of atomic weapons on (West) German territory (a considerable percentage of the 8,000 American nuclear warheads deposited in Western Europe are there—the publisher) ensures the timely transfer of the atomic explosives to these carriers." (34)

### Three Ways to Nuclear Arms

Just as the previous West German governments, the Kiesinger-Strauss government too is following the course of three ways to the independent control of nuclear arms, already introduced in 1958/59: the indirect way through the use of nuclear arms by NATO; the indirect course in the direction of a "Western European nuclear force", and the direct way of the inland production of nuclear arms and the corresponding carriers.

In the process of advancing in the direction of control over nuclear arms along three parallel ways, the NATO-way—i.e. the attempt of arriving at a faster solution via the development of the axis Bonn-Washington—had priority up to the middle of the Sixties. With the accession of the Kiesinger-Strauss government and the transition to an intensified expansionist policy, accents were shifted. The most extreme group of West German monopoly capitalism now started to advance along a broad front, in alliance with the generals.

On the one hand they continued their endeavours to achieve success by the NATO-way, integrating their policy of revenge and military strategy in the American global strategy. On the other hand the existing Non-proliferation Treaty stands in their way. They managed nevertheless to ensure their influence on NATO and US nuclear arms strategy also institutionally, by means of the formation of the "Nuclear Planning Group", the permanent members of which are the West German War Minister and the Inspector General of the Bundeswehr with a corresponding special staff.

The *Bonner Rundschau* triumphantly commented on November 29, 1965, following the foundation meeting of the group: "The Federal Republic has set a foot into the door to the sacrosanct domain of NATO

At the present time however the Bundeswehr leaders are more interested than ever in not only influencing the nuclear arms strategy of NATO in the spirit of their aggressive military concept and war-doctrine and in integrating their ideas on the conduct of war into the concept of military strategy of "flexible reaction". They are also not content any longer with only participation in strategic decisions and participation in control of American nuclear ammunition. They are striving for the possession of their own nuclear arms within the near future. The previous war minister von Hassel had already indicated this plainly, stating that only "the physical share in the possession of nuclear arms could in the long run lead to a participation (in the nuclear planning of NATO—the Ed.)" (35)

(34) Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, No. 143, Bonn, Dec. 7, 1967

(35) *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Munich, Dec. 16, 1966

since last week-end, namely into the bureau, where the strictly secret Atlantic nuclear strategy is being worked out." After the "foot had been set into the door", the room was entered. At the meeting in the Hague in April 1968 the next move was made. The West German press wrote about the "advances made so far in the nuclear planning of the Alliance": West Germany had the decisive say in questions concerning the "possible use of atomic mines, on the participation of the European NATO countries in US-nuclear planning and in the new concept of the tactical operation of nuclear arms." (36)

Bonn's NATO-way to nuclear arms is thus being systematically continued. The West German government succeeded in obtaining an influence on the participation in the planning and decision of strategy, although the USA government had up to the present not agreed to authorising the NATO Commander-in-Chief to decide on the use of tactical nuclear arms.

The second Western European way to nuclear weapons has certainly been attributed a greater significance by the Kiesinger-Strauss government within the framework of their "Concept for Europe". Strauss himself clearly underlined: "I have never left any doubt about the fact, that I would welcome as a long-term aim the establishment of a European nuclear striking force." (37)

The way to a strategic nuclear arms potential is the long-term solution calculated by Strauss and the extremist imperialist forces that stand behind him; it is ultimately aimed at the establishment of a "third Great Power" in the world besides the USA, in the shape of a political, economic and military Union of Western Europe—an "atomic Western Europe". This "Third Power" is to materialize the expansionist programme of Bonn under West German imperialist leadership and with the aid of a "European atomic

(36) DPA, Apr. 17, 1968

(37) *Der Spiegel*, Homburg, No. 1/2 1967, p. 30

forward strategy" on the basis of a "European armament pool".

These facts prove that the activity of West German imperialism and militarism with the aim of obtaining strategic nuclear arms by the "European-way" has greatly increased under the Kiesinger-Strauss government.

The third way of Bonn to nuclear weapons—inland production—had been taken since a very early stage—at least since the coming into force of the Paris Agreements (1955), carefully camouflaged and comparatively independent of the others, in a continuous process. The speed however was increased consider-

ably with the transition of the West German regime to a comprehensive expansionist course, as from 1963/64.

The then Foreign Minister, Schröder, stated in July 1965 in the obvious tone of an extortioner, that West Germany would "acquire its own nuclear arms", unless a NATO solution was soon brought about.<sup>(38)</sup> The measures undertaken in view of the inland production of nuclear weapons since then have confirmed Schröder's threat, directed in the first place to the address of Bonn's western allies.

(38) Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, July 9, 1965

## Consequences

Which consequences could arise under the aspects of military policy and military strategy, out of the possession by Bonn, to begin with of tactical nuclear arms of its own production, after the Bundeswehr already disposes over tactical and operative carriers?

1. To start with it should be noted, that West German imperialism would not be in a position to bring about any fundamental change in the balance of power in the world to its own advantage, even by such a considerable strengthening of its military power. This not only applies in view of the superior military strength of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty states. The production of nuclear arms in West Germany would undoubtedly result in a renewed sharpening of the imperialist contradictions on a higher level, above all within NATO. The struggle for hegemony in Western Europe would be continued with greater intensity. The resistance of the peoples against West German militarism equipped with nuclear arms would also be considerably reinforced.

2. This development would nevertheless considerably increase the danger of war in Europe. A new situation would come about in West Germany and Western Europe: in the striving of West German imperialism for hegemony, in its desire for total dictatorial power in the West German Federal Republic, and in the extent and speed of its war preparations.

a) West Germany as the most powerful conventional military power in Western Europe and as an atomic power would greatly intensify the struggle for hegemony, in alliance with the USA, by means of the nuclear coercion of its partners—in particular of the smaller NATO states. NATO could become a functional organ of American-West German complicity and be quite possibly more subordinated to the American global strategy.

b) West Germany with the status of an atomic power would add to the weight of the extremist imperialist groups around Strauss in home policy. Renazification, emergency legislation and the possession of nuclear arms would be utilized by those elements for the accelerated creation of the

conditions in the interior for intensified war preparations.

c) the aggressiveness of the West German state would be given a great impulse by the combination of territorial demands, in particular on the Socialist states, with the atomic potential. The West German plan for a systematic political and military escalation, coupled with psychological warfare against the GDR and other Socialist states of Europe would receive further dangerous accents.

d) the position of Bonn in the struggle for its long-term "Concept for Europe" could finally be further consolidated. The powerful economic potential of Bonn would be reinforced by the possession of nuclear arms and be effectively completed from the military point of view. Its course in the direction of an independent "European NATO Column" under West German leadership, with its own nuclear arms potential would be accelerated, and the political and military objectives would become even more ambitious.

3. The military strategical consequences possibly arising from the possession of nuclear arms, fully controlled by the West German regime, would mean, that:

a) the war doctrine of the West German state and the Bundeswehr leaders, which has been given priority, would be strengthened by their own nuclear arms systems. This would give them even greater possibilities for imposing their military strategic principles within NATO. These include, for example, the lowering or even elimination of the "atomic threshold" making it possible to lead an atomic Blitz-war, the shortening and at the same time the limitation of the "atomic escalation rhythm", the accordance, envisaged in document HDV 100/1, of the operational competence for tactical nuclear arms to all commands down to brigade level, and the stationing of nuclear arms near the frontiers of the GDR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

b) West German nuclear arms as an immediate military counterpart to intensified psychological warfare against the GDR and other Socialist



states in Europe could be used for stepping up the expected disintegrating effect and the tension to "demonstrative blows" through atomic threats and attempts at coercion. Thus in document HDV 100/1 it is stated that "nuclear arms influence warfare even though they might not be used. By their very presence they constitute a constant threat." (39)

c) West German nuclear weapons could under certain circumstances be available as means for a nuclear surprise attack in a "local nuclear war". The West German military leaders might, in their irresponsible adventurism be induced to unleash a so-called representative war as an "atomic dead pledge undertaking" in the illusion of evading the phase of the strategic use of nuclear arms.

d) West German nuclear arms might be used as the most powerful "fuse" for unleashing a war, and as a means of unleashing the "nuclear phase" of the escalation cycle. Thus document HDV 100/1, fig. 97 states that "a sudden transition from non-nuclear to nuclear warfare should always be expected".

e) West German nuclear arms might be misused as an instrument for releasing the NATO coalition mechanism. The military expert A. Dalma, previously mentioned, had written in this connection in 1965 "that national nuclear arms in the possession of second or third-class powers..." were keeping the chance open that "in the event of a serious conflict the nuclear intervention of the allied super power might be released." A West German nuclear potential would allow the exercise of a "political influence on the decisions and planning of the super powers". (40) The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* commented in December of the same year: "The possession of nuclear arms could be decisive for moves on the political chess-board. An atomic power is capable—in contrast to a non-nuclear power—of influencing the Great Powers according to its own wishes. One nuclear blow—or the threat of it—will set the Great Powers in motion. This in the ultimate consequence means nothing other than the intention of Bonn to ensure the backing of the strategic nuclear arms potential of the USA for a military escalation, at first, up to the stage of a "local nuclear war".

Furthermore the intention might be materialized to provoke a strategic nuclear attack by NATO to cover a West German or NATO aggression.

f) West German nuclear arms could be made available for the participation of the Bundeswehr in a general nuclear war.

All this would give further dangerous features to the aggressive "forward policy and strategy" of West German imperialism. The adventurous concept of the Bundeswehr leaders, envisaging a series of atomic Blitz campaigns against the Socialist states would be further emphasized in its significance. The conventional phase of programmed escalation would partly or wholly be replaced by the immediate transition to atomic warfare. The cycle of aggression, envisaged in the "Concept for Europe", comprising, to begin with, a comparatively long-term phase of "indirect strategy" in the shape of the "flexible eastern policy" and psychological warfare, would even more plainly and rapidly be re-orientated to a "direct strategy", i.e. to an open armed conflict.

The military and military strategical consequences of the possession of nuclear arms by Bonn, outlined above, would certainly contribute not only to the increase of tensions in Europe. The "Concept for Europe" of West German imperialism reinforced in this way would increasingly become an activating element of American global strategy.

4. The Socialist states of Europe would see themselves obliged to draw timely consequences from such developments. At the 5th session of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the GDR stated in this connection:

"This development confirms the statement made by the member states of the Warsaw Treaty in Bucarest in 1966, that all efforts would have to be directed towards excluding the possibility of the West German Federal Republic obtaining access to nuclear arms. This is also required by the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, which stipulate the liquidation of German imperialism and militarism and the ensurance that these forces should never again be able to plunge the world into a renewed war. The prevention of access to nuclear arms by the West German Federal Republic has not only become a most urgent demand; it is at present also well possible to implement this demand." (41)

(39) HDV 100/1 fig. 9

(40) *Wehrkunde*, Munich, vol. 1, 1965, p. 3

(41) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Mar. 22, 1968



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# Stop the Successors of the Hitler Reich from Obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction— Command of International Law

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## International Duty to Limit Arms

The remilitarization of West Germany and the striving of the Bonn government to possess or control atomic weapons not only contradicts the vital interests of other nations in a political sense, but is a gross violation of a number of international agreements—above all of the Agreement signed on August 2, 1945 by the USSR, the USA and Great Britain in Potsdam and later by France as the fourth of the main powers in the anti-Hitler coalition. Both German states are legally bound by this Agreement:

- firstly, because Germany was made responsible and liable by an international court of law for breaking international law before and during World War II,
- secondly, because in the Potsdam Agreement the Big Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition defined this responsibility in concrete form.

The Potsdam Agreement could not be signed by the two German states because they did not exist in 1945. However, this makes the Agreement no less binding for both German states as its principles were determined by conditions which Germany had created during World War II.

The basic idea underlying the Potsdam Agreement is that German militarism and fascism must be liquidated forever: "The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated."<sup>(42)</sup> This is unequivocal and can only be interpreted in this way: Neither in 1945, at the time when the German Reich was defeated and the German state ceased to be a subject of international law nor at a later date—when the German people will, once again, have created their own state organs—should militarism or fascism ever again raise its ugly head.

Militarily, this declaration meant that all fascist armed forces and military installations in Germany were abolished.<sup>(43)</sup> Applied to the later situation,

when the two German states came into existence, this declaration means that any remilitarization, any armament over and above the needs of a legitimate defence must be banned. Needless to say, both German states have a right to individual and collective self-defence as was recognized in the Soviet drafts of a Peace Treaty submitted in 1952 and 1959.

So the logical consequence is that the successor states of the German Reich must, of necessity, have their arms limited to at least the same extent as the arms limitation imposed on the former allies of Hitler Germany (for example in the Peace Treaties concluded on February 10, 1947 between the anti-Hitler coalition powers and Hitler's former allies; see Article 46 to 70 of the Peace Treaty with Italy and the State Treaty with Austria).

Through these Treaties the principle of arms limitation has become the general principle of a peace settlement between these groups of states. The fact that a German Peace Treaty has not yet been signed, does not mean that the two German states are not duty-bound to limit arms. International responsibilities do not arise from treaties, but from violations of international law by one subject of international law. (Subjects of international law are actually existing states—in this case the former German Reich and now its two successor states.) International law agreements—such as the Potsdam Agreement and peace treaties—are nothing more than the concrete forms in which international responsibility has been put into exact terms. So West Germany, as one of the two successor states of the former German Reich is still duty-bound by international law to limit arms, analogous to the regulations of the Peace Treaties mentioned above and the State Treaty with Austria, even if West Germany has so far succeeded in preventing a German Peace Treaty. The duty of the West German Federal Republic—and this, of course, applies also to the GDR—to limit arms extends to three basic elements:

1. a complete ban on weapons of mass destruction (A-B-C-weapons)
2. complete ban on very heavy conventional offensive weapons

(42) "The Potsdam Agreement" in Official Gazette of the Central Council for Germany, Supplement No. 1, p. 23

(43) *ibid.* p. 24



UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY



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RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/7016/Add.1)]

2373 (XXII). Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2346 A (XXII) of 19 December 1967, 2153 A (XXI) of 17 November 1966, 2149 (XXI) of 4 November 1966, 2028 (XX) of 19 November 1965, and 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961,

Convinced of the urgency and great importance of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and of intensifying international co-operation in the development of peaceful applications of atomic energy,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, dated 14 March 1968,<sup>1/</sup> and appreciative of the work of the Committee on the elaboration of the draft non-proliferation treaty, which is attached to that report,<sup>2/</sup>

Convinced that, pursuant to the provisions of the treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes,

Convinced further that an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim,

<sup>1/</sup> A/7072.

<sup>2/</sup> Ibid., annex I.



Affirming that in the interest of international peace and security both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States carry the responsibility of acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations that the sovereign equality of all States shall be respected, that the threat or use of force in international relations shall be refrained from and that international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means,

1. Commends the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;
2. Requests the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;
3. Expresses the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States;
4. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;
5. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to report on the progress of its work to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session.

1672nd plenary meeting,  
12 June 1968.

#### ANNEX

##### Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,



3. limitation in quantity of the armed forces and non-banned weapons.

*International law as at present accepted lays down that the West German Federal Republic has no right to possess or gain control over nuclear and rocket weapons. So West Germany is not allowed to produce such weapons on its own territory or outside the Federal Republic in cooperation with other powers, nor to acquire them anywhere or gain control over*

### **Bonn's "Voluntary" Renunciation— a Trick to By-Pass International Law**

As West Germany still stood at the beginning of its nuclear industry, the addenda and amendments to the Brussels Treaty—later known as the West European Union (WEU) Treaty—laying down that the Bonn government would not produce atomic weapons or plants exclusively intended for the production of such weapons were not of particular importance for the West German imperialists. At the time it was far more important for them to get rid of the stringent limitations on the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes, for only then could they build their own nuclear industry at all.

Protocol No. III of the WEU Treaty does not mention the possibility of revising the ban on the production of atomic weapons. This ban can only be lifted by a unanimous vote of all parties to change the Protocol No. III (Art. 1 and Annex I).

Up to now, the West German imperialists have refrained from even attempting to apply to the WEU Council for a revision of the production ban.

However, they consider the Protocol III on the arms control of the WEU, despite all demagoguery about their "voluntary renunciation", as a discrimination against

them in any shape or form. That goes much further than what the former Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared valid for West Germany (not to produce ABC weapons in West Germany) when he signed the Paris Treaties. Adenauer's declaration was deliberately formulated vaguely so that the question of acquisition and control over nuclear weapons was left open so as to be able to get hold of them at a later date after the planned remilitarization.

them and they see the ban on the production of atomic weapons as a factor hindering their adventurous plans for war and revenge.

The West German imperialists have become more and more open and insolent in their demand to remove these "discriminations".

As early as August 27, 1965, the chairman of the Christian-Social Party (CSU), Franz Josef Strauss, in an interview with the Düsseldorf newspaper *Mittag*, declared that the Federal Republic had "renounced" the production of nuclear weapons in 1952 and 1954 under the political, strategic and technical conditions of the time: "Every renunciation is made on the condition that from time to time it is reviewed to see whether the conditions which applied then, are still valid."

At the same time, Strauss recalls "the changes in the atomic field since 1954".(44) However, West Germany's duties on disarmament under international law do not have their legal basis in their unilateral declarations (like that of Konrad Adenauer in 1954), but in the international responsibility of the former German Reich. The Federal Republic, as a successor state, cannot free itself of this responsibility either by unilateral actions or by juridical subterfuges.

(44) Associated Press, Aug. 28, 1964

### **International Law Demands: Bonn Must Sign the Non-proliferation Treaty**

Through its attempts to gain possession or control of nuclear weapons, the government of the West German Federal Republic does everything in its power to avoid signing the Non-proliferation Treaty, although this Treaty would not place any new obligations on it, but only reconfirm its present obligations. By opposing the Non-proliferation Treaty, the Federal Republic places itself in contradiction to the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty accepted by over 100 countries and even signed by the Bonn government itself. In the preamble of the Treaty, which has the same legal validity as the stipulations of the treaty, the signatories proclaim that their "main aim is to bring about a treaty on general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible under strict international control, in accordance with

the aims of the United Nations Organization". So the signatories of the *Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty* took on themselves a duty before international law, to bring about a treaty on general and complete disarmament as quickly as possible. This means—in so far as general and complete disarmament is not begun immediately—that each of the signatory states is obligated by international law to carry out measures which would stop the arms race and create better conditions in which general and complete disarmament could take place. By refusing to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty, the West German government is sabotaging such measures.

*West Germany's attempts to gain control over nuclear weapons is not in line with the aims of the Moscow treaty, but, on the contrary, makes it more difficult to carry them out.*

There can be no doubt that Bonn's nuclear ambitions are not only an impediment to general and complete disarmament, but can even make this impos-

sible for a long time to come. The history of German imperialism proves that this reactionary system will never be prepared to give up any modern offensive weapons once they have acquired them.

It is no coincidence that during the negotiations on a Non-proliferation Treaty, the West German monopolies' desire to prepare and take up their own production of atomic weapons became more and more obvious. Between the two World Wars, these forces showed that they always use developments of science and technology for preparing a new war to gain domination over Europe and the whole world. As it was too difficult to camouflage the production of secret weapons, banned by the Versailles Treaty, within Germany itself, German rearmament and research work on sophisticated weapons was done abroad. During the Weimar Republic pseudo-firms in other countries began German rearmament in U-boat and aeroplane production.

The successor concerns, and in part, the same people who rearmed Germany in the past, today are behind the hypocritical official West German declarations emphasizing the need for the free development of West German research and industrial potential in the fields of nuclear energy and engineering. West German monopolies use the excuse of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to search for new paths leading to nuclear weapons. Dynamit-Nobel which belongs to the Flick group wants to contribute 10 per cent to an undertaking of American and West European firms which use "atomic explosions for oil prospecting and water-ways".(45)

Today, the West German rulers use the same tactics as Hitler applied to back out of the post-war obliga-

tions to limit arms: When the draft of the West German CDU programme, adopted in December, 1967, states, "the CDU strictly opposes discriminating disarmament and arms control" this is comparable to Hitler's attitude when he rejected a treaty on complete disarmament on May 17, 1933: "Under no circumstances will the German people be pressed into signing, because it would mean perpetuating Germany's disqualification."(46) The West German CDU programme declares that it wants to "bring about conditions for a lasting peace . . . while maintaining its own rights". And this "right" is nothing more than the demand for atomic weapons. It is similar to the declaration made by the first Nazi Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, on December 17, 1934: "We lay claim to equality in the field of armament to secure peace and ourselves act as an effective factor for peace in Europe."(47) Nazi Germany left the World Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in 1933 because they did not fulfil its demands for rearmament quickly and comprehensively enough. Today, the West German government refuses to even enter the United Nations Organization because it fears this will jeopardize its aggressive aims.

In view of the obvious and undeniable signs of multifold and comprehensive West German preparations for nuclear weapons production, it lies in the interests of world peace and particularly in the interests of the people in both German states to expose the web of lies woven by the West German imperialists and militarists and, once and for all, prevent another war starting from German soil.

(46) Verhandlungen des Reichstages, 8th legislative period 1933, Berlin, vol. 457, p. 50

(47) Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, vol. 2, Berlin 1935, p. 96

(45) Frankfurter Rundschau, Dec. 30, 1967

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# Nuclear Power Stations— Arms Potential— Nuclear Weapons

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## How a Legend Arose

The West German imperialists claim that nuclear industry and research serve "only peaceful purposes" in West Germany. Referring to the Paris Treaties they deny that this important branch of industry has been militarized. They put militarization on a par with nuclear arms production and so try to divert attention from the fact that they are systematically creating a nuclear arms potential.

However, militarization of the economy is not identical with arms production. "Militarizing the economy does not only mean producing arms. The sums spent on science, particularly research, on the so-called infra-structure, particularly territorial planning and road-building, are also allocated from a military viewpoint." (48)

This also applies today to the construction of the West German nuclear industry.

The Soviet government's declaration of January 28, 1967 on neo-nazi developments in West Germany states: "The militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany try to camouflage the fact that they are carrying on intense military work in the fields of nuclear, rocket and space technology by speaking of the need to 'keep up with technical progress' and misuse the close links between the possibilities for peaceful or military purposes in these fields." (49)

The liberal West German newspaper *Die Zeit* quite

rightly describes the government expenditure on the West German atomic energy scheme as "defence expenditure in the broader sense of the term". (50)

The double character of the nuclear industry is shown, for example, by the fact that every nuclear power station, apart from nuclear energy, also produces a certain amount of plutonium which can be used as the nuclear explosive of an atom bomb. When the uranium fuel element in the reactor is exposed to radiation, the fissionable material, plutonium 239 is formed. If the radiation is continued for a long time (high burn-up), which is the case if one wants to produce cheap electricity because of the shorter fuel cycle, the non-fissionable plutonium 240 is created. A too large percentage (more than 6 %) of plutonium 240 in the plutonium isotope mixture makes it impossible to use it directly as nuclear explosive. So when producing so-called bomb-clean plutonium, the uranium fuel elements have to be changed more often than when making cheap electricity. The burn-up has to be so small that the share of fissionable material (plutonium 239) in the plutonium isotope mixture must be not only 60 % to 80 % (as is the case when the reactor is used for civil purposes), but at least 94 %.

The slim border-line between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy makes it possible for the West German imperialists to create an atomic arms potential by formally keeping to the Paris Treaties and the West German Atom Law. In addition, it gives the revenge-seekers in Bonn an opportunity to hide the true use being made of their nuclear plants.

(48) Offener Brief des ZK der SED und die Antwort der SPD, Berlin 1966, p. 22

(49) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Jan. 29, 1967

(50) *Die Zeit*, Hamburg, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 27

## The Real Plans and Purposes

The West German imperialists are being highly demagogic when they deny that the West German nuclear industry is militarized referring to the ban contained in the Paris Treaties and the stipulation to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only found in the West German Atom Law. Particularly the events at the time when the Federal Atom Law was passed,

expose the legend about the development of the West German atomic industry and research "only for peaceful purposes".

On February 2, 1957, the Bonn government introduced a Bill amending the Constitution and another on the Production and Use of Nuclear Energy and the Protection from its Dangers (Atom Law) for its first reading. The amendment of the Constitution was necessary to grant the Federal Parliament the right of



concurrent legislation in this field. However, both Bills strictly avoided limiting the production and use of atomic energy to peaceful purposes only.

The Bill amending the Constitution was passed over to the Committee for Laws and Constitutional Law, while the Atom Law Bill was submitted to the Committee for Nuclear Matters.

After the first reading, resistance against Bonn's strivings to arm the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons became stronger. After Konrad Adenauer, then Federal Chancellor, belittled the destructive capacity of tactical atomic weapons at a press conference on April 5, 1957 describing them as a further developed artillery weapon, 18 prominent West German atomic scientists issued the "Göttingen Appeal" proclaiming that they would refuse to participate in any way in the production, testing or use of nuclear weapons. The 18 included Nobel Prize Winners Max von Laue, Werner Heisenberg, Otto Hahn and Max Born.

The *Wehrtechnische Monatshefte*, a journal brought out by the militarist Working Group for Military Technique and sponsored by the Defence Ministry, admitted frankly that the rulers in Bonn had set their minds on creating conditions for nuclear weapons production right from the beginning.

"We do not want to leave any doubts that we deeply regret this attitude. We need the work of the German nuclear physicists to solve scientific problems which are of the greatest significance ... for our defence and the security of the West." (51)

Despite the appeal of the 18 professors, the West German government found prominent atomic scientists who were willing to help develop atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. Today, as in the past under Hitler, there are scientists who irresponsibly and sometimes consciously support the great power politics of German imperialism.

The attitude of the Göttingen atomic scientists had a positive influence on the committees working on the two Bills.

The Committee for Law and Constitutional Law decided to add the words "for peaceful purposes" to the amendment of the Constitution. (52)

The Committee for Nuclear Matters decided to replace the words "production and use of atomic energy" in the heading, with the words "peaceful application of atomic energy". (53)

When the Bills were put to the vote, the Free Democrats opposed them because they advocated a Federal Institution for Nuclear Energy with its own executive and not, as the amendment laid down, administrative rights for the *Länder*. The groups behind the FDP hoped for more influence on development in the atomic industry through such a solution.

However, decisive for the vote was the fact that 44 CDU and CSU MPs abstained and many others from these two parties did not even attend the session. Of the Bonn cabinet, only the builder of concentration

camps, Heinrich Lübke, then Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forests and now the West German President, took part in the session, but abstained. Siegfried Balke, then Federal Minister for Atomic Questions and now president of the "Federal Association of German Employers", had taken his seat on the government bench, but was then the only cabinet minister who was not a member of parliament. The four DP (FVP) ministers, Franz Blücher, Hans-Joachim von Merkatz, Hans-Christoph Seeborn and Victor-Emanuel Preusker did not take part in the vote although the whole DP (FVP) parliamentary group voted in favour of the amendment. So obviously, either the cabinet had made a corresponding decision or Adenauer had given instructions on the attitude that cabinet members should take during the vote. And the chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group at the time, Heinrich Krone, left no doubts that this attitude had political motives."

"Our reservations", he declared, "are based above all on the fact that the explanatory preamble to the two Bills contains formulations which go far beyond what is good for German security." (54)

Before him, the now deceased deputy SPD chairman, Wilhelm Mellies, told the CDU/CSU: "The remark from your ranks that the chancellor feels this amendment of the Constitution might be detrimental to NATO shows that you are obviously not only prepared to equip the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, but also considering how to open the road to atomic weapons production in the Federal Republic." (55)

Even the journal of the atom concerns, *Atomenergie*, admitted that there are reservations in government circles "about embodying in the constitution the renunciation of atomic weapon production as laid down in the treaty (Paris Treaties-Ed.)." (56)

That was the main reason why a Federal Atom Law on the peaceful use of nuclear energy was prevented in the year 1957. This is not altered by the fact that the amendment of the Constitution and the Atom Bill were passed with the same stipulations on the peaceful application of nuclear energy were passed by the Bundestag on December 3, 1959. In the meantime, the CDU and CSU had formed the opinion that the disputed wording "for peaceful purposes" would not exclude future military use of nuclear power. In addition, it would calm the protests at home and abroad to equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, decided in the Bundestag on March 25, 1958; it would keep up the legend of a development of West German atomic industry and research "for peaceful purposes only", a legend which had lost much of its credibility through the attitude adopted by the Bonn government and the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in 1957.

The West German imperialists are still trying to mislead the West German people and the world with this legend. It is therefore very revealing and useful to recall the events of the year 1957.

(51) *Wehrtechnische Monatshefte*, Frankfurt/Main, No. 5, 1957, p. 173

(52) Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn, 2nd legislative period, Drucksache 3416

(53) *ibid.* Drucksache 3502

(54) *ibid.* 221. Sitzung, p. 13045

(55) *ibid.* p. 13044

(56) *Atomenergie*, Munich, No. 1, 1958, p. 37

## Increased Efforts for Home Production of Carriers

Closely linked to the West German monopoly bourgeoisie's striving to produce nuclear weapons, is the stepped-up production of carriers (rockets) for these weapons. The (West) German Commission for Space Research is the centre for the development and production of large rockets. Development and production which are concentrated in the big monopolies are directed towards military purposes. Leading representatives of the firms involved—Bölkow-Messerschmitt GmbH, DEMAG, Telefunken AG, Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuremberg (MAN), Wasag-Chemie AG, Siemens AG, Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugbau GmbH—are on this rocket commission. The same applies to the competent department IV of the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research, the Commission for Space Flight Technology to the executive bodies of the Federal League for West German Aviation and Space Flight Industry and the Society for Space Research. The task of these central institutions (Research Ministry, Space Research Commission, Commission for Space Flight Technology) is to plan the West German rocket industry solely from a military point of view.

Behind nuclear research, rockets are second on the list of the West German allocations for scientific research.

At the moment, it is not possible for the Federal Republic to engage openly in military research on rockets. So it declares that its activities in the field of carriers for atomic weapons are determined by peaceful intentions in the service of "scientific progress". It does this work partly in West Germany itself and partly abroad like the monopolies did in the Weimar Republic and at the beginning of the Hitler period.

One obvious example is West German participation in the West European rocket and satellite programmes "ELDO" and "ESRO". Here the West German mono-

polies see a chance of catching up in the field of research and production of large rockets and hope, within the framework of these programmes, to play first fiddle among the West European countries.

Further proof was the meeting of West European states on Space Problems held early in November, 1968 in Bad Godesberg. The meeting decided in principle to merge the two programmes, "ESRO" and "ELDO" into a West European Space Authority. This decision—*Die Welt* tells us discreetly on November 14, 1968—came about thanks "to the good offices of Federal Research Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg". The West German monopoly bourgeoisie is urging for a concentration of research and development capacities in Western Europe, in order to control them more easily and use them to arm themselves with nuclear weapons and rockets.

Right at this moment, the Federal Republic, through the project "ELDO" A is dealing with developments which go far beyond peaceful space research. Apart from participating in this West European project, the federal government continues its bilateral work with the USA. Consequently, the West German monopolies have two irons in the fire both for their atomic weapons research and for their rocket carrier program. They aim to obtain the experiences and knowledge of their West European and American partners, and build on this to produce their own long-range missiles.

The West Germans' own programme for the space flight and rocket industry looks like this:

- development and production of the third-stage rocket in the ELDO carrier system;
- development of high-altitude research rockets and experimental rockets;
- development of space transporters and "progressive carrier systems";
- work on high-power chemical and non-chemical rocket propulsion systems;
- development of research and communication satellites.

## Effective Control is Necessary

In view of the Bonn government's refusal to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty, the question of control of the West German "renunciation" of nuclear weapons production on its own territory gains particular significance. In the "Memorandum on the Present Disarmament Negotiations" of May 19, 1967, the Bonn government claims that it had renounced production of nuclear weapons once and for all on October 3, 1954 and allowed controls. It demands "existing, tested control systems should not be limited in their effectiveness".(57)

But what do these controls look like and how can one assess the effectiveness of these allegedly "tested

control systems"? With the declared aim of making certain controls by the Armament Control Service of the Western European Union (WEU) possible, the WEU countries, on December 14, 1957, passed an "Agreement on measures to be taken by the West European Union member states to make the Armament Control Service capable of effectively practising controls and on the introduction of a suitable legal procedure in accordance with Protocol No. IV annexed to the Brussels Treaty which was modified by the protocols signed in Paris on October 23, 1954".(58)

Article 23 of this Agreement lays down that it must be ratified and will come into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the ratification certificate by the last ratifying state. Although, after a

(57) Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, No. 52, Bonn, Mai 10, 1967, p. 441

(58) *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, Cologne, No. 17, April 17, 1961, p. 386



# Wissenschaftlich-technisches Gutachten


über die Schaffung von Voraussetzungen zur Produktion von Kernwaffen  
in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik

## 1. Einleitung


Bei der Beurteilung der Voraussetzungen für eine Produktion von Kernwaffen in Westdeutschland müssen die besonderen Bedingungen beachtet werden, unter denen sich Kernforschung und Kerntechnik in Westdeutschland entwickeln. Es ist zu erwarten, daß diese besonderen Bedingungen zu anderen technischen Lösungen führen, als sie von den

... der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zu vernichten sucht, mit wachsender Besorgnis.


Wir betrachten deshalb die Politik der Regierung der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik als das Hauptproblem im Zusammenhang mit der Nichtweiterverbreitung von Kernwaffen und werten die volle und uneingeschränkte Wirksamkeit des Atomwaffensperrvertrages für Westdeutschland als wesentlichen Beitrag für Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa und in der Welt.




Prof. Dr. Max Steenbeck  
Vorsitzender des Forschungsrates  
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik




Prof. Dr. Klaus Fuchs  
Stellvertreter des Direktors  
des Zentralinstituts für Kernforschung der  
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Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin



Prof. Dr. Karl F. Alexander  
z. Z. Vereinigtes Institut für Kernforschung Dubna



longer delay, the Bonn government(59) ratified the Agreement on April 10, 1961 with the "Law on the Agreement of December 14, 1957 concerning Arms Control Measures of the West European Union"(60), this regulation has still not come into force because France and Italy did not ratify it.(61)

So the WEU Council repeatedly stated in its annual reports that for this reason, controls were not possible.(62)

In its reply to the 10th Annual Report of the WEU Council, the WEU Assembly, at its 11th Ordinary Session on April 13, 1965 noted that the controls which had been made so far could not expose any violations because, as the Agreement of December 14, 1957 was not yet in force, the controls could only be carried out with the permission of the national authorities and firms concerned.(63)

Once again, in its reply to the 11th Annual Report, the 12th Ordinary Session on June 11, 1966 declared: "It is obvious that under the present circumstances, if a state does not wish to respect the duties contained in the treaty, this cannot be exposed."(64)

The WEU documents show that no prerequisites for genuine controls have been created by the organization. The 12th Ordinary Session declared: "Although Europe's position in the nuclear field has changed considerably over the past few years, the Service is not in a position to fulfil its tasks for the following reasons.

..... Despite repeated requests made by the Assembly, the Service has never received the experts needed to carry out documentary controls and on-the-spot controls in nuclear centres.

..... The fact that the Council does not provide the Service with the means to carry out controls in the

nuclear field, makes it impossible for this body to apply one of these controls."(65)

One year previously, the Session had noted that the Arms Control Service of the WEU was not carrying out any controls on the territory of West Germany.(66)

Let us take a look at the *Euratom Control System*:

Firstly, it must be said that the supervision by Euratom is not aimed at preventing the military use of nuclear fuels. It simply is to guarantee that the nuclear material is not used for purposes other than those laid down (Art. 2 and 77 of the Euratom Treaty). The Treaty even expressly states that supervision does not include material "which is intended for defence, if it is being included in special devices for this purpose or, after it has been included in such devices, is to be placed into a military installation or to be stored there." (Art. 84)

It is only logical from the aim of this supervision, that there is no necessity to build a comprehensive and effective control mechanism. As a result, the Euratom Commission does not effect any genuine controls. The WEU's 11th Ordinary Session on April 13, 1965 stated that neither the WEU nor the Euratom carry out the controls laid down in various treaties.(67)

The West German Minister of Scientific Research, Gerhard Stoltenberg, was purely demagogical when he declared in an interview granted to the news magazine *Der Spiegel* that each kilogramme of plutonium produced in West German reactors was under Euratom control.(68)

These facts show that neither the WEU control system nor that of Euratom nor both together are likely to prevent the military misuse of nuclear energy.

As the West German imperialists—who praise these control systems—could not prevent the Non-proliferation Treaty coming into being, they, at least, want to avoid any genuine controls so that they can carry on undisturbed with their for advanced work to lay the foundations for the production of atomic weapons, and keep open the possibility of later producing them.

(65) *ibid.* p. 189

(66) *ibid.* Eleventh Ordinary Session, First Part, June 1965, I Assembly Documents, Paris, p. 85 (Doc. 338)

(67) *ibid.* p. 86

(68) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 10 1967, p. 34

(59) see *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 15, p. 18

(60) *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, *ibid.*, p. 384

(61) Assembly of Western European Union, Proceedings, Twelfth Ordinary Session, First Part, June, 1966, I Assembly Documents, Paris, p. 189 (Doc. 374)

(62) *ibid.*, Eleventh Ordinary Session, First Part, June 1965, I Assembly Documents Paris, p. 39 (Doc. 335) and footnote 61

(63) *ibid.* Eleventh Ordinary Session, First Part, June 1965, I Assembly Documents, Paris, p. 84 (Doc. 338)

(64) *ibid.* Twelfth Ordinary Session, First Part, June 1966, I Assembly Documents, Paris, p. 189 (Doc. 374)

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## Knowledge and Experience of the NATO Partners— Basis for the Atomic Rearmament of West Germany

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### Dangerous Concessions by the USA to West German Imperialism

Up to the coming into force of the Paris Treaties, West Germany was subjected to stringent limitations regarding the use of nuclear energy. The Occupation Statute made it impossible for West Germany to develop its own nuclear industry and research. Thus arose, as a result of the outcome of World War II, a lag of many years regarding developments in this field. In his capacity as Federal Minister for Atomic Affairs, CSU chairman Franz Josef Strauss described the overcoming of the ten to fifteen years' backlog of the Federal Republic in the nuclear field as a national duty which is incumbent on the state, science and economy.<sup>(69)</sup>

To achieve this aim, the West German imperialists spent enormous amounts and regard bilateral or multi-lateral agreements as the method to overcome the lead of their NATO partners speedily and at relatively low cost. Dr. Menne, chairman of the Study Circle for Atomic Questions of the "Federal Association of the German Industry" (BDI) stated quite frankly: "Being realists we recognize completely the weakness of our post-war position . . . Basically speaking we regard it as self-understood to strive for close international co-operation on the broadest possible basis."<sup>(70)</sup>

The imperialist forces of the USA and Great Britain met the nuclear ambitions of Bonn's revanchist politician half-way.

Thus West Germany was in 1956/57 able to conclude bilateral agreements with the USA and Great Britain, the leading atomic powers in the Western camp, on cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic power. Professor Balke, Strauss' successor to the post of atomic minister, expressed his satisfaction on November 3, 1959 before the American Atomic Forum in Washington that the West German imperialists can utilize to a great extent the experiences which have been placed at their disposal in a generous way by

friendly nations, particularly by the United States and Great Britain within the framework of bilateral agreements and on the basis of agreements between West German and foreign firms.

The efforts of the West German monopoly bourgeoisie for close collaboration particularly with the USA have been favoured by the international development in the field of using nuclear energy. It is generally known that the American imperialists never dreamt in the first years after the termination of World War II of surrendering their knowledge in the use of nuclear energy to other states. They concentrated one-sidedly on the military use of nuclear energy while neglecting its use for peaceful purposes. Even after the foundation of NATO they guarded for many years their "atomic secrets" against their closest allies. The West German periodical *Wehrkunde*, the mouth-piece of the militarist Society for Military Science, supplies the following reasons: "After the termination of the Second World War the possession of the secret of the atom bomb seemed to provide the United States of North-America with a powering superiority over all other big powers of the world. The USA . . . passed already in 1945 the so-called McMahon Bill which was to safeguard this lead as long as possible."<sup>(72)</sup>

The Americans changed their attitude only after the Soviet Union had broken the atomic monopoly of the USA and made no secret of her discoveries in the peaceful use of atomic energy and was prepared to share them with anybody who was seriously anxious to place these achievements of modern science at the service of mankind. This development, which was characterized by the putting into operation of the first industrial atomic reactor of the world by the Soviet Union in 1954, lead to the first international conference for the peaceful use of atomic power which was held in Geneva in August 1955 and where it was demonstrated that "America was anything but leading in the application of the nuclear-physical knowledge and technological processes for the industrial production of nuclear energy".<sup>(73)</sup>

(69) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 1 1956, p. 2

(70) *ibid.* p. 7

(71) *Deutsche Politik 1959*, Federal Government Report, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, p. 585

(72) *Wehrkunde*, Munich, No. 8 1958, p. 543

(73) *Baltimore Sun* (USA) July 8, 1955 quoted by *New Times*, Moscow, No. 32, 1955, p. 10.





The strategic conception of West German imperialism provides for the use of nuclear weapons. Alongside the border with the GDR and Czechoslovakia shafts for nuclear explosives have been sunk into the roads.



From that time onwards, the USA was no longer able to ignore the peaceful use of nuclear power in her own country or to refuse cooperation with other states. The progress made by the Soviet Union in this field of the peaceful use of nuclear energy compelled the leading capitalist countries likewise to turn to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

From then on the USA tried to dominate the developing market for nuclear fuel and nuclear engineering plants and to exert influence on the development of the atomic industry and research of as many states as possible.

By the end of 1958 the USA had already concluded bilateral agreements for cooperation in the field of the civil use of atomic energy with 40 countries as well as with West Berlin.

Although the West German imperialists since then received comprehensive assistance for the development of an autonomous industry and research they were forced to concede far-reaching controls regarding a predestined use of the supplied materials, equipment and installations to their American partners in


the bilateral agreement.(74) In constructing her own atomic industry and research West Germany thus became greatly dependent on the USA. Thus the journal *Atomwirtschaft* complained that possession of imported reactors and other equipment and material required for the operation of a reactor does not ensure unlimited power but it transferred to the buyer with many encumbrances of a legal and factual nature.(75)

West Germany's atomic industry and research has, however, in the meantime, mainly thanks to the support by the USA, reached a state which enables the West German imperialists to create all the technical conditions for a West German production of atomic weapons, independent of the NATO partners by its own efforts.

In their drive for access to atomic weapons, which they try to obtain by various means, the establishment of the atomic arms potential in West Germany means to the Bonn rulers both a way to attain this aim and a means of pressure vis-a-vis the USA and the other NATO partners in order to advance in the pursuit of multilateral nuclear arms projects within the framework of NATO or even a bilateral solution with the USA.

At the present time the West German imperialists are, however, not yet able to put the overwhelming part of the consent of their NATO partners, in particular the USA, since the reactors, which have so far been built and put into operation in West Germany, are, with the exception of research reactor 2 (FR 2) and the multi-purpose research reactor (MZFR) in the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe are reactors which use enriched uranium as nuclear fuel on whose import from the USA the West German monopoly bourgeoisie will have to depend for quite some time, yet. At present the Bonn government, by utilizing the crisis of the French currency, which broke out in November last, is trying to gain a stronger influence on the French uranium enriching plant in Pierrelatte. Thus the *Demokratisch-Konservative Korrespondenz* speculated as early as late in September 1968, with reference to "CSU circles in Bonn" (F. J. Strauss): "In order to expand it (Pierrelatte-plant, the Ed.) also for the production of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes an amount of 5 thousand million francs would be required, according to French estimates, which could not be raised within the French budget. According to the view of the CSU circles, the Federal Republic would be very well able to make such an amount available, albeit under the condition that it will have access to the civil use of this atomic fuel."(76)

"CSU circles in Bonn" are interested in this project also because they would become independent of nuclear fuel supplies from the USA "in case the federal government would not sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty". It is furthermore obvious that the Bonn government with its FR 2 and the MZFR pursues, without economic necessity, a line of development in the construction of reactors which is to enable it to produce fissionable material independent of its NATO partners.



Sprengschachtdeckel in der Bundesstraße 27

(74) *Bundesanzeiger*, Cologne, No. 181, Sept. 20, 1967, p. 1

(75) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 6 1957, p. 184

(76) *Demokratisch-Konservative Korrespondenz*, Munich Sept. 27, 1968



Most significant for the implementation of the nuclear armament schemes of West German imperialism is also the surrender of military nuclear information by the USA to West Germany. Thus the USA declared their readiness to transfer both to NATO as an organization and the individual NATO states military atomic data, in order to so enable the NATO Armed Forces to wage nuclear war.

On June 22, 1955, the American government concluded an agreement with the NATO states on "cooperation in the field of atomic information". It provided the handing over of American military atomic data to NATO, namely

"a) for the working out of defence plans

b) for the training of personnel in the use of atomic weapons and in the defence against them and

c) for the assessment of the potential of possible enemies if atomic weapons are employed." (77)

Thus the West German imperialists obtained possession of these atomic data by way of NATO.

During the years 1958–59, the USA also concluded bilateral agreements with individual NATO states on "cooperation in the use of atomic energy for the purpose of joint defence" which made it possible to directly hand over American military atomic information to these states.

The American imperialists were forced to this concession in order to strengthen the position of their wavering allies in view of the "alarming shock by the successful Sputnik start in the Soviet Union" (78) which clearly demonstrated to the whole world the changes of the international balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries.

In July 1959 such a bilateral agreement on "cooperation in the use of atomic energy for the purpose of joint defence" (79) was concluded between the USA and West Germany which served to implement the resolutions of the NATO Summit Conference of December 1957 on the reinforcement of the NATO fighting forces through atomic weapons. This agreement was concluded in addition to the West German-American agreement on cooperation in the field of the civil use of atomic energy. It forms the basis for the supply of American nuclear devices with the necessary technical documents to the West German imperialists as well as the training of members of the Bundeswehr for these arms systems.

The government of the German Democratic Republic protested by diplomatic notes of August 21, 1959 to the United States' government and the government of the West German Federal Republic against the conclusion of this agreement and pointed out the serious dangers arising from it. The note to the American government describes the agreement as an important link in the chain of measures by which West Germany is to be put in a position to obtain access to nuclear weapons. (80)

(77) *Bundesanzeiger*, Cologne, No. 145, July 28, 1956, p. 2

(78) *Wehrkunde*, Munich, No. 8 1958, p. 543

(79) The fact of the agreement was made known but its full text was not published

(80) *Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, vol. VII, Berlin 1960, p. 113

On June 18, 1964 an "Agreement between the partners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on cooperation in the field of atomic information" (81) was concluded. It serves to make atomic data available to NATO and the individual member states. The agreement replaces the agreement of June 22, 1955, but not the bilateral agreements between the USA and the NATO-states.

The agreements and their realization show clearly how the USA, after having started to hand over military atomic data to NATO in 1955, was compelled by its allies, particularly by the West German militarists, to make ever greater concessions in this field.

The transfer of American atomic data enabled the West German imperialists to prepare their revanchist army for an atomic war. The service regulations of the Bundeswehr Command, such as the confidential service regulation 100/1 "Troop Leadership" of October 1962 and in the confidential service regulation 132/1 "Effects and Use of Nuclear Warheads" of July 1960 lucidly reflect the knowledge which the West German militarists already possess regarding atomic warfare as well as the effects and properties of atomic weapons.

Without the atomic information placed at its disposal by the Americans, the Bundeswehr Command would not be in a position of issuing such service regulations in which both the principles and the details of atomic warfare are laid down and according to which the West German staffs and troops are systematically trained.

The Bonn War Ministry also vigorously intensified the training of members of the Bundeswehr for the West German atomic devices. During the first years this training was carried out mainly in the USA.

Since 1962 secret training courses are also held at various schools of the Bundeswehr in which officers and non-commissioned officers of Bonn's revanchist army are trained in the handling of atomic weapons. The subjects and aims of those courses show that the West German militarists also possess precise knowledge of the construction of atomic weapons.

The Americans, however, went even further in the violation of the Potsdam Agreement and passed on knowledge to the West German imperialists—as has been evident since 1957—which they gained from their atomic weapons tests. Even after the conclusion of the Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty the West German imperialists receive further data on the results of the underground atomic explosions of the USA, a clear breach of the spirit and letter of that important international treaty.

As early as 1957, the West German militarists tested so-called shelters at the American testing ground in Nevada. Late in August 1957 the effects of an atomic bomb, which was exploded by the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), were tested on shelters of various types. Subsequently a West German expert commission travelled to the USA in order to establish and evaluate the results of the test. In 1962 the Pentagon informed the West German Bundeswehr Com-

(81) *Europa-Archiv*, Frankfurt/Main, No. 1, 1965, D.18–D.21



mand on its experiences and knowledge gained during the military exercises with real atomic weapons in the Nevada desert.

In 1963 the Americans handed over documents on the latest knowledge of the effects of atomic weapons on buildings. In December 1963 the Bonn government evaluated these data in a confidential report in the following terms: "In contrast to conventional explosive arms, the Bundeswehr is unable to base itself on German experiences regarding the effects of atomic weapons and is therefore, regarding investigations on the effects of atomic arms dependent on the test knowledge and experiences of the NATO partners, particularly the United States . . . The United States . . . recently issued information on their latest knowledge.

"New bases for calculation derived from underground atomic tests in Nevada are now available for an analysis of the individual components of atomic effects . . .

"As a result, the Federal Republic has, next to the USA and Great Britain as the only NATO state precise knowledge on the effects of atomic weapons on building installations."

## Cooperation in Little Europe Favours Bonn's Drive for Nuclear Weapons

The governments and monopolies of the imperialist states are trying to take into account the tendency towards internationalizations of economic life, emanating from the scientific-technological revolution, by setting up international, state monopoly organizations, such as EEC and EURATOM which are meant to unite the imperialists, despite all contradictions, in their struggle against the Socialist world system.

The treaty for the foundation of the European Atomic Community (EURATOM)(83) was signed in Rome on March 25, 1957 by the governments of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg together with the treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC). These two treaties became valid on January 1, 1958.

Despite the limited scope of EURATOM it has a rather great significance for the development of the atomic economy of its member states by concentrating, in its research and investment budget considerable means for the fulfilment of its primary task.

Apart from promoting research, EURATOM sets itself the task to spread the knowledge which the Community acquires through its own research as well as any knowledge conveyed to it freely. This refers also to any knowledge derived from the military use of nuclear energy. This demand was made by the West German imperialists with special emphasis. Thus we read in *Wehrkunde* a few months prior to the signing of the treaty:

"If the knowledge were to confine itself solely to the peaceful-economic sphere this would mean a mon-

The hand over of such data on the effects of atomic weapons to the Bonn government, the import and the construction, by way of licence, of nuclear devices by West Germany, the training of Bundeswehr personnel on these weapons provide the West German imperialists with knowledge which enable them to produce atomic weapons without having to test them. Facts prove the correctness of the statement made late in 1964 by the Soviet news agency TASS: "In view of the present state of developments of science and production it would not be difficult for the West German Federal Republic to construct her own atomic weapons. For this purpose the West German militarists would not even have to carry out atomic tests, as the atomic weapons have already been prepared for use on the American test grounds."(82)

Therefore, in the light of the known facts of the West German-American nuclear weapons conspiracy, we must at present proceed from the fact that the West German imperialists can start the production of operational atomic weapons.

(82) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Nov. 15, 1964, p. 7

opoly of information for France who would like to produce her own atomic weapons within 4 or 5 years. Such a solution would be a discrimination against the other participating countries, above all the Federal Republic which renounced in the Paris Treaties, the production of nuclear weapons, since the scientific and technical data of atomic energy cannot be separated. Checks and exchange of data must therefore comprise peaceful as well as military use."(84)

The West German imperialists who allege that West Germany developed her atomic industry and research "for peaceful purposes only" point out the close link between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy only when such an argument is in conformity with their political aims.

The EURATOM states reserved themselves the possibility of joint military use of nuclear energy within the framework of EURATOM.

It became evident, however, that the imperialist contradictions, which cannot be overcome by the international state monopoly organizations, came to the fore in all their forcefulness and clarity already during the negotiations for the foundation of EURATOM. A few days after the signing of the EURATOM treaty the *Deutsche Zeitung* commented on the result of these arguments:

"So little has been left of the original concept, which was tantamount to a copy of the supra-national dictatorship of European Coal and Steel Community that one would like to see in the EURATOM organization actually no more than a research community with alternating tasks."(85)

(84) *Wehrkunde*, Munich, No. 10 1956, p. 514

(85) *Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung*, Düsseldorf, April 3, 1957, p. 5

(83) *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Bonn, Part II, No. 23, Aug. 19, 1957, p. 1014

The principle task of EURATOM has been confined to promoting and facilitating national research activity and merely supplementing it by domestic research and training programs. Its significance therefore conforms to its limited supra-national character.

The very detailed text of the treaty does not differentiate at all between the peaceful and military use of fissionable material. West Germany is however the only EURATOM state, which, according to the Paris Treaties (Protocol No. III on Armament Control) is not allowed to produce atomic weapons.<sup>(86)</sup> The West German imperialists therefore speculated, in conjunction with the foundation of EURATOM to be able to circumvent the prohibition to produce atomic arms imposed on them by the Paris Treaties. Thus Strauss presented already at that time the view that the legal position allowed the Federal Republic in agreement with her partners in the Western European Union (WEU) to produce certain parts of a European atomic bomb.<sup>(87)</sup>

However, France's policy after the coming into power of de Gaulle, frustrated the schemes of the West German imperialists to carry out a joint production of nuclear weapons within the framework of EURATOM.

The objective tendency towards internationalization of atomic life is clearly visible counter-acted in the atomic field by the drive of the leading imperialist powers, which are interested in the military use of nuclear energy for the construction of a rather independent atomic industry and research. While the French imperialists are carrying into effect their endeavours for hegemony in Western Europe by con-

structing their "Force de Frappe", the Bonn rulers, who failed to set into motion the production of atomic weapons within the framework of EURATOM, concentrated on the accelerated construction of nuclear research centres of their own. This drive for the establishment of a mainly independent industry and research impairs in particular the supra-national character of international cooperation which is linked with the handing over of sovereignty rights of individual imperialist states to a common authority. Thus we cannot be surprised that France's participation in EURATOM amounts to no more than about 5 per cent of its entire nuclear effort.<sup>(88)</sup> In West Germany the share of expenditure for EURATOM in the state budget for the development of atomic industry and research has so far been approximately 15 per cent.<sup>(89)</sup>

Agreement reached on January 26, 1963 between France and West Germany in which both partners pursue their own imperialist aims also envisages close cooperation in the field of armament and scientific research.

In the field of the civil use of atomic energy this agreement led to the joint tackling of various projects. This cooperation of the two states therefore goes beyond the frame of EURATOM. Both the bilateral cooperation with France and cooperation with the framework of EURATOM serve the West German imperialists in establishing an atomic arms potential. At the same time they pursue the aim to thereby counter-act the existing dependence on the USA.

(86) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 9, 1965, p. 411

(89) Worked out on the basis of the atomic allocations of the Bund and the Länder from 1958–1967; payment for various projects by the electricity supply enterprises was not included.

(86) The ban for Italy is laid down in the 1947 Peace Treaty.

(87) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 18 1957, p. 16



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## Under the Cloak of Peaceful Application

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### The Tactics of West German Imperialism to Obtain Nuclear Weapons

Militarization of the West German nuclear industry and the economic conception of the West German monopolists for this field are influenced by a number of factors which are less important in conventional weapons and the so-called classical arms industries. Such factors are:

- Atomic weapons are weapons of a new quality which threaten the existence of the whole of mankind. For this reason, the struggle of the Soviet Union, the GDR, the other Socialist countries and peace forces the world over is concentrated, not only on the problems of atomic disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in general, but, above all, on preventing the West German imperialists, who want to revise the results of World War II, from getting their hands on them.
- In the Paris Treaties the West German imperialists had to give the pledge to their NATO partners not to produce atomic weapons on their territory. This duty is primarily the result of the Potsdam Agreement.
- The West German imperialists were several years behind in the nuclear field and through international cooperation, hoped to catch up as quickly as possible. However, they had to accept far-reaching controls by their treaty partners who wanted to ensure that the material and equipment they supplied were used for peaceful purpose.
- The American imperialists want to maintain their domination over NATO, particularly by exercising control over the nuclear weapons of the alliance, but they are making dangerous concessions to their main ally in Europe, West German imperialism.
- The French imperialists are not prepared to enable their rival in the struggle for domination over Western Europe to gain control over nuclear weapons. France frustrated the plans of the revenge-seekers to create a common European nuclear weapons production within the framework of EURATOM.

However, these factors cannot prevent that the atomic arms potential needed for the home production of nuclear arms is being created in West Germany.

These factors not only decisively influence the plans of the monopolists in this field, but also determine their tactics to gain control over nuclear weapons and the methods they use.

It must not be overlooked that the West German atomic potential, established mainly without outside help, is gaining importance.

The world-famous atomic physicist, Professor Klaus Fuchs, already pointed out in 1965 that attempts were being made in West Germany, to take over all phases of nuclear power station construction, because the independence of the reactor industry would make it possible to avoid any unwanted controls by their own allies.<sup>(90)</sup>

Replying to the West German government's so-called Peace Message of March 25, 1966, the Soviet government said:

"It is no secret that hand in hand with persistent attempts by the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to gain access to nuclear weapons through NATO, the construction of an atomic industry is being stepped up in West Germany. The fact that the widely ramified state apparatus, the big concerns and numerous scientific research institutions have been drawn into the nuclear program of the FRG gives witness that the government of the FRG attaches importance to work in this field."<sup>(91)</sup>

West German atomic scientists and politicians have also made statements to this effect. The overall plan of the West German monopolists is to use the experiences of the leading imperialist countries to catch up with them and then build up their own atomic industry which would be largely independent of supplies from abroad and competitive on the world market. To this end, this new branch of industry is largely organized and controlled by the state on behalf of the monopolies.

The West German imperialists want to use nuclear energy both as a productive force for the technological

(90) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Sept. 14, 1965, p. 6

(91) *ditto*, May 20, 1966, p. 3

revolution and as the basis for their own atomic weapon industry, without, however, giving up their efforts to import atomic arms and to bring about atomic arms integration.

The West German monopolists will, of course, continue their international cooperation to gain the knowledge of the other countries. However, it will erect its own projects without foreign help if they can be used later for military purposes. These plans for a partly self-sufficient atomic industry are already being carried out in West Germany. The West German imperialists are concentrating their efforts on the uranium-plutonium-cycle. The chairman of the GDR Research Council, Professor Max Steenbeck, stated in this connection:

## Their Aim: Bomb Type Plutonium

As already mentioned, the West German imperialists are concentrating their efforts on the uranium-plutonium-cycle. Production of militarily applicable plutonium is closely bound up with the construction of industrial-type nuclear power stations. Consequently, the construction of installations for producing plutonium can be very easily camouflaged as development of West German atom industry for peaceful purposes. To produce plutonium, one needs:

- uranium ore, processing installations for the production of uranium concentrates,
- installations for processing the concentrates into nuclear fuels and fuel elements,
- suitable reactors,
- installations for reprocessing the irradiated fuels.

So the uranium-plutonium-cycle encompasses two

"As the Federal Republic has some, though small, uranium deposits, as it has constructed a reactor in Karlsruhe for natural uranium, and as it wants to build its own installation to gain plutonium from the burned-up reactor fuel elements, in this respect, it would be self-sufficient, although only to a limited extent."(92)

In the meantime, construction of an installation for preparing radiated fuels has begun in the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, due to commence operations in 1969/70. With that, the nuclear cycle will be complete. Then the West German imperialists will be able to produce militarily applicable plutonium, quite independent of their NATO partners.

(92) dito, Feb. 2, 1966, p. 6

distinctly different spheres: nuclear fuel industry and reactor construction, the most important branches of the nuclear industry.

The Bonn government report for 1965 gives details of the West German imperialists' efforts to develop a nuclear fuel industry and to ensure the fuel cycle: "The Federal Ministry of Scientific Research in 1965 continues to try and create the prerequisites for a complete nuclear fuel cycle which ranges from uranium prospecting, processing the ore, enriching and producing fuels and making the fuel elements up to the repressing of irradiated fuel elements."(93)

In the nuclear fuel industry, the attempts of the Bonn rulers to attain self-sufficiency are particularly obvious. As West Germany has very few uranium deposits, the supply of nuclear fuels for the West German atom industry is a particular problem. This is how the West German imperialists try to solve it:

(93) *Deutsche Politik* 1965, Federal Government Report, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, p. 316

**Nuclear Power Stations with Light-Water-Type  
Reactors Under Construction or Planned in West Germany**

Power station	Electric output	Begun	Completed	Cost (est.) (mill. marks)	Major Firms Involved
Experimental power station at Kahl	15 MW	1958	1961	35	General Electric, AEG, Hochtief AG
Nuclear power station at Gundremmingen	252 MW	1962	1966	335	General Electric, AEG, Hochtief AG
Nuclear power station at Lingen	240 MW	1964	1968	264	AEG, General Electric
Nuclear power station at Obrigheim	282 MW	1965	1968	303	Siemens AG, Westinghouse
Nuclear power station at Würgassen/Weser	640 MW	1968	1972*		AEG, General Electric
Nuclear power station at Stade	660 MW	1968	1972*	526	Siemens AG, Westinghouse

\*planned



## Mining Uranium Ore in West Germany

Although the Advisory Council of the EURATOM Supply Agency made known that it is much more expensive to mine known uranium deposits in Europe than new deposits overseas, although the uranium stock in the capitalist world will be sufficient until the year 2000 for the planned developments and although it is probable that prospecting will bring to light further deposits(95) so that there will be no lack of cheap uranium(96), the West German imperialists are speeding up prospecting in the Federal Republic to make the West German atom industry, at least in part, independent of nuclear fuel supplies from abroad.

Even at the beginning of 1957, the journal *Atomwirtschaft* wrote: "The uranium deposits discovered in the Federal Republic up to now justify the attempt to make us at least partly independent of other countries in uranium supply."(97)

Since 1965 prospecting in West Germany has been concentrated in Menzenschwand (Black Forest), Ellweiler (Rhineland-Palatinate) and Tischenreuth (Upper Palatinate/Bavaria).

## Contracts for Delivery from Other Countries

Apart from contracts for delivery of uranium with the USA, Canada and Britain, with whom West German has signed agreements on co-operation for the civilian use of nuclear energy, the West German imperialists try to find countries which do not attach the condition of peaceful usage to their uranium deliveries. One of these is South Africa. The Bonn government's report for 1960 reveals that this possibility has been made use of for many years now: "But from the Union of South Africa, too, the West German atom industry obtained raw material with the help of the federal government."(98)

According to the forecasts of western experts, Canada and South Africa will be the only countries, at the end of the seventies, in a position to export uranium.(99) It need not be stressed that South Africa does not place any conditions of peaceful usage on its uranium deliveries to West Germany. The journal *Atomwirtschaft* writes that it is presumed negotiations on the purchase of uranium concentrate from South African uranium mines will not be burdened with control conditions.(100)

The West German concerns also want to exploit Czechoslovakia's mineral resources, as the following proves:

"One of the most important—if not the most important—deposits of fissionable raw material for atomic energy found on the European continent lies in the Sudeten area, i.e. in that part of Bohemia and Moravia/Silesia which was inhabited by Germans until 1945/46. This fact alone could justify the appeal to the German public to think more about the problems of this area, its people and its relations to the rest of the world."(101)

## The West German State and Atom Concerns Directly Participate in Production, Mining and Processing of Uranium Ore Abroad

It was already in the summer of 1956 that the then West German Atom Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, negotiated with the Franco regime in Spain about the possibilities of West German firms helping to build and work uranium ore mines. The West Germans even proposed mixed West German-Spanish companies.(102) The Bonn rulers are continuing their efforts for co-operation with Spain, as in Western Europe, only France, Spain and Portugal have uranium deposits of any size. For a long time, official relations to the two regimes have been intensified from year to year, as demonstrated most recently by Chancellor Kiesinger's state visit to Spain and Portugal in October, 1968. Professor Karl Winnacker, the deputy chairman of the West German Atomic Commission, made known that the Federal Institution for Ground Research is examining "whether rights to uranium deposits emanating from possessions of the Reich should be maintained".(103) And the Advisory Council of the EURATOM Supply Agency recommends that the Euratom countries should either find themselves or help to find uranium deposits, if they do not want to lose their commercial and political independence in uranium supply in future.(104)

The Bonn government's report for 1965 reflects this concern: "As sufficient uranium stocks at home are not to be expected, first steps towards secure uranium supplies have been introduced, which make it possible to sign long-term delivery contracts abroad, to obtain rights to large deposits or to engage in prospecting."(105)

All this is done to avoid direct controls by the atomic powers. In the processing of uranium ore into uranium concentrates, these efforts are even more evident. In 1960, an experimental installation, built with substantial financial support from the Atom Ministry, began

(94) *Wehrtechnische Monatshefte*, Frankfurt/Main, No. 8, 1963, p. 338

(95) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1965, p. 658

(96) *ibid.*, No. 9, 1965, p. 424 and No. 12, 1965, p. 666

(97) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 1, 1957, p. 29

(98) *Deutsche Politik* 1960, Federal Government Report, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, p. 529; Raw material means uranium concentrates, etc.

(99) In addition, the USA export enriched uranium. The USA, Canada and South Africa are by far the largest uranium producers in the capitalist world.

(100) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 10, 1965, p. 498

(101) *Mitteleuropäische Quellen und Dokumente*, vol. 2 Munich 1957, p. 4

(102) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 7/8 1956, p. 283

(103) "10 Jahre Kerntechnik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" a series of brochures published by the (West) German Atomic Forum, Bonn, No. 14, p. 24

(104) *Wehrtechnische Monatshefte*, Frankfurt/Main, No. 8, 1963, p. 337

(105) *Deutsche Politik* 1965 . . . *ibid.*, p. 316

operation near Birkenfeld/Rhineland-Palatinate right by the Ellweiler uranium mine. The installation prepares uranium ore and has a capacity of 300 tons of uranium oxide annually. At present only 5 % to 6 % of its capacity is used for West German uranium(106), and the concentrate will be bought up by the federal government in the next few years as no other buyers are expected.(107) So this installation was built and is maintained, although highly uneconomical.

The efforts at self-sufficiency showed themselves even earlier in the field of fuel and fuel elements.

In its 1957 report, the Bonn government stated that the metallurgical industry, after years of work, was then capable of making fuel elements and other materials for West German reactors.(108) During the World War I, already, some 15 tons of uranium metal were produced in fascist Germany. And the West German imperialists continued research in this field from 1945 to 1955, as is proved by the following extract from a "Historical Review" published in *Atomwirtschaft*:

"On the basis of experience collected during the war, it was possible to develop the installations for producing uranium metal still further and sell them abroad. From the discussions with foreign customers, valuable knowledge for the production of uranium metal could be collected so that immediately after Germany became sovereign it could begin work in this field."(109)

So on October 27, 1957, Atom Minister Strauss was able to receive the first uranium rod made from West German ore. Various details made known on this occasion left no doubt that the West German imperialists had prepared for that moment long before the Paris Treaties.

It was a question of uranium ore which was being mined in the mountain range of the Fichtelgebirge in the Weissenstadt area. The ore preparation was effected by the Chemische Fabrik von Heyden AG in its Regensburg branch, the smelting by DEGUSSA. Despite the allied laws banning such activity, the Eisenwerk Maximilianshütte AG, Sulzbach-Rosenberg, part of the Flick Concern, took up uranium ore mining in the spring of 1950. The director-general of this firm, Dr. Odilo Burkart, declared quite frankly that Friedrich Flick, who was then in the US war criminal jail at Landsberg took the "risk", together with the head of the US section of the Allied Security Department in West Berlin, Mr. Kelly, of financing the prospecting hiding its true purpose from the allies.(110) Flick later received from the Bonn government double and three times the amount he spent on mining the uranium ore for the first West German uranium rods. The West German news magazine *Der Spiegel* wrote on this:

"The old concern ruler, Friedrich Flick, is not in such a hurry to mine the uranium near Weissenstadt as Atom Minister Strauss. Flick is not particularly inter-

ested in the uranium mine unless the state advances the money to start mining quickly. The executive of the Flick Maximilianshütte AG has already sent a list of the grants Flick expects from Bonn if he is to start uranium mining. The immediate sum needed is 2.2 million marks."(111)

In West Germany, production of nuclear fuel and fuel elements is concentrated in DEGUSSA and AEG. DEGUSSA was the only firm in Nazi Germany to produce uranium metal.(112)

On April 1, 1960, DEGUSSA founded a new branch together with the British firm, Rio Tinto Management Services (U.K.) Ltd., the NUKEM (Nuklear-Chemie und Metallurgie-Gesellschaft mbH) with its seat in Wolfgang near Hanau (Main) to continue DEGUSSA's research and development work in the field of nuclear fuel and fuel elements.

At the beginning of June, 1965, the AEG and the American firm General Electric founded the KRT (Kernreaktorteile GmbH—Nuclear Reactor Parts). It produces components for AEG-made reactors and for reactors built by General Electric abroad, particularly the fuel elements. In 1959, the Atom Ministry signed a contract with DEGUSSA which made it possible for the later to produce an annual quantity of 40 tons of uranium oxide and uranium metal for five years running, so as to be able to produce fuel elements if necessary.(113) For the uranium concentrate, needed as raw material, the Ministry granted DEGUSSA a loan without interest.(114)

This state-monopoly measure has made it possible to accumulate not only uranium concentrate in West Germany, but also pure nuclear fuels as a "national reserve stock".

But the West German endeavours to become self-sufficient and the military and political motives behind them become most apparent in the field of the chemical reprocessing of irradiated fuels.

On December 20, 1957 the European Company for the Processing of Irradiated Fuels (EUROCHEMIC) was founded by member states of the European Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.(115) The foundation stone for the reprocessing installation was laid on July 7, 1960 in Mol, the Belgian nuclear research centre. It began operating after exactly six years of building work. Having a capacity of some 100 tons of natural uranium fuel elements a year, it can process natural and highly enriched (up to 95 %) uranium. Legally, the EUROCHEMIC is a joint-stock company whose shares are at present owned by 13 Governments and a number of industrial undertakings. The capital is at the moment \$ 35.75 million. The Bonn government owns 109.5 shares (1 share costs \$ 50,000). 19 shares are owned by West German atom concerns and electricity supply companies who, at the cost of one share, gain the knowledge and experience gathered in Mol.

(111) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 34, 1956, p. 19

(112) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Hamburg, No. 2 1956, p. 85

(113) *Deutsche Politik* 1959 . . . *ibid.*, p. 591

(114) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 3, 1960, p. 138

(115) They were Belgium, West Germany, Denmark, France, Switzerland, Turkey, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Portugal, Sweden. Since July 28, 1959 Spain has been also a member.

(106) *Das Parlament*, Hamburg, March 8, 1967, p. 2

(107) "10 Jahre Kerntechnik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" *ibid.*, p. 23

(108) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1956, p. 428

(109) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1957, p. 421

(110) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1956, p. 428



# Bonner Atomrüstung



Reaktoren  
zur Gewinnung von  
**Plutonium**

## Reaktoren im Betrieb



Karlsruhe



Gundremmingen



Kahl




Lingen

## Reaktoren bis 1970 im Betrieb



Obrigheim



Großwetzheim



Niederaichbach

The EUROCHEMIC installation was built to give other countries interested in erecting large installations later, the opportunity to train building and operating personnel and to carry out the research necessary for processing installations.(116) In other words, to save the countries belonging to EUROCHEMIC building small experimental installations themselves. This was expressly confirmed by Dr. Erich Pohland (West Germany), who was elected Director-General of EUROCHEMIC at the end of October, 1959(117):

"Nothing has changed in the aim of EUROCHEMIC in the course of the years 1959/60. Through the construction and operation of a small installation the nations participating are to receive the knowledge necessary to build a large installation. The industry of the individual countries are to help in construction, insofar as they are interested, so as to be able to help in building a large installation later."(118)

So it is all the more surprising that the Second West German Atom Program provides for the erection of a reprocessing installation in West Germany with a capacity of some 30 tons of natural uranium fuel elements a year.(119) Construction was begun in the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe at the beginning of 1967.

The Gesellschaft zur Wiederaufarbeitung von Kernbrennstoffen mbH (Company for the Reprocessing of Nuclear Fuel) was founded as early as August 12, 1964 and on completion is to take over the experiments for the state at public expense.(120) The Bonn government is the builder and owner of the installation. It is scheduled to process irradiated fuel elements with 40 tons of natural or slightly enriched uranium each year.(121)

The West German imperialists are building this installation in order to close the nuclear cycle enabling them to produce plutonium for military usage without help from their NATO partners.

Professor Klaus Fuchs has pointed out that contrary to all economic considerations, the West Germans have opted in favour of an out-dated installation but one necessary for military purposes.(122)

To camouflage their real aims, the West German imperialists try to invent an economic necessity for this small plant; they tell outright lies and contradict themselves.

One statement is that the plant is to provide first experiences in the planning, building and operating of reprocessing installations in West Germany.(123) This is an absolute lie. West Germany participates in

the activities of EUROCHEMIC with the declared aim of collecting such experiences. The plant in Karlsruhe is not necessary for such purposes. The British journal *Nuclear Engineering* expressed the same opinion in March 1965 when it wrote that the Karlsruhe plant "obviously receives support from influential circles in Germany, presumably for nationalistic reasons. As a project—it is even smaller than EUROCHEMIC—it seems to suffer from the same weakness that an expensive pilot plant is used for an out-fated process".(124)

In addition, it is claimed that the question of whether it is better to reprocess irradiated nuclear fuels in a few large plants or in many small installations had not yet been decided.(125) This, too, is an absolute lie.

Dr. Erich Pohland pointed out as early as 1958 that a reprocessing plant pays only if at least 1,000 tons are treated annually.(126) This opinion has not changed since then. Even the journal *Atomwirtschaft* wrote at the end of 1965:

"Reprocessing plants for burned-up fuel elements can only be profitable if they are large enough and used to full capacity."(127)

Professor Winnacker stated that the Karlsruhe plant was necessary because West German nuclear power stations would work with enriched uranium.(128)

But the project came into being in connection with the multi-purpose research reactor which uses natural uranium as fuel and concentrates on the production of plutonium.(129)

And the reactor was rated for the quantities needed in military application where burn-up periods are much shorter than in electricity production.

EUROCHEMIC offered to take over the reprocessing of the reactor fuel elements. For obvious reasons, the leaders of the West German atom industry rejected this offer by the then Director-General of EUROCHEMIC, Dr. Pohland.

Instead of accepting this offer, the West German imperialists pushed to have the EUROCHEMIC plant process not only natural and slightly enriched uranium, but, contrary to original intentions, also highly enriched nuclear fuels, for the Federal Republic has no interest in reprocessing these because of the small quantities available.

Ministerial Director, Dr. Joachim Pretsch, head of the Nuclear Research Department in the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research wrote the following revealing words at the beginning of 1965: "The reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuels must also be made possible in a small plant in the Federal Republic of Germany at last, as it is simply unbearable to have to depend solely on foreign or international plants abroad."(130) He could hardly have used plainer words. The West German imperialists are determined

(116) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1959, Bonn, p. 41

(117) Poland had this position up to the end of 1963.

(118) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 3, 1960, p. 110

(119) "Atomprogramm der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1963–1967", *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1964, Bonn, p. 198

(120) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1964, p. 601; partners are the Forbwerke Hoechst AG (50 %), the Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks AG (25 %) and the NUKEM (25 %)

(121) *Deutsche Politik* 1965 . . . *ibid.*, p. 316

(122) *Neues Deutschland* Berlin, Sept. 14, 1965, p. 6

(123) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 2, 1965, p. 53

(124) quoted from *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Sept. 14, 1965, p. 6

(125) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 4, 1964, p. 153

(126) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 2, 1958, p. 83; see also No. 6, 1964, p. 248

(127) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1965, p. 663

(128) *ditto*, No. 9, 1965, p. 444; because of the expensive fuel, enriched uranium has to be re-processed.

(129) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1964, Bonn, p. 115

(130) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 1, 1965, p. 20



to become self-sufficient in reprocessing irradiated fuels and today they are already able to decide on the use of such fuels, independent of their NATO partners. For this purpose they are satisfied for the time being, with the WAK reprocessing plant now being built in Karlsruhe.

Typical of "democracy" in the West German state are the circumstances of the preparations to build the WAK. After the Society for Nuclear Research in Karlsruhe (Gesellschaft für Kernforschung-GfK) applied to the Economics Ministry of the *Land* Baden-Württemberg to build a reprocessing plant for irradiated fuel elements, a security report was made available to the public from September 22 to October 22, 1965. This report informed a disturbed public on the character and security precautions for this project, but did not contain a site plan of the WAK. As it was generally thought the plant would be built on the ground of the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, no objections were made. Very soon, workers began clearing an area, four hectares in size, in the protected Hardtwald Forest, inside the protected zone of the water purifying plant in Linkenheim/Hochstetten. After the Linkenheim community objected, another report was laid out from March 20 to April 19, 1966, this time stating that the WAK would be built on Linkenheim territory.(131)

Thereupon, eleven communities and 700 individuals protested and the mayor of Linkenheim recommended to the house and land-owners whose property lay in the 2.2 kilometre security zone that they, too, make their objections. The mayor, Herr Nees, gave the following comment: "We simply do not understand why such a plant should be erected in a densely populated area, as no one can judge whether it will not be dangerous to human life over the years. No one can expect us to leave our homes and that of our forefathers or to accept our property losing in value, when it is possible to erect the plant where there is no danger for man and property."(133)

In the course of two sessions for the verbal discussion of the objections, namely, on April 26, 1966, and November 17, 1966, which had to be conducted in accordance with the regulations for the atomic project, it was not possible to refute the complaints of those who had raised the objections. Lacking counter-

arguments, the management of the GfK accused the participants in the discussion of having "a pro-Eastern and Communist orientation", although the atomic scientists of the nuclear research centre at Karlsruhe had to admit that there are cheaper, faster and considerably less dangerous reprocessing techniques available than those used in the WAK, but these, however, were not suitable for the production of plutonium that could be used for military purposes.(134)

The West German imperialists are so strongly interested in setting up the reprocessing plant in the nuclear research centre at Karlsruhe, that has been greatly increased in area for purpose, because they there wish to reprocess the fuel elements of the multiple-purpose reactor, which is also in Karlsruhe, and because they have great possibilities for concealing their use of these nuclear engineering facilities in the framework of the centre. Against the will of the population, the GfK on January 21, 1967, received the first permit for the partial construction of the WAK on a tract of land with an area of 200 square metres and situated 10 kilometres from the centre of Karlsruhe.

The strenuous efforts of the Bonn government to build a nuclear-chemical technical school in Garding, near Munich, has to be seen in intimate connection with the reprocessing of fuel elements for the purpose of producing plutonium. In this school, among other things, experts are to be developed who know how to handle plutonium and who can be allocated to the sector of the civilian utilization of plutonium as well as the sector producing plutonium bombs. The production of plutonium bombs would not be complicated, since hot cells(135) already exist in abundance through the production of fuel elements in various institutions.

The other pre-conditions for the production of plutonium bombs—the creation of certain neutron sources for detonating devices and the mastering of implosion techniques—create far fewer problems than the construction of the nuclear cycle for plutonium production, and can be solved without difficulty in West Germany, concealed from the public view.

The Bonn government thus has as its disposal, as of the moment the WAK begins to operate in 1969/70, the means for the production of plutonium bombs, both from the standpoint of materials and personnel.

(131) *Badische Neueste Nachrichten*, Karlsruhe Jan. 19, 1967

(132) *ibid.*, 20. 5. 1966, p. 16

(133) *Mittelbadische Orts-Nachrichten*, Linkenheim, April 15, 1966, p. 3

(134) *Badische Neueste Nachrichten*, Karlsruhe, Jan. 19, 1967

(135) Laboratories equipped with special apparatus to deal with and process radio-active material.

## West Germany's Nuclear Power Stations— An Atomic Armaments Potential

In a reactor, atomic energy is obtained through controlled nuclear fission. The difference between research reactors, power reactors (for the production of energy) and production reactors depends on the purpose for which they are to be used.

The function of the production reactor is the production of the fissile agent plutonium in an isotopic

composition permitting its use for military purposes. Power reactors and large research reactors can be used for the same purpose, however, if the burn-up time is suitably shortened.

In practice, it is sometimes not possible to make a clear differentiation between reactors in terms of the purpose for which they are used. A typical example of that is the multiple-purpose research reactor at the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, which can handle research tasks, deliver electricity, and produce

plutonium suitable for military use. Because of the prohibitions of the Paris Treaties, and in accordance with their legend of the "purely peaceful" development of West German atomic industry and research, the West German imperialists have until now not announced projects for a reactor designed to be exclusively a production reactor. The West German research reactor FR 2 and the West German power reactors can nevertheless be used to turn out plutonium suitable for military purposes, and thereby constitute an atomic armaments potential. The late American physicist, Professor I. Robert Oppenheimer, declared in this connection:

"The power plants producing electricity may not be ideal for the production of bomb materials, but in case of need . . . they can nevertheless be made to serve the purpose." (136)

In West Germany, at the moment, 26 research and 10 power reactors are either in operation or being set up. Of these reactors, the research reactor FR 2, as well as all the power reactors, and especially the heavy water-natural uranium type, are suitable for the production of plutonium for military purposes.

The construction of power reactors permits a great number of variations, arising from the combination of nuclear fuels, moderators, coolants and many technical details. The high cost of developing reactors, however, have had the effect of restricting the number of reactor types on a world scale, so that in practice only two types of reactor construction have been tried out. These are, firstly, the light water reactors, which use slightly enriched uranium as the nuclear fuel and light water (normal water) as the moderator and coolant (American construction type), and the natural uranium reactor with natural uranium as the nuclear fuel, graphite as the moderator and gas as the coolant (British-French construction type). Both reactor construction types belong to the uranium-plutonium cycle.

In reactor construction, the West German imperialists, along with the reactor types of the fast and thermal breeders, which will be ready for use only from approximately 1980 on, above all are using the light water reactors and the heavy water-natural uranium reactors. The heavy water-natural uranium reactor is a more advanced type than the graphite-gas-natural uranium reactor using heavy water as a moderator.

The light water reactors include the boiling water reactor of the experimental power station at Kahl, the boiling water reactor of the nuclear power station at Gundremmingen, Lingen and Würgassen, as well as the pressurized water reactors of the Obrigheim and Stade nuclear power stations (see table on page 42).

The heavy water-natural uranium reactors include the research reactor FR 2 and the multi-purpose research reactor at the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, as well as the nuclear power station in Niederachbach (KKN).

Up to now, only the two greatest West German

electronics concerns, AEG and Siemens, have received contracts for the construction of light water and heavy water-natural uranium reactors. They have been able to achieve this dominating position only on the basis of their close connections with the American electric concerns, General Electric and Westinghouse. In the field of nuclear energy, the economic base of the aggressive Washington-Bonn axis reveals itself very clearly.

In the construction and the use of the light water reactor, the West Germans are at the moment still dependent on collaboration with the USA. For that reason they need the agreement of their American partner if they want to utilize these reactors for military purposes. EURATOM also has a say in the use of the Gundremmingen, Lingen and Obrigheim nuclear power stations, since these have been declared to be a joint undertaking in the EURATOM agreements (Article 1 and 49, as well as supplement III).

The following of a second line of reactor construction, that of the heavy water-natural uranium reactor, is not tenable from the economic standpoint in view of the high costs of reactor development. It is an expression of the West German imperialists' striving to get atomic armaments. Thus the mouthpiece of West German atomic concerns writes that in many places there is a shying away from the control connected with the procurement of enriched uranium. (137) The representatives of Siemens argue quite openly that the heavy water-natural uranium reactor line of development makes possible a stock-piling of fissile material for many years without difficulty, with all the advantages of being independent of market fluctuations and political insecurity. (138)

The pursuit of this line of reactor development is an expression of the militarization of the West German atomic industry. That is recognized and even confessed by West German atomic scientists also.

Thus Professor Wolf Häfele, director of the fast breeder project, declares that the line of development of heavy water-natural uranium reactors is completely superfluous from the economic-technical point of view.

"In no case", he says, "is there now, from the standpoint of nuclear energy reserves, an argument for intermediate and supplementary generations considering that the fast breeders will not be economically and technically ready for use until about 1980. For that reason it would now serve a better purpose to couple the light water reactors, which predominate in Germany today only with the fast breeders. That means, however, that we must make judgments only from an economic-technical standpoint (our emphasis—Ed.) in the development of available reactor types." (139)

Herewith are some particulars about the heavy water-natural uranium reactors, for the construction of which no economic-technical considerations are decisive, but military and political considerations, and those of the production of armaments.

(137) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1959, p. 508

(138) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 7/8, 1965, p. 392

(139) *idita*, No. 6, 1966, p. 301

(136) J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomkraft und menschliche Freiheit" Rowohlt's Deutsche Enzyklopädie, Hamburg, 1957





Research, production and testing sites of the West German rocket and arms industry

The planning of the research reactor FR 2 (140) was begun in the Max Planck Institute of Physics in Göttingen immediately after the first Geneva conference on the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1955.

This reactor type was decided upon primarily because of the demand that natural uranium should be used as the nuclear fuel. A further demand, which was connected with the development of the reactor, was that "the whole range of problems arising from such a development should for once be worked out independently in the Federal Republic".

Numerous West German concerns were involved in the construction of FR 2. The cost for the construction of the reactor, including fuel elements and heavy water, was 78 million marks.

In the case of the FR 2, which was erected on the grounds of the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe, what is involved is a natural uranium reactor that is moderated and cooled with heavy water. For the FR 2's second charge of fissionable material, 1.5 per cent-enriched uranium was used. The thermal power of the reactor was thus raised from 12 to 44 MW.

On the grounds of the Nuclear Research Centre of Karlsruhe, a multi-purpose research reactor(141) was set up with an electrical output of 50 MW. This was a tank-type reactor that used natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as a moderator and coolant.

The constructor is the state-owned Gesellschaft für Kernforschung mbH, Karlsruhe. The cost of constructing the reactor was 157 million marks.

On December 22, 1961, the over-all contract was signed between the Gesellschaft für Kernforschung (Society for Nuclear Research) and the Siemens-Schuckert Werke AG (now Siemens AG) as the responsible parties for the delivery of the reactor. This is the first power reactor developed by West Germany on its own. With an electrical performance of 50 MW it is able to produce electrical energy economically. It was developed as a multi-purpose reactor that could be used especially for the testing of fissionable and reactor materials. In addition, it is especially suitable for the turning out of plutonium for military purposes.

While a shortening of the burn-up time of the fuel elements, and the refuelling of the reactor, requires a shut-down in other reactor types, such an interruption is not necessary with the multi-purpose type. A charging unit operated by remote control makes pos-

sible a continuous refuelling and thus the shortening of burn-up time necessary for the production of plutonium for military purposes.

At the beginning of 1962, the construction of the reactor was begun. On September 29, 1965, it became critical for the first time, and on April 21, 1966, it began to operate at capacity. It is at the moment the largest heavy water-natural uranium reactor operating in the capitalist states.

The *Niederaichbach nuclear power station (KKN)* is being built at Landshut on the Isar with a pressure tube reactor having a capacity of 100 MW, which is moderated with heavy water and cooled with gas.(142)

The Kernkraftwerk Niederaichbach GmbH and the Gesellschaft für Kernforschung granted a contract to Siemens-Schuckert to set up the complete nuclear power plant. The nuclear section of the plant, i.e. the actual reactor, will be the property of the Gesellschaft für Kernforschung in Karlsruhe, and the conventional part will be the property of the Kernkraftwerk Niederaichbach GmbH. The construction and operation of this nuclear power plant are being financed out of state funds. The cost of the construction is put at 210 million marks. It is estimated the construction will take one year.

The former Director of Economy in the Euratom Commission, Dr. Hans Michaelis, told journalists in May 1966 that the Euratom officials had supported the nuclear power plant designed by Siemens for Niederaichbach, since it was not desirable to remain dependent on the USA alone.(143)

The FR 2 and the multi-purpose research reactor (MZFR) are especially suitable for the production of plutonium usable for military purposes. Both reactors are in the hands of the Bonn state. The capacity of the reprocessing plant for irradiated fuels now under construction in Karlsruhe will be sufficient for reprocessing the fuel elements of these reactors. In this manner the nuclear cycle will be closed for the first time in West Germany precisely for these reactors, which are especially suited for the production of bomb-type plutonium and which were built by West Germany independently of its NATO partners. With the coming into operation of the reprocessing plant the technical preconditions will be created in West Germany for the production in 1969/70 of enough plutonium for the turning out of at least six Nagasaki-type atom bombs annually.

(140) see on this Taschenbuch für Atomfragen 1964, Bonn, supplement between pages 46 and 47, and Die Atomwirtschaft, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1957, p. 402

(141) Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik, Düsseldorf, No. 7/8, 1965, p. 330

(142) Die Atomwirtschaft, Düsseldorf, No. 12, 1964, p. 634

(143) Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, May 27/28, 1966, p. 4; support by Euratom does not mean participation in this nuclear power station.



# Science in the Service of West German Nuclear Armament

## In the Hands of the West German State

According to the Bonn Constitution, the competency of the state in the promotion of scientific research are distributed between the federal authorities and the *Länder*. Legislation in the domain of science, according to Article 70 of the Basic Law (Constitution), is subject to the competency of the *Länder*, with the exception of specific competencies accorded to the Federal Parliament in Bonn. In 1966 the share of the government in Bonn in the expenditure for scientific research had amounted to 39.2 per cent and that of the *Länder* to 59.6 per cent.<sup>(144)</sup> Whereas in the total expenditure for scientific research the share of the *Länder* still surpasses that of the federal government, the proportions are exactly the reverse in the sphere of nuclear research. The expenditure for nuclear research during the period from 1956–1966 was financed to 71.2 per cent by the budget of the federal government and to 28.8 per cent by the budgets of the *Länder*.<sup>(145)</sup> The government in Bonn began to take a share of any importance in the promotion of scientific research only since the beginning of the development of nuclear technology in West Germany. During the years from 1956 to 1964 its share in the total state expenditure on scientific research was increased from 14.8 per cent to 40.6 per cent. During the same period the share of the *Länder* was reduced from 81.3 per cent to 57.6 per cent.<sup>(146)</sup> This shifting of burdens between the federal government and the *Länder* are to a large extent due to the constantly rising expenditures of the Atomic Ministry and the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research in the Sphere of Nuclear Energy.

Nuclear research is being conducted in West Germany at the university institutes and the institutes of the Max Planck Association, the atomic trusts and above all at the state centres for nuclear research.

(144) 1.2 % comes from the villages.

(145) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 6, 1965, p. 251 and *Deutsche Politik 1966*, Federal Government Report, Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, Bonn, p. 292; West Germany's spending for international participation is not included in the allocations of the Bund.

(146) *Deutscher Bundestag*, 4th legislative period, printed matter 2963, Bonn, p. 137

The fact, that nuclear research is to an overwhelming extent being conducted at state institutions and financed by the state, in no way means a disadvantage to the atomic trusts. On the contrary, the state monopoly capitalist organization of West German nuclear research allows the atomic trusts to acquire, free of charge, the results of research work obtained there and to utilize the state institutions for their own research and development work.

In the endeavour to maintain the fairy-tale of the development of the West German nuclear industry and research "for exclusively peaceful purposes", the West German imperialists try to create the impression that nuclear research in West Germany—in contrast to that in the countries of the atomic powers—was largely decentralized. They therefore necessarily come in contradiction to the facts. The results are contradictory statements and assertions.

Thus, the authors of the federal report on Research No. 1 on the one hand state that the overwhelming part of the means for the promotion of nuclear research and the development of nuclear technology were spent on the construction of the nuclear research centres<sup>(147)</sup> and that in many cases nuclear research could only be conducted as large-scale research, on account of the extensive personnel and material expenditure required.<sup>(148)</sup> On the other hand they assert, that West Germany refrained from the establishment of large state centres of nuclear research, among other things because the national research centres abroad owe their existence above all to the fact, that nuclear research was in the first place undertaken under the aspect of military purposes.<sup>(149)</sup>

If the authors of one report make such contradictory statements in regard to state centres of nuclear research, it is not surprising that the authors of various publications should express diametrically opposed points of view.

Thus *Atomwirtschaft* stated in 1960, that the Federal Republic lacked to a large extent the prerequisites

(147) *ibid.*, p. 13

(148) *ibid.*, p. 52

(149) *ibid.*, p. 53

existing elsewhere, namely the large state research and experimental centres, frequently set up for military purposes.(150)

On the other hand the Bonn government in its reports on activities for the same year was obliged to state:

"The specific nature of the material requires in part the establishment of research institutions in the atomic sphere of dimensions, which would exceed the scope of capacities of the universities or the Max Planck Association. Specific nuclear research institutes therefore had to be set up for the fulfilment of these tasks. These include, in particular, the Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe and the Joint Nuclear Research Centre of the Land Northrhine-Westfalia near Jülich, the work of which covers nearly all branches of nuclear research."(151)

Around the middle of 1965 the industrialist gazette *Handelsblatt* made the noteworthy admission that the Federal Republic had created institutes of research at Karlsruhe, Jülich, Garching and Geesthacht which were similar to those of the USA.(152)

These contradictory statements express the desperate endeavour to deny the militarization of West German nuclear research.

Out of the state expenditure for nuclear research during the period from 1956–1965, totalling 3,380 million marks, 1,437 million marks (42.5 per cent) were consumed by the nuclear research centres.

If the share of West Germany in the international organizations, amounting to 702 million marks (20.8 per cent), is left out of consideration, then more than half of all state expenditure goes to the nuclear research centres.(153)

Thus the line initially propagated by West German imperialism, according to which the concentration point of nuclear research should be at the technical colleges and universities, was abandoned.(154) An even greater centralization was to be achieved in the future.

The concentration and centralization of nuclear research at state nuclear research centres was pointed out as an example to be followed also in other spheres of science and research, in connection with the debate on science in the Federal Parliament in Bonn on February 10, 1966:

"Success was achieved where not remnants, but massive sums were invested. This was nowhere as clearly shown as in atomic research, systematically promoted by the federal government ... as a key project. Nuclear research centres were set up with powerful financial assistance from Bonn near Karlsruhe and Jülich, which have brought Germany up to international standards in the domain of reactor physics."(155)

The high degree of militarization of West German

nuclear research arises out of the circumstance, that the largest nuclear research centres at Karlsruhe and Jülich dispose over nuclear engineering plants on an industrial scale for the production of fissile material, thus not only being centres of research, but also centres of nuclear production. The possibilities for veiling the utilization of nuclear engineering plants within the scope of a research centre are very much greater than in industry or nuclear power stations for energy supply, above all because the Paris Agreements impose no limitations on West German monopoly capitalism in the sphere of atomic research.

The ruling circles in Bonn are meeting the demands of an objective trend of development in the centralization of their nuclear research; yet the extension of nuclear research centres beyond the scope of research, into production plants for fissile materials, should not be explained as an objective trend of development, but as an expression of the striving of West German imperialism to create the technical basis for the production of their own nuclear weapons. It is an expression of the militarization of West German nuclear research.

Together with the construction of the West German nuclear research centres, the Bonn government is increasing its pressure on West German scientists to prepare them for the accomplishment of tasks connected with direct atomic armament research and production—in conformity with the provided possibilities for the military utilization of nuclear energy. It is therefore giving priority to political aspects also in the domain of science, rigorously subordinating research work to the political aims of the West German state. That type of research was expressed in the following words by the West German Atomic Minister Balke on January 18, 1962, at the plenary meeting of the West German Central Association of Chambers of Industry and Commerce at Bad Godesberg:

"Science in our country aspires for freedom from politics. This is an impossible demand ... This neutrality, still widely spread in our scientific system in practice has the effect, that a great deal of money is demanded from the state, yet without the readiness on the other side of fulfilling the demands of the state to science in any way ... The state will therefore be inevitably obliged to devote more attention to the situation and to the relationship between science and the state, apart from giving financial aid."(156)

A similar statement was also made by the former Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research, Herr Cartellieri who said on April 27, 1965, lecturing in Switzerland:

"The state, therefore, could no longer be the former 'neutral cultural state' of Humboldt's days, promoting science only on account of the pure search for truth and for the ethical education of man. The modern technological state rather needs science also for its immediate aims."(157)

(150) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 4, 1960, p. 150

(151) *Deutsche Politik* 1960 ... *ibid.*, p. 517

(152) *Handelsblatt*, Düsseldorf, June 11/12, 1965, p. 16

(153) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 6, 1965, p. 251

(154) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1959, Bonn, p. 161

(155) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg, No. 9, 1966, p. 43

(156) *Unsere Wirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 3, 1962, p. 57

(157) quoted by Prof. Fuchs in *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Sept. 14, 1965



In other words: West German scientists should subordinate themselves and their work to the policy of revenge, emergency and nuclear war of West German imperialism.

Apart from the nuclear research centres at Karlsruhe and Jülich, the following other centres are of direct military importance:

- Society for Radiation Research, Munich-Neuherberg. The researches conducted here on the effects of radioactive radiation on living organism are of direct significance in regard to the nuclear war preparations of the army of revenge in West Germany.
- Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in

Shipbuilding and Shipping Hamburg-Geesthacht. The military significance of the work of this centre arises from the significance of atomic propulsion for the construction of warships.

- Institute for Plasma Physics, Garching near Munich. The work of this centre in the sphere of thermonuclear fusion is significant for the production of hydrogen bombs.

In the following it will be revealed, from the development of the nuclear research centres at Karlsruhe and Jülich, how the Bonn government is establishing the foundations for the production of nuclear fissile materials for military uses at those centres.

## Forges for Atomic Weapons—

### The Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe

The construction of the Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe was begun in 1956. On July 19, 1956 the Nuclear Reactor Building and Operating Company was founded at Karlsruhe for the purpose of collecting scientific and technical knowledge on the construction and operation of a reactor station, to evaluate that knowledge and to promote the practical training of scientific and technical experts—in particular also for industrial enterprises. Industry participated in the shape of the Nuclear Reactor Financing Company, Frankfurt on Main to 50 per cent, the federal government to 30 per cent and the *Land* Baden-Württemberg to 20 per cent.

As a result of the atomic trusts' refusal to participate in the costs of the centre, which considerably surpassed the estimated sum required for the Centre because its program of work had been extended in the meantime, the Nuclear Research Company (K II) was founded on June 26, 1959 as financial source for additional institutes and plants, that means besides the Nuclear Reactor Building and Operating Company (K I), which had its capital increased from the original amount of 40 million marks to 60 million marks. In that second company the federal government took a share of 75 per cent and the *Land* Baden-Württemberg participated with 25 per cent. It was to materialize the project, with estimated costs of an additional 80 million marks up to the end of 1965.(158)

It soon became evident that the plans of West German imperialism were much more far-reaching. They were concerned with the construction of a nuclear research centre comparable with those of the western atomic powers.

The statements made by the Social Democratic member of the Federal Parliament Dr. Ratzel on May 9, 1958 in the Federal Parliament revealed that the West German imperialists intended from the start to develop Karlsruhe into a nuclear research centre for which the

nuclear research centres of the western atomic powers served as example.

"As stated by the Minister of Economic Affairs of Baden-Württemberg, these 40 million marks are not enough. This was clear from the beginning, if it had been taken into consideration that the model of Karlsruhe, i.e. Harwell, had an annual expenditure between 160 and 170 million marks in running costs."(159)

In 1962 the West German imperialists announced that after the completion of the centre, approximately 640 million marks would have been invested.(160)

On December 2, 1963 the two companies K I and K II merged in the Nuclear Research Company Karlsruhe (GfK). The legal foundation of the merger was the exclusion of industry from K I, which transferred its share amounting to 30 million marks to the K II free of charge. This transfer of the shares of the atomic trusts free of charge was utilized for propaganda purposes by West German imperialism and proclaimed as a "generous donation".(161)

By this "gesture", the atomic trusts tried to divert attention from the fact that, after having set the stone in motion as regards the construction of the Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe, they shifted all further responsibility for financing it from their shoulder. The most influential trusts ensured their continued influence on the activity of that important nuclear research centre. Thus the *Farbwerke Hoechst* are represented on the Supervisory Board of the company by Professor Winnacker, and the Siemens AG by Director P. Bousset.

It was made known in the autumn of 1965 that the company (GfK) was planning to extend its grounds of approximately 165 hectares by another 110 hectares. The following construction projects are envisaged for the extended grounds, which are not yet included in the investment costs estimated approximately 640 million marks:

(159) Deutscher Bundestag, 3rd legislative period, 29th session, Bonn, p. 1600; Harwell is an important British nuclear research centre.

(160) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 11, 1962, p. 566

(161) *Deutsche Politik* 1963... *ibid.*, p. 428; the sum of 30 million marks came from 92 enterprises (*Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 4, 1963, p. 193)

(158) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen 1960/61*, Bonn, p. 71

- a compact sodium-cooled reactor (KNK)
- a reprocessing plant for irradiated nuclear fuels (WAK)
- a linear accelerator.(162)

In addition to the investment costs there are enormous operational costs. They were estimated at 93 million marks for 1965.(163) The nuclear research centre employed 2,921 persons by the end of 1965.(164)

Among the West German nuclear research centres, Karlsruhe at present has the greatest military significance for West German imperialism, since the research reactor 2 (FR2), the multi-purpose research reactor (MZRF) and the reprocessing plant for the fuel elements of these reactors under construction are providing, up to 1969/70, the technical basis for the production of plutonium for military use within the framework of the centre.

The work on the fast breeder project, the main concentration point of the centre, is also of military significance. This project involves the sum of one thousand million marks.

A breeder reactor is one which produces more fissile material during operation than it consumes.

Since 1960 the construction of such a reactor has been worked on in Karlsruhe. Following the research reactor 2 this is the second large reactor project conceived and undertaken in West Germany, not by the atomic trusts, but by a research centre. The work is now distributed to two types of reactors: one sodium-cooled and one steam-cooled fast breeder. In the meantime the atomic trusts are also taking part in this work. Thus Karlsruhe is cooperating in the sodium-cooled fast breeder project with Siemens and Interatom, and in the steam-cooled fast breeder project with the AEG, the Gutehoffnungshütte and MAN.

The West German imperialists have started setting up a sodium-cooled and a steam-cooled prototype reactor with an electric energy output of 300 Mw in 1968, and set themselves the target to take these reactors into operation by 1973. Subsequently a fast breeder reactor with an electric energy output of 1,000 Mw is to follow.(165)

The program also envisages the construction of a sodium-cooled and zirconiumhydride moderated experimental reactor (KNK) by Interatom on the grounds of the Nuclear Research Centre at Karlsruhe, and of a hot steam reactor (HDR) by the AEG near Kahl, for testing the cooling agents sodium and steam.(166)

At the beginning of 1965 the West German imperialists succeeded in bringing the development of fast breeder reactors to one level with that of Great Britain and France. The head of the competent government department, Pretsch, characterized the West German efforts in this domain as follows:

"This is an ambitious, but well thought-out fifteen-year program, based on precise detail-research,

which is controlled, corrected and coordinated in the various domains and phases of development by modern scientific methods."(167)

The EURATOM states are still dependent on assistance by the US and Great Britain in the development of fast breeders, since those states alone are able to supply the plutonium and the enriched uranium required for the fast incubator projects. Thus EURATOM has taken over the functions of procuring nuclear fuels and of participating in the financing of projects. Although the western atomic powers have so far produced the plutonium suited for atomic weapons in converter reactors of tested construction types, fast breeder reactors assume a great military significance, since they serve as a means for promoting a vast increase of plutonium production.

### The Nuclear Research Centre at Jülich

On February 29, 1956 the government of the Land of Northrhine-Westfalia announced its intention to set up nuclear research institutions. In that same year it was decided, in deviation from the plans of other Länder of the West German Federal Republic, to construct a large central joint nuclear research institution for all universities of the Land. The foundation stone was laid on June 11, 1958.

The Nuclear Research Centre in Jülich (KFA) had been an institution of the Land of Northrhine-Westfalia up to 31 December 1967, legally established as a registered association. The members of the association "Nuclear Research Centre Jülich" (KFA) included the Land of Northrhine-Westfalia, as responsible member, the universities of Northrhine-Westfalia, 17 firms and the Verein Deutscher Eisenhüttenleute e.V., which paid nominal membership dues.(168)

On the Board of Directors of the KFA, the AEG was represented by Dr. Hämmerling, the Rhein Stahl Iron and Steel Works Co. by Professor Spolders, who functioned as Vice President of the Board, and the Krupp trust by Dr. Jng H. Gres.(169)

The entire costs of the construction of the nuclear research centre were originally estimated at 80 million marks.(170) By the end of 1963 they were already estimated at 650 million marks.(171) This made clear, that the ultimate aim no longer consisted merely in the construction of a joint nuclear research centre for the scientific training institutions of Northrhine-Westfalia.

In this case as well, the nuclear research centres of the western atomic powers served as a model to the

(167) *ibid.*, p. 19

(168) Some of these firms were: AEG, Brown Boveri & Cie. AG, DEGUSSA AG, Gelsenkirchner Bergwerks AG, Gutehoffnungshütte Sterkrade AG, Farbenfabrik Bayer AG, Friedrich Krupp, Essen, Kali Chemie AG, Hannover, Mannesmann AG, Maschinenfabrik Budau R. Walf AG, Phoenix-Rheinrohr AG, RWE AG, Rhein Stahl-Hüttenwerke AG, Röbling'sche Eisen- und Stahlwerke GmbH, Siemens AG (Annual Report 1965 of the KFA, p. 7)

(169) *ibid.*, p. 8

(170) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 1, 1967, p. 27

(171) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1964, Bonn, p. 32

(162) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 9, 1965, p. 400

(163) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 10, 1964, p. 520

(164) *Deutsche Politik* 1965 . . . *ibid.*, p. 311

(165) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 3, 1966, p. 99 and *Atompraxis*, Karlsruhe, No. 3, 1966, p. 159

(166) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 1, 1966, p. 4



West German imperialists from the beginning. Around the middle of 1960 the Ministerial Councilors of the Land government of Northrhine-Westfalia, Seiler and Speicher wrote: "Around the same time the Atomic World Conference in Geneva in 1955 had clearly shown, that atomic research and atomic engineering could not be developed fast and far enough by the extension of university institutes alone, and that it was necessary to establish larger combined research centres, in accordance with the models of other countries." (172)

The KFA has two research reactors with a thermal capacity of 5 Mw and 10 Mw respectively. In Jülich too there are considerable operational costs in addition to investment costs, totalling 62.9 million marks in 1965. (173)

In view of the high investment and operational costs of the KFA, the Land government made endeavours to obtain a greater participation in the financing of the enterprise by the federal government.

On December 5, 1967 the federal government and the government of the Land Northrhine-Westfalia signed an agreement on the further extension of the KFA Jülich, and the KFA was transformed into a limited

shares company with a basic capital of one million marks, made available in equal parts by the federal government and the Land government respectively. Up to the end of 1967 the Land of Northrhine-Westfalia had spent 400 million marks on investments and 300 million marks on operational costs of that nuclear research centre with 2,600 employed, whereas the federal government had up to that time granted subsidies to the amount of 60 million marks. (174)

The alteration of the legal status of the KFA Jülich will to a great extent facilitate the coordination of work between the two largest West German nuclear research centres, leading to a further considerable rise in the expenditure of the federal government on nuclear research in West Germany, and strengthen the influence of the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research on the further extension and utilization of the KFA.

This will beyond doubt result in the further acceleration of the militarization of nuclear research in West Germany. The research and development work which is being conducted at Jülich in the domain of the isotope separation of uranium and in the thorium uranium cycle are of particular significance in this connection.

(172) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 2, 1960, p. 301

(173) Annual Report 1965 of the KFA, p. 19

(174) *Industriekurier*, Düsseldorf, Dec. 5, 1967, p. 4

## Research and Development Work for the Separation of Uranium Isotopes

Natural uranium contains only 0.7 per cent of the fissile isotope 235. Natural uranium consists to 99.3 per cent of the non-fissile isotope 238. The reactivity of a reactor may be greatly intensified by means of enrichment, i.e. by means of increasing the proportion of uranium 235 in the uranium-isotope mixture. For this reason numerous reactors use low-enriched uranium as nuclear fuel. In an extremely high enrichment of more than 90 per cent, uranium 235 is suited for use as an explosive for nuclear weapons. The isotope separation of uranium (enrichment) is only possible by physical means. So far only the diffusion process and the electromagnetic mass separator have been tested in practice, the western atomic powers giving preference to the diffusion process. This has the disadvantage however, of only being profitable in very large centres. The West German imperialists are furthermore obliged to consider that in this connection the military purpose of a gas diffusion and isotope separating plant with the highest concentrations could hardly be denied. Thus the journal *Atomwirtschaft* stated already in 1958, that enrichment if brought to a high level in the first place serves military purposes. (175)

Several years later the same journal stated:

"Presuming that the size of diffusion plants at pres-

ent operating in the USA represent an economic optimum, a plant of this kind (in West Germany—the Ed.), intended exclusively for peaceful purposes and therefore not requiring the highest enrichment, should be estimated to involve an investment sum of 4 thousand million marks". (176)

The aim of the West German imperialists therefore consists in developing a new procedure up to industrial maturity, which should be superior to the diffusion process and allow highest enrichment in a camouflaged manner. Intense research work is being conducted in that direction.

Thus in October 1960 the western press already published sensational reports on alleged successes of the DEGUSSA in enriching uranium by means of the centrifuge method. Work by that method was subsequently declared secret by the Bonn government. The government report on activities in 1960 stated that the centrifuge method appeared to be the most hopeful among the various methods of uranium enrichment. The standard of development attained justified the continuation of the research and development work begun at an experimental centre. (177)

The advances achieved by the West German imperialists in developing the centrifuge method were, in fact, entirely out of proportion with the sensational press reports.

On May 29, 1964 the Company for Nuclear Engineering (GKT) was established. This company was set up

(176) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 4, 1964, p. 152

(177) *Deutsche Politik* 1960 . . . *ibid.*, p. 523

(175) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 4, 1958, p. 170

for the purpose of coordinating all research and development work conducted, up to that time, by various institutions in West Germany in the domain of the centrifuge method and to ensure the continuation of that work at the nuclear research centre in Jülich. This was also intended to guarantee a more reliable observation of the security regulations.(178)

This confirms once more that the possibilities of keeping secrecy over the utilization of nuclear engineering centres in the West German state centres for nuclear research are very extensive.

In this way the research and development work for the isotope separation of uranium was concentrated at the Nuclear Research Plant (KFA) in Jülich. The report of the Bonn government on its activities in 1965 states in this connection:

"The development of a procedure for isotope separation by means of gas ultra centrifuges has been fully taken up by the Company for Nuclear Engineering (GKT) in Jülich, established in 1964, the basic capital of which is in the hands of the federal government. The operational and investment costs of the Company are exclusively being defrayed by the federal government."(179)

The aim of work at Jülich consists in the development of an economically efficient centrifuge. Investigations on centrifugal parameters and research on the improvement of individual separating power are at present in progress. Furthermore, centrifuges are being linked in groups, with the aim of investigating the specific problems of such cascades. It is estimated that the separating factors in gas centrifuges are considerably greater than in the other process, which greatly simplifies the construction of cascades.(180)

This simplification offers the possibility to camouflage an extreme concentration of uranium 235, and this represents the particularly valuable aspect for West German imperialism. It was mainly for this reason that the American Atomic Energy Commission withdrew the licence for work with gas centrifuges from four private US-firms, since such centrifuges are attributed a particular significance from the aspect of security, "since the gas centrifuge method of separating uranium 235 from natural uranium complicates international controls more than the gas diffusion process at present in application in the United States and in Great Britain."(181)

This explains the interest of West German monopoly capitalism in the construction of an isotope separating plant on the basis of gas centrifuges. This also explains the striving of the Bonn government to exclude such plants from true international control.

A particular accent is placed on the control of isotope separating plants under the aspect of their possible utilization for the isotope separation of plutonium. Whereas the isotope separation of uranium for military purposes requires a concentration of uranium 235 from 0.7 per cent to more than 90 per cent, the isotope separation of reactor plutonium, i.e. plutonium won in the course of the normal operation of nuclear power stations and not suited for military purposes in that composition, offers far greater possibilities, since reactor plutonium contains the isotope 239 in a concentration of 60–80 per cent, and only needs a further enrichment up to 94 per cent in order to be suitable for use in nuclear bombs.

As a result of the extreme secrecy which shrouds the problems associated with the isotope separation of plutonium by means of centrifuges, only very little information leaks out in regard to the advances made at Jülich.

The eagerness with which West German information media are striving to prove the impossibility of the separation of plutonium isotopes should however be regarded with some suspicion. At the beginning of 1967 *Die Welt* had commented:

"As far as we know, there is no country in the world up to now, which has a plant allowing the separation of plutonium isotopes in quantities worth mentioning. Indeed it has not yet been established with certainty, that plutonium isotopes can be isolated at all by means of the known separating processes."(182)

Apart from the fact that so far there have not yet been imperative military or civilian requirements for the development of a procedure for the separation of plutonium isotopes, the above assertion is in contradiction with the statement already made on February 2, 1966 by the member of the team which discovered the separating method by means of gas ultra centrifuges and Chairman of the GDR Research Council, Professor Dr. Steenbeck, to the effect, that the separation of plutonium isotopes by means of gas ultra centrifuges was basically possible.(183)

The electromagnetic mass separator taken into operation at the Nuclear Research Centre in Jülich in 1966 offers a further potential possibility for the production of plutonium for military purposes, out of "contaminated" reactor plutonium. It was stated officially, that this separator was to be used for transplutonium research. That statement however does not alter the fact that the electromagnetic mass separator was also suited for the separation of isotopes of plutonium and uranium. It should be noted that the uranium 235 for the Hiroshima-bomb was won by this method of isotope separation in the USA.

(178) "10 Jahre Kerntechnik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", *ibid.*, p. 25, 329

(179) *Deutsche Politik* 1965, . . . *ibid.*, p. 313

(180) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 8/9, 1967, p. 387

(181) *Die Welt*, Hamburg, March 25, 1967

(182) *ditto* 24. 2. 1967, p. 10

(183) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, Febr. 2, 1966



# Research and Development Work on the Thorium Uranium Cycle

In the thorium uranium cycle the element thorium 232, non-fissile and available in nature in large quantities, is transformed by neutron capture in reactor operations into the artificial nuclear fissile material uranium 233. Since thorium itself is not a fissile material nor contains such a material, the fuel charge of the reactor must contain a fissile material besides thorium. The aim in this cycle as well consists in developing a breeder which produces more fissile material than it consumes.

The West German imperialists are above all concentrating on the thorium-uranium cycle with a view to improving the supply of the West German atomic industry with nuclear fuel by the use of thorium, and on the other hand in order to gain possession of uranium 233, which can be used for military purposes. The economic and technical aspects alone will not justify the high investments on these additional reactor construction projects pursued by the West German imperialists, as shown by the statement by Professor Häfele.(184)

As a first move on the way to the thorium breeder an experimental atomic power station was set up on the grounds of the Nuclear Research Centre in Jülich during the period from 1960–1966, which has a thorium converter with an electrical energy output of 15 Mw. This is a gas-cooled high-temperature reactor with spherical fuel elements, developed by BBC/Krupp, on the order of the Working Group Test Reactor (AVR).

(184) compare footnote 139 in this documentation  
(185) Die AVR was founded by 10 EVUs on Febr. 3, 1959 in Düsseldorf (*Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 5, 1957, p. 171 and No. 2 1959, p. 78)  
(186) *Deutsche Politik* 1966 . . . *ibid.*, p. 295

(185) The reactor was in a critical state for the first time on August 25, 1966.(186)

Also in this case the West German imperialists depend on deliveries of highly enriched uranium from the USA and even the combustible elements are produced by the American firm Union Carbide Corporation. Uranium and thorium dicarbide are being used as nuclear fuels. The uranium-thorium ratio is 1 : 5. The uranium has an enrichment of 93 per cent uranium 235.(187)

The supply of highly concentrated uranium empowered the American Atomic Energy Commission to impose an agreement, enabling it to acquire the results of research and experimental work with the AVR-reactor and to utilize that West German reactor for testing the new American nuclear fuel.(188)

As a next move the planning and subsequent construction of a prototype thorium high temperature reactor (THTR) with an electrical energy capacity of 300 Mw is envisaged.(189)

The Bonn government noted in its annual report on activities in 1965:

"At the Nuclear Research Centre in Jülich . . . work to develop a gas-cooled thorium high temperature reactor (THTR) with a high conversion ratio and investigations on thermal thorium breeders are beginning to move into the focus of nuclear technological research and development work."(190)

Since the nuclear fission agent uranium 233 is gained in the operation of thorium converters and thorium breeders, the research and development work in the sphere of the thorium uranium cycle assumes a military significance.

(187) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, No. 10, 1964, p. 519  
(188) *ditto*, No. 5, 1963, p. 340  
(189) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf, No. 1, 1966, p. 4  
(190) *Deutsche Politik* 1965 . . . *ibid.*, p. 313

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## Behind Closed Doors

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### In the Interest of the Armament Monopolies

The West German atomic industry and research work in the GFR has a marked state monopoly capitalist character. Thus, the construction of reactors in West Germany is financed out of state funds. The large companies of the atomic industry, that entered the lucrative atomic business as suppliers, have the West German state as business partner, in the shape of the Nuclear Research Company. The comprehensive activity of the West German state in the utilisation of nuclear energy is in flagrant contradiction to the programmatic declarations made above all at the beginning of the nuclear technological development in West Germany. Thus the Secretary of State at the Ministry for Scientific Research at that time, Dr. Wolfgang Cartellieri, had stressed that in accordance with the "principles of the open market economy and with the aim of free competition", great value was attributed to the development of private initiative, and that the newly developing branch should as far as possible do without state control.<sup>(191)</sup> In fact however, the West German imperialists made sure, by means of state monopoly capitalist measures, that the West German atomic industry and research should from the start be subject to a centralised direction and régulation. Thus by the end of 1955 the Federal Ministry for Nuclear Affairs was set up for the purpose of promoting scientific research and development in the field of nuclear engineering. Four years later the Federal Parliament was given the right of passing concurrent legislation for the domain of nuclear energy by an amendment of the Basic Law (Constitution). A Federal Atomic Energy Law was passed together with the Basic Law. It is particularly evident in the sphere of nuclear energy, how the private ownership of means of production and private initiative on that basis have become outlived by the direct state involvement in economic development.

The interlacement of monopoly capitalist and state power is a decisive feature of state monopoly capitalism. A solid mechanism has been established in West

Germany today, by means of which the most powerful monopolies determine all government decisions. An important part is being played in this connection by the employers' associations, which dominate all the important government commissions and advisory councils. This is clearly demonstrated in the sphere of the atomic industry and in nuclear research. Thus the large companies of nuclear industry exert a decisive influence on the executive and legislative bodies of the West German state, above all through the following executive bodies and organisations:

- the *Working Group for Atomic Questions* of the Federation of German Industry (BDI)  
Owing to the fact that the atomic industry is newly arising out of other existing branches of industry, and since it is as yet far from representing a branch with a clearly defined outline, there is no special association for the atomic industry within the framework of the BDI.
- The "German Atomic Forum" (DATf)  
Includes among its membership industrial and commercial enterprises, associations, institutes, authorities and individuals. It has a comprehensive organisational mechanism. Its most influential body is the Presiding Board. The Board of Trustees includes all large companies of importance in the sphere of atomic energy (see appendix p. 85).
- the Federal Parliamentary Committee for Science, Cultural Policy and the Press.  
This Committee is largely influenced by the DATf. Frau Geisendörfer (CSU), the Vice Chairman of the Committee, is a member of the Board of Trustees of the DATf (see appendix p. 85).
- The German Atomic Energy Commission (DAK).  
This is the most important instrument of the nuclear trusts for imposing their interests, as no important decision by the competent Federal Ministry can be made concerning nuclear energy without its recommendation (see p. 86).

The DAK was set up on January 26, 1956, by a decision of the Bonn Government and officially entrusted with the task of advising the Federal Minister for Scientific Research on all important matters linked

(191) Taschenbuch für Atomfragen, Bonn 1959, p. 3



with the research and application of nuclear energy. As a consultative body the DAK has no executive powers, in contrast to the atomic energy commissions of other countries. This fact frequently leads to an underestimation of the significance and function of the DAK. This was expressed in a drastic manner by the SPD member of the Federal Parliament, Dr. Ratzel, speaking in the Federal Parliament on May 9, 1958, when he said among other things:

"This atomic energy commission stands entirely in the shade of the Ministry. We hear and see very little of it. This shortcoming, we consider, is largely due to the fact, that the commission basically has no competency, only representing a consultative body of the Ministry."(192)

The fact that very little is seen or heard of the DAK should not lead to the conclusion however, that this body was inactive, insignificant or merely standing in the shade. It is one of the tasks of the state monopoly capitalist organisation in the sphere of nuclear energy to exclude legislature, so as to conceal and veil the concrete enforcement of the interests of the nuclear trusts before the eyes of the public. That is why one of the first actions of the DAK consisted in establishing standing orders for its work, according to which the sessions of the atomic energy commission, its special committees and groups were not public but confidential. It is expressly laid down within those standing orders, that communications on statements made by individual members, on voting proportions and on the content of the minutes are not permitted. Any results of consultations may be published only with the consent of the Chairman.

As far back as 1967 the Bonn government had written that the influence of the DAK was limited from the *de jure* point of view, but *de facto* its recommendations were of great significance.(193)

Herr Cartellieri characterised the work of the DAK as follows:

"A five-year-program decided by the German Atomic Energy Commission provides it (the Federal government—the Ed.) with guiding lines for action. Furthermore each detail problem of any importance, such as the worthiness of promotion of a research project or technical development scheme out of means of the Federal government, is carefully discussed with the special committees of the Commission."(194)

The former executive manager of the DAK at the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research, Willi Hesse, stated that the Federal Minister for Scientific Research deviated from the results of the consultations of the DAK only in "cases of rare exception".(195)

In this connection the demagogical appreciation of the work of the DAK by the former Federal Minister for Scientific Research, Hans Lenz, in 1965 is also significant:

"There is one thing which I was able to note with satisfaction in the cooperation (between the Ministry and the DAK—the Ed.). The members of the committees of the German Atomic Energy Commission, who are extremely burdened in their capacity as leading representatives of research and industry, have nevertheless made no attempt to cast aside this work, which lies in the interest of the public; they have always fulfilled their tasks in the Commission in a spirit of great responsibility. The state therefore obviously has an opportunity to include citizens to a far greater extent in shaping the common destiny than this frequently appears to be possible within the traditional scope."(196)

The "citizens" i.e. the representative of monopoly capitalist interests, are doing comprehensive work in the DAK, its special committees and groups for the benefit of the large atomic companies. It goes without saying that there could be no thought of selflessness on the part of those "citizens" appointed to the DAK by the monopolies.

The decisions of the DAK, its special committees and groups, appearing in the guise of recommendations, are implemented by the Ministry. A special department of the Ministry for Scientific Research labelled "Executive Management of the German Atomic Energy Commission and the German Commission for Space Research", in cooperation with the competent organs of the Ministry is dedicated to this task. In practice the Ministry is rather more the executive body of the DAK than the DAK is an advisor to the Ministry on matters concerning nuclear energy.

The DAK for its part is an instrument of the most important monopolies in the sphere of nuclear energy, serving the enforcement of their interests; this is clearly visualized by the list of DAK members in the appendix on page 77. This is equally clearly reflected by the composition of the special committees and groups of the DAK.

Dr. Ratzel therefore was justified in criticizing the personal composition of the DAK, speaking in the Federal Parliament in 1958:

"Nor are we entirely content with the personal composition of the DAK; it is somewhat too one-sided. If I am correctly informed, 13 out of the 25 members of the Atomic Energy Commission are representatives of industry, in contrast to only 2 trade unionists. I think that this is a rather modest and underdeveloped fig-leaf, since the employees are also greatly interested in the things taking place in the sphere of atomic energy."(197)

Yet there has not been the slightest change since then in the composition of the DAK.

On the basis of the orientation issued by the BDI, there is a distribution of tasks between the DAK and the DATf. Whereas the DAK officially functions as a consultative body of the Ministry, the DATf conducts extensive public activities, the main task of which

(192) Deutscher Bundestag, 3rd legislative period, 29th session, Bonn, May 9, 1958, p. 1601 (Deutscher Bundestag)

(193) *Deutsche Politik* 1957 . . . *ibid.*, p. 461

(194) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 8/9 1964, p. 362

(195) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen* 1974, Bonn, p. 14

(196) 10 Jahre Kerntechnik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland . . . *ibid.*, p. 4

(197) Deutscher Bundestag, p. 1601

consists in obtaining even more state support for the West German atomic industry. In special cases the good offices of the Scientific Committee of the Federal Parliament are called upon.

The major atomic companies have a seat and vote on the organisations decisive in regard to the development of the atomic industry and nuclear research in West Germany.

The Farbwerke Hoechst AG and the Krupp trust have secured the most influential positions for themselves:

– Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg

In his capacity as Federal Minister for Scientific Research, he is at the same time Chairman of the DAK. Prior to his appointment as Federal Minister he had been a director at Krupp's.

– Professor Dr. Karl Winnacker

Vice Chairman of the DAK and at the same time chairman of the important special committee III "Technical and Economic Aspects of Reactors", Winnacker also presides the Board of Directors of the Farbwerke Hoechst AG and the DATF.

– Dr. Wilhelm Alexander Menne

He is a member of the DAK and at the same time the chairman of the important special committee V "Economic, Financial and Social Problems". Herr Menne is a member of the Board of Directors of the Farbwerke Hoechst AG. His most important functions include: Vice President of the BDI and chairman of the Working Group for Atomic Problems of the BDI; member of the Board of Directors of the DATF and chairman of the Economic Committee of the Federal Parliament in Bonn.

The other large atomic companies also occupy powerful positions in the state monopoly capitalist

organisation for the direction and regulation of the atomic industry. Thus the AEG-Telefunken group is represented in the Committee for Atomic Problems of the BDI by Dr. Boden, a member of their Board of Directors, and in the "(West) German Atomic Energy Commission". Dr. Knott, member of the Board of Directors of the Siemens AG is a member of the Committee for Atomic Problems of the BDI and the German Atomic Energy Commission, and Professor Goeschel, representing the same firm, is a presiding member of the "German Atomic Forum". Dr. Prentzel of DEGUSSA is a presiding member of the DATF and of the Committee for Atomic Problems of the BDI.

In this connection, the fact that the armament trusts which previously and at present exist on West German territory, above all appointed persons to the above mentioned bodies, which exert a decisive influence on the atomic policy of the West German state, who are known to dispose over the necessary qualifications for the solving of problems of the armament economy from their activity in the fascist war economy and the Hitlerite state administration, is particularly significant and dangerous; those men have proved, by their activities up to 1945, that they are ready to give unconditional support to the aggressive and criminal power politics of German imperialism. Yet the agents of German imperialism of the past and present should not only be sought in West Germany. Similar to Hitler, West Germany has its fifth column. Its members are sitting in EURATOM or in countries such as South Africa—which by the way is to function as the raw material basis of the West German atomic armament industry—so as to help to enforce the aims of West German imperialism. (appendix p. 73).

## A Carefully Coordinated Scheme

The fact that the same atomic trusts are represented on the Committee for Atomic Problems of the BDI, on the DATF, the Scientific Committee of the Federal Parliament and the DAK—partly by the same "citizens"—permits and facilitates the coordination of tasks in the effort to enforce their interests. This was expressed very drastically for example in the measures undertaken by the atomic trusts for ensuring state assistance in financing the program for the development of reactors with small and medium output for emergency purposes, launched in 1960.

In the second reading of the budget law for 1961, on March 16, 1961, the CSU Member of Federal Parliament, Linus Memmel, presiding member of the DATF, complained, in his capacity as a member of the Committee for Atomic Energy and Water Supply Atomic Energy Committee of the Federal Parliament, about the fact, that the means for Item 891 "Measures of Promoting the Projection and Installation of Experimental Reactors" to be financed out of the program for the development of reactors of small

and medium capacities should be included in the extraordinary budget. (198)

Although the Minister of Finances and the Secretary of State of the Nuclear Research Ministry had promised, according to Memmel, to include this item also in the extraordinary budget and to reinstate it in the ordinary budget in 1962, the DATF passed a resolution in April 1961, in which an intensified state assistance for the construction of reactors in West Germany was demanded. The DAK adopted a decision on that resolution during the same month, expressing full support of the demands of the DATF. (199)

The atomic trusts however were not content with this. On May 8, 1961, 16 members of Federal Parliament tabled an interparty motion, asking the government "in view of the backwardness of German nuclear research, to take all measures without delay to ensure the attainment of international standards of development." The supporters of that motion included the presiding members of the DATF Fürst Otto von

(198) *ibid.*, 3rd election period, 152nd session, p. 8752

(199) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 5/1961, p. 304



Bismarck, Herr Linus Memmel and the late Dr. Thomas Dehler.(200) This motion was passed on to the Atomic Energy Committee of the Federal Parliament on May 30, 1961.(201)

The Atomic Energy Committee supported the motion, stressing above all the importance of the development of reactors of small and medium output, and demanding the provision of adequate means under the ordinary budget of the Atom Ministry for the year 1962. The written report by the Atomic Energy Committee of June 16, 1961 was signed by the late Dr. Thomas Dehler (FDP), chairman of the committee at the time, of Frau Geisendörfer (CSU), presiding member of the DATf and reporter, and member of the Board of Directors of the DATf.(202)

On June 29, 1961 the application made by the 16 MPs was unanimously passed as an act of parliament.(203)

On August 23, 1961 the Board of Directors of the DATf appreciated the results of this action, conducted in the interest of the atomic trusts: "Thanks to the initiative of the members of the Federal Parliament represented on the DATf... the Federal Minister of Finances consented to include the Item on the promotion of the construction of reactors in the extraordinary budget, and this consent was noted in the protocol of the Federal Parliament. Apart from the fact that soon afterwards a generous allocation of means was noted for certain reactor projects by the Federal Ministry for Atomic Energy and Water Supply, this laid the foundations for a parliamentary action. On June 29, the Federal Parliament unanimously passed the motion as an act... In this way the position of the Federal Atom Ministry in further negotiations with the Federal Ministry of Finances was considerably reinforced. The DATf considers the ensurance of the implementation of the overall concept as laid down within the act of the Federal Parliament, to be an essential task."(204)

The aim of that action, started by the atomic trusts through the representatives of their interests in the DATf and the DAK, who also had a decisive say in the atomic committee of the Federal Parliament(205), above all consisted in imposing and securing state finances for the program to develop reactors with small and medium output within the scope of the emergency program. At a meeting of the "German Atomic Forum" in Constance in 1963, the then head of the nuclear research department of the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research, Herr Kaissling, expressed

his views on that program. *Atomwirtschaft* reported on this as follows:

"It (the emergency program—the Ed.) envisages among other things the construction of comparatively small power stations at the concentration points of consumption and in a sheltered position, i.e. above all underground, the total capacity of which is to constitute 3 per cent of the capacities to be installed in the Federal Republic by the year 1975, i.e. 2,000 Mw. According to Kaissling this purpose would be served by 50 power stations of 10 Mw each, 20 of 25 Mw each and 10 of 100 Mw each. Atomic power stations appear to be particularly suited to this program for numerous reasons. At the same time the development of reactors could receive important new impulses in this way."(206)

Herr Kaissling had "unwisely" revealed something which was to have been concealed. Yet this made clear, that the extension of the first West German atomic program in 1960 by reactors of those dimensions should be explained by emergency plans, not by alleged prospects of export to the developing countries, which are interested in deliveries of power stations which are not too large for the construction of their industry in underpopulated areas and without compound network, as previously alleged by the Bonn government.(207) Nor did the assertion made by Dr. Pretsch, the successor of Herr Kaissling, on December 5, 1962 at a meeting in Essen organized by the "German Atomic Forum", that the West German power industry was interested in the construction of small and medium-sized atomic power stations correspond to facts.(208) At the beginning of 1965 that gentleman had changed his mind and he said, in view of the fact that the development of atomic power stations in West Germany was giving him the lie, that the extension of the first West German atomic energy program was intended not least as a transitory aid to reactor development groups in industry(209), not in the interest of the power industry as he had previously asserted, but in the interest of the atomic trusts. The DATf presiding member Memmel had made the demagogical statement on March 16, 1961 in the Federal Parliament, that the program imposed a considerable burden on the responsible firms(210).

This example clearly shows the way in which the mechanism of the system of state monopoly capitalism in West Germany enforces the profit interests of the monopolies, and how the West German population is deceived and betrayed in this connection.

(200) Deutscher Bundestag, 3rd legislative period, Bonn, Drucksache 2737

(201) *ibid.*, 160 session, May 30, 1961, p. 9266

(202) *ibid.*, printed matter 2867

(203) *ibid.*, 165th session, p. 9627

(204) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 9/1961, p. 472

(205) Mit Beginn der 5. Wahlperiode Ausschuß für Wissenschaft, Kulturpolitik und Publizistik

(206) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 5/1963, p. 331; Kaissling retired in March, 1963.

(207) *Deutsche Politik* 1960, p. 522

(208) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf 1/1963, p. 44

(209) *Atomwirtschaft/Atomtechnik*, Düsseldorf 1/1965, p. 19

(210) Deutscher Bundestag, 3rd legislative period, 152nd session, Bonn, p. 8752

## The Legend about the Specific West German Organization of the Atomic Industry and Research for "Exclusively Peaceful Purposes"

The state monopoly capitalist nature of the West German atomic industry and of nuclear research is in conformity with their state monopoly capitalist organization, as represented by the scheme shown on p. 63. The form of the state monopoly capitalist organization for the regulation and direction of the West German atomic industry and of nuclear research differ in several respects from that of the western atomic powers. On the basis of this fact, the West German imperialists state that the West German organization deviated from that of the USA, Great Britain and France in that West Germany was developing the atomic industry for "exclusively peaceful purposes." Thus it was stated in an article published by *Atomwirtschaft* that:

"This construction (Federal Ministry for Scientific Research and DAK—the Ed.) is possible not leastly, because the Federal Republic has renounced the development of nuclear weapons."(211)

The former executive manager of the DAK at the Federal Ministry for Scientific Research, Herr Hesse, wrote around the same time:

"In this way the German Atomic Energy Commission differs from those of other countries, which, because of military reasons being frequently in the foreground there, are authorities with their own executives and in part vested with legislative powers."(212)

Herr Cartellieri substantiated the deviating West German form of organization as follows:

"The reasons are to be sought in the belated start and in the confinement to the peaceful application, as well as in the federative structure of the Federal Republic and the relationship between the state and private enterprise."(213)

In fact, however, the possibility for the creation of the atomic armament potential does not depend on the form of state monopoly capitalist organization for the regulation and direction of the atomic industry and of nuclear research. This possibility arises for the West German imperialists from the double nature of atomic energy, which permits them to formally observe the provisions of the Paris Treaties. The technical pre-

requisites of the military utilisation of nuclear energy are being created in West Germany just as they already exist in the USA, in Great Britain and France. The policy of West Germany is directed towards the creation of a complete nuclear technological uranium-plutonium cycle, which is to allow for a possible production of atomic weapons even independently of the NATO partners. The assertions claiming the existence of a "specific West German organization for the exclusively peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy", are devoid of all foundations and can therefore not be substantiated. They are an expression of the efforts to divert attention from the militarization of West German atomic industry and nuclear research.

Even the leading West German legal expert in the sphere of nuclear energy, Professor Fischerhof, could do no more than point out, that the Atomic Energy Commissions of the USA and Great Britain arose from the days of war and the development of atomic weapons. On the other hand he was obliged to confirm that those "institutions are rooted in the particular features of the state and economy of those countries, which differ from our own far more than is generally assumed." The formation of an atomic energy commission "which is vested with legislative and executive powers apart from the government and independently of it, issuing regulations, directives, licences, prohibitions etc., is incompatible with the constitutional law valid in the Federal Republic."(214)

The West German organization therefore takes account of the specific West German conditions—the federative structure of the West German Federal Republic and the aspects of constitutional law linked with it—and the endeavours of the West German monopoly capitalists to maintain the fiction of a free market economy also in the sphere of the atomic industry. The West German imperialists are striving to camouflage the creation of the atomic armament potential by the legend about the development of the West German atomic industry and nuclear research "for exclusively peaceful purposes". They are trying to include in that legend also the difference in the form of their own state monopoly capitalist organization of the regulation and direction of the new branch of industry from that of the western atomic powers.

It is obvious, therefore, that the politicians of revenge in Bonn are content to use every means for the concealment of the militarisation of the atomic industry and research in West Germany, blinding the eyes of the population of their own state and of world public opinion in regard to this dangerous development.

(211) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 4/1960, p. 162.

(212) *Taschenbuch für Atomfragen 1960/61*, Bonn, p. 9.


(213) *Die Atomwirtschaft*, Düsseldorf, 8/9 1964, p. 362.

(214) *ditto* 3/1956, p. 93.





# Das staatsmonopolistische System der rüstungsorientierten Atomwirtschaft Westdeutschlands



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## Conclusions

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The policy conducted at present by the West German government is a direct menace to the German people and to European security.

The arrogant claim to speak for all Germans which has been dictated by the accursed expansionist urge and insatiable greed for profit of the state-monopoly system in West Germany is meant to cover up the aggressive plans of restoring the imperialist German Reich within its 1937 frontiers. In fact, this claim can only be interpreted as a declaration of war on the GDR and the other member states of the Warsaw Treaty.

The endeavours to obtain control over nuclear weapons underline the aggressive character of the aims pursued by the present government of the Federal Republic, which obviously consist in forcing through its revanchist concept towards the GDR and its Socialist neighbours through nuclear blackmail.

The military policy of the West German state is a dangerous and adventurous one, and it is one without any chances whatsoever. The only perspective it has is its own ruin, but this time even larger sections of the European peoples would be plunged into disaster than at the first and second attempt of German imperialism to establish a "new order" in Europe.

The events on August 21, 1968 reconfirmed unmistakably that the imperialist forces are unable to put back the clock of history. The constellation of forces in the world and in Europe has definitively changed in favour of Socialism which is allied with the anti-imperialist liberation movement in those nations still under the imperialist yoke. The Socialist states will never allow a situation to arise in which the vital interests of Socialism are jeopardized, in which the inviolability of the frontiers of the Socialist community are challenged thus endangering world peace.

The arms race which is at present being stepped up by NATO, particularly by West German and US imperialism, will further jeopardize world peace. It will lay more burdens on the nations and prevent the solution of other problems of world-wide importance. It must therefore be the primary task of the democratic forces in West Germany and in the other imperialist countries to oppose the senseless arms race

in powerful actions and to come out in favour of internationally valid measures ending the arms race, limiting arms production and leading to disarmament as proposed anew by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko before the United Nations General Assembly on October 3, 1968. In the first place it is necessary—and such a measure is in the interest of the West German population and all European nations—to compel the Bonn government to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty so that the West German imperialists will never gain access to nuclear weapons. To reach this aim the Federal Republic needs a new policy, but not new wine in old bottles.

Such a new policy implies pushing back the state-monopoly system, which is a permanent source of aggression and danger to European peace, so that the road will be open to a change of the social conditions in West Germany with democracy and Socialism as the great aim.

The vast majority of the citizens in the Federal Republic want peace and security. The way out of the impasse into which the West Germans have been led by the ruling state-monopoly system has been shown in many alternative proposals and concepts submitted by West German democrats and trade unionists, Communists and Socialists, who love peace and hate war and who champion social progress in the Federal Republic. These ideas found their most eloquent expression in the Draft Programme of the Communist Party of Germany published in February 1968.

In full agreement with the other Socialist states, the German Democratic Republic has time and again tabled realistic proposals for a contribution to European security by the two German states, proposals which are in the interest of the West German population. The Bonn government has turned down all these proposals so as to be able to further intensify its program of changing the status quo in Europe. They could not prevent, however, that ever more citizens in the Federal Republic are identifying themselves with the realistic demands of the GDR.

Whether or not the future policy of the West Ger-



man Federal Republic will be based on realities will depend on the recognition of the existence of two German states and of the special political status of West Berlin, on the acceptance of the frontiers created in Central Europe after the World War II as

well as of the status quo, on the renunciation of any nuclear armament and on its readiness to enter a denuclearized zone along with the GDR.

This is the path leading to peace and security in Europe.

## Questions and Replies at the Press Conference

### Question:

*There has been mention here of the so-called control of fissile material within EURATOM. It is well-known that the present West German Chancellor, Herr Kiesinger, just in the recent period reiterated that in having renounced the production of fissile material and nuclear weapons in 1954, the West German Federal Republic made certain performances in anticipation. Now my question is: How do you judge this in the light of the refusal to sign the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty?*

### Reply by Professor Rudolf Arzinger:

To answer this question, I feel, one should take a closer look at the declaration of 1954. As you know, when concluding the Paris Treaties in 1954, the Federal Government renounced the production of nuclear weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic. This is to say that it underwent a so-called obligation, which, however, in no way excludes the production of nuclear weapons outside the Federal Republic, the manufacture of parts of nuclear weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic and following assembly abroad as well as the acquisition, the possession and the control of nuclear weapons.

This is by no means an interpretation we are imputing to this declaration. If I may draw your attention to the West German "Dictionary of International Law" to which all noted international law experts of the Federal Republic without exception contributed: this dictionary unambiguously states that the Declaration of 1954 contains deliberate changes as compared to the more comprehensive wording of a similar declaration made in 1952. Assessing this declaration, the West German international law experts say it merely was prohibiting the Federal Republic from producing nuclear weapons at home, but not from possessing them, whereas, on the contrary, countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and also Finland and even the NATO member Italy were banned from both production and possession under the 1947 Peace Treaties.

Naturally, it should not be neglected that the Federal Republic if not through the Declaration of 1954, through other international documents which are part of International Law is in fact clearly bound to desist from nuclear armament in any form whatsoever. This results e.g. from the obligations enshrined in the Potsdam Agreement which say that no more threat to world peace or Germany's neighbours must emerge from German soil. This is also the spirit of all the principles laid down in Potsdam and other agreements of the Four Powers in 1945.

In the final analysis, nothing is left in the 1954 Declaration of the ban emerging from these principles which are sanctioned too by Article 107 of the U. N. Charter and other documents of International Law. Consequently, the Declaration of 1954 was not designed to profess a renunciation but rather to reduce existing international bans which should be binding for the Federal Republic, by picking out a small, unessential part easy to elude. This argument, actually goes at diverting the attention from the existing international bans on nuclear armament which are valid for the Federal Republic and which for the rest are prudently neglected in all these declarations. It goes at diverting the attention from the need for creating additional safeguards against a nuclear armament of the Federal Republic by way of its accession to the treaty banning the spread of nuclear weapons. But I think that on the other hand precisely this argument, not least together with the whole constellation of facts mentioned earlier today, testifies precisely the urgent need for creating such additional guarantees.

### Question:

*What is your opinion of the Bonn government's claim that the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the controls associated with it would impede the peaceful use of nuclear energy?*

### Answer by Professor Steenbeck:

These controls would in no way impede the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They allow for quantities, dif-



ferences in material and results permitting to run a pilot plant without interference. Differences are, however, limited so that the production of bombs with the unregistered material is ruled out.

**Question:**

*Do carriers for nuclear weapons exist in the Federal Republic?*

**Reply by Hermann Steffen, Engineer:**

Certainly, I am not the first one to tell you that as carriers in the Federal Republic there is the Pershing rocket, and moreover, the Starfighter. But to me it does not seem to be of primary concern that these carriers do exist there. Pershing rockets, for example, can also convey conventional warheads, and the Starfighter is not only a fighter-bomber but also a reconnaissance aircraft and an interceptor. What seems decisive to me is that atomic war is in fact rehearsed. To prove this I will give you two examples from my activity, at least concerning the Starfighter.

From my practical experience I know that during atomic bomb dropping exercises in Sardinia difficulties occurred with the engine. I think you know that atom bombs are released by a so-called shoulder-drop. Since the Starfighter engines were too weak for this, some changes became necessary.

I would like to draw your attention to another example. In 1963 or 1964 I had several talks with Starfighter pilots who were trained as fighter-bomber pilots. During one of these talks I learnt from a Starfighter pilot that during their trainings they were given at least two possible targets for dropping atom bombs. This goes to show they were acquainted with the territory they would have to overfly and they had to find out prominent navigation marks so that practically a word would suffice for them to enter their planes, after a few security bars were overcome, and approach the target.

During this first conversation I was still under the impression the pilot was exaggerating things. But on reading the very same fact in *Spiegel* one year later I found that two very different informants had given identical statements. Then I had all reason to assume that the Starfighter pilot I had talked with had not told a story but facts.

**Question:**

*Can you, please, give me some information on the nuclear cooperation between West Germany and Israel?*

**Reply by Hans Wiczorek, physicist:**

In the Federal Republic the state of Israel maintains a representation which on government order purchases certain articles in the Federal Republic. These include equipment, instruments and test racks required in the nuclear field. I have knowledge about

several of these supplies, and I know also who received them. In every case it was the Weitzmann Institute.

**Klaus Breuer, physicist, B.Sc. (on the same question):**

If I may add something regarding the connection Bonn-Israel, it is not just a matter of the known good relations between Bonn and Tel Aviv. One should see in addition, that the effectivity of these links are increased since the Israelis are given all opportunity of gathering information in the Federal Republic. I myself came to meet a number of Israelis living in the Federal Republic or touring it in an official mission who wanted me to give them information on works of nuclear physical research with military applications, so to speak from my angle and my capacities. I should like to put it like this: For Israelis all doors are open in the Federal Republic.

**Question:**

*What importance do the ruling circles in Bonn attach to NATO and EURATOM in their bid for nuclear weapons?*

**Reply by Dr. Bock, Departmental Head in the GDR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs:**

There are some politicians in the western countries who have kept trying to create the impression NATO and EURATOM were efficient instruments of controlling the policies and the developments of West Germany, especially in the spheres of rearmament and nuclear armament.

If you look at the practical policies you will see that right from the first hour of its membership in NATO and EURATOM the Federal Republic did everything that could be done not to be a simple member leave alone giving controlling rights to these organisations, but to gain influence on the policy lines of these alliances.

Just see the nuclear armament, the industrious and not at all futile endeavours of the Federal Republic to obtain a say in the NATO's so-called Nuclear Planning Group, i.e. a say in defining the strategy and tactics of the North Atlantic Treaty. The discussions going on in this alliance in recent times particularly with regard to the use of nuclear weapons clearly reveal the handwriting of the West German Federal Republic. The Federal Republic tries by all means to keep the so-called atomic threshold to the use of nuclear weapons at the "H-Hour" as low as possible. If in recent debates of NATO there was talk of launching so-called demonstrative nuclear blows, this has been a fruit of the efforts by the West German government.

The West German government's growing influence in NATO politics is reflected, for example in the rising number of key positions in the commanding staffs of NATO given to West Germans. This is particularly true for the Central European sector. As you know this is

the sector in which more than 6,000 nuclear warheads are stockpiled, and which is under the command of a West German general.

It is in this light that one has to judge the desire whose special purveyor is Herr Franz Josef Strauss: the desire for creating a so-called European nucleus of NATO with the line towards an atomic nucleus in which naturally Bonn, according to its economic positions, claims a decisive say.

What I have said here for NATO also applies to the position of West Germany in EURATOM. I think, Herr Wiczorek has put clearly what you have to think about EURATOM control on West Germany. If there are cases of Plutonium disappearing there by whole kilogrammes, this gives you a clear impression of these controls.

But discussions which appeared recently in connection with the research programme, i.e. the future work of EURATOM give a clear-cut idea of what West Germany wants. As generally known, West Germany does not want to put any limits to the EURATOM programme. West Germany also endeavours to link this programme as closely as possible to the military uses of the nuclear capacities. These facts unambiguously prove that far from being controlled by NATO and EURATOM West Germany wields growing influence on the policies of these organizations.

#### **Question:**

*Is there a cooperation with West German intelligence services and what role do they play altogether in connection with the facts you have given here?*

#### **Reply by Hans Wiczorek, physicist:**

One of my tasks was to ensure that matters with which we were made acquainted did not fall into enemy hands. A person is only appointed to these duties if certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions were examined by the security organs of the Federal Republic. I do not want to go into further detail, as, particularly of late, so many accidents occurred in this institution . . .

#### **Question:**

*Does the USA know all about the West German plans? To what extent are American scientists and governmental bodies involved in them?*

#### **Reply by Dr. Bock:**

There is no doubt, I think, that unless getting support from the USA, the American institutes and enterprises, West Germany would have never been in a position to reach the standard of the development of nuclear weapons it has at present. Please take detailed information on this subject from the documentary material of this press conference which will thoroughly answer your question.

#### **Question:**

*Is there any information that the Federal Republic already possesses nuclear weapons of its own?*

#### **Answer by Professor Steenbeck:**

Nobody said that this production is already running. We would mainly like to emphasize here that all preparations are in progress for setting this production going.

I would only like to say that if there was evidence that the Federal Republic is in possession of it, this would cause reactions of quite a different extent, because then the threat would already be a fact. We want to prevent the threat from becoming reality. That is why we point out this threat and why I expressly said nothing which I cannot substantiate in this direction.

We do not want to wait until it is too late. Therefore we insist on control. This is our concern.

#### **Question:**

*Herr Patzelt, why did you come to the GDR and did not go to a Western country?*

#### **Reply by Herr Patzelt, physicist:**

Why to the GDR and not a Western country? Let me ask you a counter-question: Why fall from the frying pan into the fire? Because—and I believe to be speaking in the name of the other gentlemen too—if we are convinced that a state exists on German soil in which we are able to work in a humanist spirit, then we go there.

#### **Question:**

*Are there according to your knowledge West German scientists who are willing to work on the production of nuclear weapons?*

#### **Reply by Professor Steenbeck:**

From the time during which I still had direct contacts, that is about two years ago, I know that the majority is unwilling. But what is decisive is that a few suffice to operate these plant after having been developed . . .

It is not the opinion of the individual which is decisive, they can be replaced. It is essential that the power is legally bound. Do not think it is already sufficient that the majority of the scientists honestly desire a humanistic application and believe they are working for this sole purpose. Do not consider this a guarantee. Also Oppenheimer did not want the hydrogen bomb. He was pushed aside and discriminated. At the time the hydrogen bomb did not yet exist, it was only being developed.

To prevent such an application it is necessary to bind the real power which the individual fails to have.



As long as one solely relies on the honourable dictates of conscience of the scientists and considers these sufficient, one is on the wrong track. These dictates of conscience are certainly important and really a moral decision of the individual concerned and absolutely necessary. But unless these are forceful enough to be considered by those having the political power, they will not have any effect. I would like to prove this by the following example:

Herr von Weizsaecker who essentially wrote and disseminated the declaration of the Goettingen 18 told me some time later that he had been approached by many young scientists urging him to create an organisation or a league of opponents to the use of atomic energy for military purpose. They said they were too few to offer resistance should they be faced one day with such a challenge. But Weizsaecker rejected this. He said he did not want a decision of conscience becoming a mass article. This was not exactly his formulation, but the contents. This is certainly a respectable attitude, but will have no effect at all. We all have seen how speedily the Goettingen 18 were represented to be innocent unfortunates. This Otto Hahn, it was said, is an old man who can no longer keep himself clean. Then the anti-nuclear weapon and the Easter March campaigns became a movement. And also of them it was said: They are good and

honest people, but are they not a bit strange like the Salvation Army?

As long as those having the political power have not been compelled to show their cards I and none of us will be at ease. Whether we shall then be really at ease is a different story. A legal binding is unfortunately not yet always a factual one. If the individual aligns himself with a power, he can do effective work but will not be able to prevent anything. There will always be people who lend themselves to pushing the button, be it out of misguided patriotism or any other reasons. Once the set-up has been established only few people are needed.

I think that for intellectuals it needs a very hard self-education to understand their capacities and the way to employ them. But the entire history of our age of fast progress shows that the individual is being pushed aside if he opposes the development of a political power without having any political power himself. As is known, this has happened to many decent people.

There are also many good people among the scientists and the overwhelming majority of them desires that atomic energy is solely used for peaceful purposes—naturally also in the Federal Republic—and this is what makes us optimistic. But that means doing what has to be done, here and today.





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## Supplement

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# Yesterday and Today — Tools of German Imperialism

The downfall of Nazism had a sobering effect on many Germans who realized that their work had exclusively served the interests of German imperialism and that they had allowed themselves to be misused for a policy denounced as criminal in Nuremberg. A certain portion of those who had been busy preparing the "final victory" by designing secret weapons in the fascist laboratories and experimental stations until the eleventh hour, began to become aware of the responsibility towards mankind resting with scientists in the age of guided mis-

siles and weapons of mass extermination.

When German imperialism, a few years after the foundation of the West German state, undertook to place scientists again in the service of its revanchist plans, outstanding atomic physicists refused to take up the work that had been interrupted by the collapse of the Hitler regime. But it was not these men who set the character of the Bonn government's policy on science, but those inveterate tools of German imperialism who had made themselves useful before 1945 in the labora-

tories of the crime-laden trusts, in the fascist state machinery and in the Nazi organizations.

It is they who transform the state-run nuclear research centres into forges of atomic arms on behalf of their old masters, who subordinate the institutions of higher education to the nuclear armament schemes of West German imperialism and who ensure that a sufficient number of junior staff scientists are irresponsible enough to support and continue the criminal great-power politics of West German imperialism which, however, is doomed to failure.

## Nazi Scientists in West German Nuclear Weapons Research

### Bagge, Prof. Dr. Erich

Before 1945:

Physicist at the Reich Physico-Technical Institute doing research on atomic weapons. Together with the head of the Nuclear Physics Section of the Research Dept. of the Army Ordnance Office in the Armed Forces High Command, Dr. Kurt Diebner, Bagge put forward a plan as early as September 20, 1939 for attempting to split the atom. In his book *Von der Uranspaltung bis Calder Hall* (From Uranium Fission to Calder Hall) which was published in 1957, Bagge expressed his regret that the Hitler regime did not succeed in obtaining atomic weapons during World War II.

After 1945:

Director of the Institute for Reactor Physics of the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping, Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, (Commission III and Working Group III), first head of the Institute for Pure and Applied Nuclear Physics at Kiel University.

### Bammert, Prof., Dr.-Ing. Karl

Before 1945:

From 1940 to 1945, deputy department head and scientific officer at

the Research Institute of Aviation in Brunswick. Member of the Nazi party (NSDAP).

After 1945:

Member of the Technico-Scientific Advisory Committee to the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping and head of the Institute for Jet Engines at the Hanover Technical College.

### Bauer, Prof. Dr. Robert

Before 1945:

Worked at the Frankfurt on Main and Tübingen Universities, headed the X-Ray Dept. in the Berlin Charité Hospital, then served in the Wehrmacht. Since 1933 member of the NSDAP and SS, SS-Untersturmführer, member of the National Socialist German Lecturers' League and the N.S. Doctors' League.

After 1945:

Director of the Radiological Institute in Tübingen University.

### Boettcher, Dr. Alfred

Before 1945:

Director of DEGUSSA, helped produce Nazi "secret weapons."

After 1945:

One of the heads of the atom con-

cern, DEGUSSA, executive member of the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich, member of the Administrative Council of the (West) German Atom Forum and the (West) German Atomic Commission (Commissions II and III), editor of the journal *Nukleonik* published by the Springer publishing house.

### Bollenrath, Prof. Dr. Franz

Before 1945:

Head of the Institute for Materials Research in the German Experiental Institute of Aviation.

After 1945:

Helped transform the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich into one of the key centres West Germany's planned home production of nuclear weapons.

### Cartellieri, Dr. Wolfgang

Before 1945:

Provincial Court President; active in suppressing the Bavarian Republic of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in 1919; then volunteered for border duty in the East, decorated with the Silesian Eagle 1st and 2nd class for courage in fighting in Upper Silesia, then received the Volunteer Corps Fighters' Certificate

in 1937; member of the reactionary Stahlhelm association and League of National Socialist German Volunteer Corps Fighters from 1924 to 1935. Holds the "Stahlhelm Badge of Honour" since 1924. A member of the German National People's Party from 1921, he joined the NSDAP on April 1, 1936. Member of the League of National Socialist German Jurists, of the Soldiers' League and the Reich Colonial League. Joined the Nazi army in 1939 and took part in the campaigns of conquest in Denmark and Western Europe. Decorations: Iron Cross 2nd class in 1940, War Service Cross 1st and 2nd class with Swords in 1941 and Bulgarian Medal for Bravery in 1942. From 1942 until the end of the war was captain in the quarter-master department of the Armed Forces Leadership Staff in Hitler's Headquarters.

After 1945:

Banned from holding public office by the Denazification Commission in his home city Erfurt (in today's German Democratic Republic).

Started working for the West German government in the Blank Office as head of the Organization and Administration Dept., in 1959 switched over to the Atom Ministry (later renamed Ministry of Scientific Research) and worked as State Secretary of the Ministry and representative of the Bonn government in the Nuclear Research Centres in Karlsruhe and Jülich. In this position he helped to draw nuclear research and development work into the nuclear armament schemes of the West German imperialists. (see document No. 1).

#### **Danneel, Prof. Dr. Rolf**

Before 1945:

Worked on experimental cell research at various universities; until 1933 member of the Order of Young Germany, since May, 1937, member of the NSDAP and Scharführer in the SA Naval Standard 90 in Königsberg.

After 1945:

Member of the Scientific Council of the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich, pushes through the interests of the West German atomic arms experts

in the institutions of higher education; Director of the Institute of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at Bonn University.

#### **Erlar, Prof. Dr. Georg**

Before 1945:

Professor of Laws at Göttingen University. From 1923 to 1934, member of the illegal Reich Army, 1933 member of the German National People's Party and from May 1, 1933 of the NSDAP; official Gau speaker for the National Socialist Jurists' League; lecturer on jurisprudential documents for the Reich Leadership of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Head of the technical committee VII for Legal Atomic Questions in the Society for the Encouragement of Nuclear Energy Application in Shipbuilding and Shipping.

#### **Flemes, Dr. Rolf**

Before 1945:

Scientific assistant at the Upper Presidium of the Schleswig-Holstein province; Government Counsellor Since March 26, 1941. Member of the Stahlhelm since 1933 and of the NSDAP since May 1, 1937. From January, 1939, provisional block leader in the Claudius local branch of the NSDAP in Hamburg.

After 1945:

Works in the Supervisory Council of the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping.

#### **Fucks, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Wilhelm**

Before 1945:

From January 6, 1941, director of the Physical Institute in Aachen, from May 1, 1937 member of the NSDAP, in charge of personnel and press questions for the National Socialist Students' League, member of the SA.

After 1945:

Head of the Plasma Physics Institute, members of the Scientific Council of the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich, director of the First Physical Institute of the Technical College in Aachen and member of the (West) German

Atomic Commission. (see document No. 3)

#### **Grosse, Dr.-Ing. Hans**

Before 1945:

Leading engineer of the Junker works (Nazi aeroplane works); participated in the Kapp putsch (frustrated attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic in 1920) as a member of the Volunteer Corps, member of the SA.

After 1945:

Member of the Scientific Council and head of the Institute for Reactor Components in the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich. (see document No. 4)

#### **Groth, Prof. Dr. Wilhelm**

Before 1945:

Worked on the adsorption and separation of isotopes; from 1939 to 1942 engaged in secret work on "special problems" for I.G. Farben; at the same time worked on special tasks for the Army Ordnance Office which included development of a Nazi atomic bomb. Member of the NSDAP from 1937 and political leader in the NSDAP from 1939.

After 1945:

One of the leading scientists in the field of isotope separation in West Germany; member of the Scientific Council and head of the Working Group "Institute of Physical Chemistry" of the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich; Director of the Institute of Physical Chemistry at Bonn University; member of the Administrative Council of the (West) German Atom Forum and member of the Commission II and III of the (West) German Atomic Commission. (see document No. 2)

#### **Hansen, Prof. Dr. Johannes**

Before 1945:

From 1936 in the Naval Arsenal in Kiel; from 1939 Naval Building Counsellor, became professor on June 7, 1940.

In 1934-35 head of the local branch of the NSDAP in Groß-Flottbek-







[illegible]

Document No. 4

Eingerungen 30. NOV. 1933  
Beantwortet III

R G

Abg. v. 27. XI. 1933  
Hr. Watsch. 17.

An den H. - Staatsrat 6.

Abg. Heubler

Auf Ihr Schreiben vom 23. XI. 33 - Bet. 309 -  
Ich habe dem H. Rat. Paul Brosse seit  
1921, nur gegen fast jedem Jahr, 1921,  
für gleichen Leitzungs- und Leitzungs-  
bedarf in Leitzungs- und Leitzungs-  
1925 an. Ich bin mir für die auf jeder  
Leitzungs- und Leitzungs- für die Rat. Brosse

Document No. 4

[illegible]

Document No. 4

Zwei Jungs hat er mit 27 Jahren bekommen  
 bekommen und gezeugt, in der Morgensonne, 1922  
 in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres  
 1922 hat er zwei Jungs mit 1922  
 in der 1922, nachdem er zwei Jungs  
 1922 in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres  
 angefangen hatte, waren fast 1922  
 3.31. bei der ersten Lüge hat er  
 49.8. bei der ersten Lüge (Körperbau)  
 (55.8. 1922) 1922 auf der ersten  
 bei der ersten Lüge 1922 -  
 nachdem er zwei Jungs mit 1922  
 1922 - fast!  
 Zwei Jungs - fast!  
 Zwei Jungs  
 Zwei Jungs

Document No. 4



Altona and from November 1, 1938, head of the Blücher local branch in Kiel.

After 1945:

Member of the Technico-Scientific Advisory Committee to the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping, chairman of the Working Circle III/2 (nuclear energy for ships) of the (West) German Atomic Commission, and Director of the Institute of Shipbuilding at the Hamburg University.

#### **Haul, Prof. Dr. Robert**

Before 1945:

Scientist and department head in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem; from 1943 lecturer at the Technical College in Prague. From March 1, 1933 member of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Member of the Administrative Council and deputy chairman of the Scientific Council for the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich. From 1949 to 1956 Principal Research Officer at the National Chemical Research Laboratory in Pretoria, South Africa. From 1957, professor at Bonn University.

#### **Hug, Prof. Dr. Otto**

Before 1945:

Assistant doctor at the Pathological Institute of the Charité Hospital in Berlin. From 1935 member of the NSDAP and SA.

After 1945:

Member of the Scientific Council of the Society for Nuclear Research; Director of the Radiobiological Institute of Munich University and head of the Institute for Health Physics in Munich-Neuherberg. The work of this Institute on the effects of radioactive radiation on living creatures is of importance for the atomic war preparations of the Bonn armed forces.

#### **Kluge, Prof. Dr. Werner**

Before 1945:

From 1929 worked for the AEG Tube

Works, finally as deputy technical manager, head of the Experimental and Development Laboratories, from 1934 professor at the German Technical College in Prague. From 1937, member of the NSDAP, from 1933 of the SA and the National Socialist German Lecturers' League.

After 1945:

Director of the Institute for High Temperature Research with the Reactor Physics Dept. at the Technical College in Stuttgart; Director of the Institute for Gas Discharge and Photoelectric Techniques.

#### **Kohler, Prof. Dr. Max**

Before 1945:

Professor for Theoretical Physics at the Berlin University. From 1933 member of the SS, Unterscharführer; from 1937 member of the NSDAP, leading representative of the National Socialist German Lecturer's League at the Institute.

After 1945:

Director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics at the Brunswick Technical College. (see document No. 5)

#### **Kohlschütter, Dr. Hans-Wolfgang**

Before 1945:

Worked on special tasks allotted by the fascist Economics Ministry. In 1938 was made assistant professor and in 1942 professor in ordinary, then carried out research work for the Nazi arms industry. From 1931 member of the NSDAP Sponsoring Circle; from 1937 member of the NSDAP; leading member of the Foreign Dept. of the National Socialist German Lecturer's League.

After 1945:

Director of the Eduard Zintl Institute for Inorganic and Physical Chemistry at the Technical College in Darmstadt.

#### **Müller, Dr. Hermann**

Before 1945:

Positions in the judiciary of the Nazi apparatus. From 1933 member of the SA and from 1937 of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Finance Minister of Baden-Württemberg; in this position, member of the Supervisory Board of the Society for Nuclear Research under whose control the Research Centre in Karlsruhe is being turned into one of the most important centres for the future West German production of atomic weapons.

#### **Quick, Prof. August Wilhelm**

Before 1945:

Worked for the German Experimental Plant for Aviation and Flight Mechanics; head of the Aerodynamics Institute.

After 1945:

Member of the Scientific Council at the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich. Leading expert on rocketry.

#### **Rudorf, Fritz**

Before 1945:

Leading employee of the Luftkontor GmbH and in charge of financing arms for the Air Force; from 1939 director and chairman of the board of directors of the Bank der Deutschen Luftfahrt AG.

After 1945:

Head of the Committee VI which investigates the profitability of nuclear propulsion for ships on behalf of the Society for the Encouragement of Nuclear Energy Application in Shipbuilding and Shipping. Is on the supervisory boards of a number of concerns working in the aeroplane and rocket fields in West Germany. Encourages rocket arms.

#### **Schenk, Prof. Dr. Günter Otto**

Before 1945:

Lecturer at Halle University; from May 1, 1937 member of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

At the Max Planck Institute for Coal Research, head of the Radiochemical Dept.; member of the Scientific Council of the Nuclear Research Plant in Jülich.

#### **Schnurr, Dr. Walther**

Before 1945:

From 1934 worked in the Nazi arms

Der Preußische Ministerpräsident.

St.Nr.V.8/12.

Präsidentenamt  
des Führers und Reichkanzlers  
Eing: 28.12.1942

RP15500/42

### Vorschlag zur Ernennung

des

außerplanmäßigen Professors Dr. Kohler zum außerordentlichen Professor  
an der Reichsbefehlungsgruppe B2 oder der Reichsbefehlungsgruppe

Beilage: 1 mitgeschickte Urkunde.

Die Partei-Kanzlei hat Einwendungen  
gegen die Ernennung nicht erhoben.

Berlin, den 24. Dezember 1942

Im Vertretung

Von dem  
Herrn Staatsminister und Chef der Präsidialkanzlei  
des Führers und Reichkanzlers

Berlin W 8  
Poststraße 4

(Herrn Reichsminister des Führers und Reichkanzlers)

Im Namen des Deutschen Volkes

erwähne ich  
dem oben genannten Beamten  
Die Ernennungssache ist unter dem Befehl  
des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers  
am 12. Januar 1943  
Der Führer und Reichkanzler  
hat nicht widersprochen.

Präsidialkanzlei, Berlin, den 13. Jan. 1943

1. Die Ernennungssache ist unter dem Befehl  
des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers  
am 12. Januar 1943  
Der Führer und Reichkanzler  
hat nicht widersprochen.

2. Bei dem Urt.

Dr. Meisner

Beilage: Urkunde zur Ernennungssache des Beamten in Berlin W 8, Eingangs-Nr. 12.1.1943, Anlage 1.

D 23 (1.2.1943) Berlin, den

Die 17. 44

1	2	3	4	5	6
Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin
a) --	a) ja.	keinen.	a) nein.	a) keine.	Die Ver- schriften des Reichs- ministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers vom 20. 5. 1942 sind beigefügt.
b) seit dem 26. Januar 1939 im Wahlkreis B2, der Luftwaffe.	b) 1.5.1937 c) 14.5.1939. d) Insti- tutionen am 1.1.1933. e) Unter- schaffung in der SS, Ein- tritt in die SS am 1.1.1933. f) Erste Formation von Kriegs- gefangenen im St. Sturn Krieg.		b) nein.	b) keine.	

Document No. 5

Document No. 5

Der Reichswirtschaftsminister  
I. Pr. Nr. 1.5.1943 (a)

RP 2262/40

### Vorschlag zur Ernennung

des

Regierungssachbearbeiter Dr. Axel Schabert zum Regierungsrat

an der Reichsbefehlungsgruppe A202 oder der Reichsbefehlungsgruppe  
Der Stellvertreter des Führers hat  
Einwendungen gegen die Ernennung nicht  
erhoben.

Beilage: 1 mitgeschickte Urkunde

Berlin, den 25. Februar 1940

Von dem  
Herrn Staatsminister und Chef der Präsidialkanzlei  
des Führers und Reichkanzlers

Berlin W 8  
Poststraße 4

Im Vertretung

Herr Hitler!

H. Meisner

(Herrn Reichsminister des Führers und Reichkanzlers)

Im Namen des Deutschen Volkes

erwähne ich  
dem oben genannten Beamten  
Die Ernennungssache ist unter dem Befehl  
des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers  
am 25. Februar 1940  
Der Führer und Reichkanzler  
hat nicht widersprochen.

Präsidialkanzlei, Berlin, den 25. Feb. 1940

1. Die Ernennungssache ist unter dem Befehl  
des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers  
am 25. Februar 1940  
Der Führer und Reichkanzler  
hat nicht widersprochen.

2. Bei dem Urt.

Dr. Meisner

Beilage: Urkunde zur Ernennungssache des Beamten in Berlin W 8, Eingangs-Nr. 10.2.1940, Anlage 1.

D 23 (1.2.1943) Berlin, den

Die 17. 44

1	2	3	4	5	6
Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin	Beauftragter des Reichsministers des Führers und Reichkanzlers in Berlin
a) --	a) 1.5.1937	1922/1939/	a) 1923 bis	a) keine	Hat am Lehr- gang Nr. 57 des Reichs- lagers der SS in Bad 1939 von 3.1.1939 teilgenommen.
b) --	b) 1.5.1937	b) 1.5.1937	b) 1.5.1937	b) keine	
c) --	c) 1.5.1937	c) 1.5.1937	c) 1.5.1937	c) keine	
d) --	d) 1.5.1937	d) 1.5.1937	d) 1.5.1937	d) keine	
e) --	e) 1.5.1937	e) 1.5.1937	e) 1.5.1937	e) keine	
f) --	f) 1.5.1937	f) 1.5.1937	f) 1.5.1937	f) keine	
g) --	g) 1.5.1937	g) 1.5.1937	g) 1.5.1937	g) keine	
h) --	h) 1.5.1937	h) 1.5.1937	h) 1.5.1937	h) keine	
i) --	i) 1.5.1937	i) 1.5.1937	i) 1.5.1937	i) keine	
j) --	j) 1.5.1937	j) 1.5.1937	j) 1.5.1937	j) keine	
k) --	k) 1.5.1937	k) 1.5.1937	k) 1.5.1937	k) keine	
l) --	l) 1.5.1937	l) 1.5.1937	l) 1.5.1937	l) keine	
m) --	m) 1.5.1937	m) 1.5.1937	m) 1.5.1937	m) keine	
n) --	n) 1.5.1937	n) 1.5.1937	n) 1.5.1937	n) keine	
o) --	o) 1.5.1937	o) 1.5.1937	o) 1.5.1937	o) keine	
p) --	p) 1.5.1937	p) 1.5.1937	p) 1.5.1937	p) keine	
q) --	q) 1.5.1937	q) 1.5.1937	q) 1.5.1937	q) keine	
r) --	r) 1.5.1937	r) 1.5.1937	r) 1.5.1937	r) keine	
s) --	s) 1.5.1937	s) 1.5.1937	s) 1.5.1937	s) keine	
t) --	t) 1.5.1937	t) 1.5.1937	t) 1.5.1937	t) keine	
u) --	u) 1.5.1937	u) 1.5.1937	u) 1.5.1937	u) keine	
v) --	v) 1.5.1937	v) 1.5.1937	v) 1.5.1937	v) keine	
w) --	w) 1.5.1937	w) 1.5.1937	w) 1.5.1937	w) keine	
x) --	x) 1.5.1937	x) 1.5.1937	x) 1.5.1937	x) keine	
y) --	y) 1.5.1937	y) 1.5.1937	y) 1.5.1937	y) keine	
z) --	z) 1.5.1937	z) 1.5.1937	z) 1.5.1937	z) keine	

Document No. 6

Document No. 6



industry; taken over by I.G. Farben, he worked as a chemist in the Main Group II, Main Laboratory of I.G. Farben, Hoechst branch, which worked on the production of poison gases during World War II.

After 1945:

Member of the Managing Board of the Society for Nuclear Research; Schnurr has exercised his influence to make the Nuclear Research Centre in Karlsruhe into one of the most important centres for the planned West German atomic weapons production.

#### **Schubert, Dr. Karl**

Before 1945:

Government counsellor in the Nazis Economics Ministry; 1923 to 1930–31 member of the Ehrhardt Volunteer Corps Brigade. From May 1, 1937

member of the NSDAP, took part in a course in the Reich Camp in Bad Tölz, Rottenführer.

After 1945:

Head of the Sea Traffic Dept. in the Federal Ministry of Transport, represents the state in the Supervisory Board of the Society for the Application of Nuclear Energy in Shipbuilding and Shipping, president of the Society for the Encouragement of Nuclear Energy Application in Shipbuilding and Shipping. (see document No. 6)

#### **Schulze, Dr. Werner**

Before 1945:

Did research on powder and dynamite in the Technical Development Section of the I.G. Farben branch in Wolfen.

After 1945:

Scientific officer at the Hahn-Meitner Institute for Nuclear Research in West Berlin and professor for inorganic analytical chemistry at Dahlem University in West Berlin.

#### **Telschow, Dr. Ernst**

Before 1945:

In the Senate and Managing Board of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, later Director-General of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, entrusted with special tasks in armaments research by the Hitler regime.

After 1945:

Managing director of the institut für Plasmaphysik GmbH and senator at the Max Planck Society in Göttingen, responsible for research on the fusion of heavy hydrogen isotopes, needed for the production of hydrogen bombs.

## **Organizers of the Nazi Armaments Industry Now in Charge of Nuclear Research**

#### **Abs, Dr. Hermann Josef**

Before 1945:

As a member of the Board of Directors of the Deutsche Bank, strongly influenced the DEMAG, the DEGUSSA concern and the Kali-Chemie AG and played a major role in Hitler Germany's armament. DEMAG and DEGUSSA produced the V weapons and made tests to produce an atom bomb during World War II.

After 1945:

Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission and deputy chairman of the Commission V—economic, financial and social problems—chairman of the Supervisory Board in the Deutsche Bank and Supervisory Board member on a whole number of leading West German concerns.

#### **Beckenbauer, Franz**

Before 1945:

Managing director of the Erzberg-

bau GmbH, Salzgitter which belonged to the Göring Concern, from 1940 mining expert and deputy of the general commissioner for iron ore mining and distribution in Lorraine, Luxembourg and Meurthe et Moselle. In this position he had a decisive share in plundering the French Minette ores.

After 1945:

Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, deputy chairman of the working group III/4 (fuel supply), representative of the Eisenwerk-Gesellschaft Maximilianhütte AG, belonging to the Flick Concern.

#### **Bismarck, Prince Otto von**

Before 1945:

From 1937 head of the Political Dept. in the Foreign Office; from 1940 envoy at the Nazi Embassy in Rome; from 1919 to 1931 member of the National German People's Party; from 1933 member of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Member of the Presidium of the (West) German Atom Forum.

#### **Boden, Dr. Hans-Constantin**

Before 1945:

Chairman of the AEG, commissioner of the Hitler government for economic questions in Hungary.

After 1945:

Honorary Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the AEG, member of the Supervisory Board of Mannesmann AG and other West German concerns, member of the (West) German Atomic Commission. (see document No. 7)

#### **Buschendorf, Dr.-Ing. Friedrich**

Before 1945:

Head of the College Working Group for Territorial Research (political-economic territorial research) of the Reich Association for Territorial

Research at the Mining College in Clausthal-Zellerfeld.

After 1945:

Director of the Mineralogical Institute of the Hanover Technical College, member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group III/3 (supply and preparation of uranium ore).

### **Finkelburg, Dr. Wolfgang**

Before 1945:

Director of the Physical Institute of the Reich University in Strasburg. From 1937 member of the NSDAP, from 1940 to 1942 Gaustellenleiter and Nazi leader at the Darmstadt Technical College.

After 1945:

General commissioner of the Siemens AG, member of the Bavarian Atomic Commission and the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group III/1 (reactors).

### **Fränzl, Prof. Dr. Johannes**

Before 1945:

Employee of the Reich Physico-technical Institute, worked on research in nuclear transformation and explosion; 1934 Government Counsellor.

After 1945:

Leading director at the Federal Physico-technical Institute (Atom Physics Dept.), member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission IV (health physics and security).

### **Friedrich, Dr. Otto**

Before 1945:

Secretary of the Federation of German Raw Rubber Industry, leading employee of the Reich Economics Ministry, executive member and director of the Phoenix Rubber Works in Hamburg, Reich Commissioner of the Reich Office for the Raw Rubber Industry.

After 1945:

Member of the Presidium of the Federal Association of German Employers, vice-president and treasurer, personally liable for the Friedrich Flick KG; member of the

(West) German Atomic Commission, Commission V (economic, financial and social problems).

### **Fundk, Dr. Walter**

Before 1945:

Reich commissioner for prices to the provincial head of the Lower Danube. From 1933 member of the NSDAP, member of the SA.

After 1945:

West German representative at EURATOM. (see document No. 9)

### **Gross, Dr.-Ing. Otto Hans**

Before 1945:

Dept. head in the Research Laboratory at Berlin-Zehlendorf which worked mainly on armaments questions; from 1932 member of the NSDAP and from 1933 member of the SA.

After 1945:

After his return from Argentina, home for many incriminated Nazis after 1945, leading official in the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research, Dept. III (nuclear research).

### **Haase, Werner**

Before 1945:

In the Reich Aviation Ministry shared responsibility for the Nazi rocket programs. From 1931 member of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Responsible position in the Federal Ministry of Scientific Research, Dept. III (nuclear research).

### **Holluta, Dr. Josef**

Before 1945:

Dean of the natural science faculty at the German Technical College in Brünn (Brno).

From 1912 organized in various right-wing German student associations in Austria-Hungary; later in right-wing German organizations in Czechoslovakia; from 1938 worked in the District Committee of the Sudeten German Party in Brünn; from 1939 member of the NSDAP, district expert on technical questions for the NSDAP, district head of the

National Socialist League of Technicians and Head of the Organization and Personnel Dept. in the National Socialist German Lecturers' Association, Lower Danube Gau. After 1945:

Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission IV (health physics); member of various working groups in the Atomic Commissions.

### **Junkermann, Dr.-Ing. Wolfgang**

Before 1945:

From 1932 member of the NSDAP.

After 1945:

Head of the atomic energy dept. in the German Babcock and Wilcox Dampfkesselwerke AG which already helped Hitler produce V weapons; member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, working group III/1 (reactors).

### **Kaissling, Karl**

Before 1945:

Senior Railway Counsellor to the General Management of the "Eastern Railway" in Cracow, occupied Poland; from 1944 assistant ministerial director in the Reich Transport Ministry. From 1937 member of the NSDAP, from 1939 SA Obersturmführer in the Standard 7 (Führungskorps z.V.), Berlin-Zehlendorf.

After 1945:

Head of Dept. III (nuclear research) in the West German Research Ministry. (see document No. 10)

### **Knott, Dr. Carl**

Before 1945:

Military economy leader, member of the Board of Directors of the Siemens Schuckert Werke.

After 1945:

Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission and the Working Group for Nuclear Matters in the Federation of German Industry.

### **Michaelis, Dr. Hans**

Before 1945:

Member of the League for German-  
dom Abroad, in 1932 joined SS, from



Document No. 9







1933 SA member, member of Nazi student organizations.  
After 1945: In responsible position in EURATOM.

#### **Nallinger, Dr.-Ing. Fritz**

Before 1945:  
Military economy leader, member of the Board of Directors of the Daimler Benz AG.  
After 1945:  
Member of the Administrative Council of the (West) German Atom Forum and the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission III (Nuclear engineering).

#### **Pohland, Dr. Erich**

Before 1945:  
Volunteered in World War I, later worked in armaments planning with special contract and salary for the German Raw Materials Office (Reich Office for Expansion of the Economy); in 1938 helped in the occupation of the Sudeten areas (Czechoslovakia); 1940 War Administrative Counsellor to the Military Administration of the Army Group A and to the head of the Military Administration in Paris, from 1942 Senior Government Counsellor; member of the Nazi Lecturers' organization and many other Nazi organizations.  
After 1945:  
West Germany's representative at the EUROCHEMIC (European Company for the Processing of Irradiated Fuels).

#### **Prentzel, Dr. Felix-Alexander**

Before 1945:  
Worked in the Central Financial Administration of the I.G. Farben concern in Berlin; Military Administration Senior Counsellor.  
After 1945: Chairman of the DEGUSSA executive which already worked on atomic bomb production in fascist Germany, Supervisory Board member of the I.G. Farben, member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, member of the presidium of the Administrative Council of the (West) German Atom Forum.

#### **Reusch, Dr.-Ing. Hermann**

Before 1945:  
Leading arms industrialist in Nazi Germany; chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Eisenwerk Nürnberg AG, member of the Board of Directors of the Gutehoffnungshütte Oberhausen, Supervisory Board member of the MAN AG and many other large undertakings. Member of the German Industry's Publicity Council, under Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry; as general commissioner for industry in Yugoslavia responsible for plundering Yugoslav and Greek economy.  
After 1945:  
Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission.

#### **Riess, Dr.-Ing. Kurt**

Before 1945:  
Until 1933 I.G. Farben director at the Dormagen branch, later technical manager in Agfa Wolfen, technical manager of the branches in Leverkusen, Dormagen, Elberfeld and Uerdingen (Farbenfabriken Bayer AG), at the same time deputy security officer and member of the Board of Directors. From 1937 member of NSDAP.  
After 1945:  
Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group II-III/1.

#### **Röhrs, Heinrich**

Before 1945:  
Senior Government Counsellor; in 1919 member of the Volunteer Corps, in 1921 member of the semi-fascist German Freedom Party, from 1933 supporting member of the SS; in 1937 member of the NSDAP, Reich propagandist.  
After 1945:  
Technical manager and member of the Board of Directors of the Howaldswerke Hamburg AG, Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission Working Group III/2 (nuclear energy for ships). (see document No. 11)

#### **Scheibe, Prof. Dr. Arnold**

Before 1945:  
In 1934 local expert for the Reich Food Board in Giessen, during World War II member of the Reich Research Council as officer of the Nazi armed forces, member of the NSDAP, the SA, the Reich Colonial League.  
After 1945:  
Director of the Institute of Agricultural Botany and Plant Cultivation at Göttingen University, member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission II (nuclear research).

#### **Schimmelbusch, Dr. Heinz**

Before 1945:  
In the Reich group 'Industry', Economic Group 'Chemical Industry', head of the dept. for tempering agents.  
After 1945:  
Representative of DEGUSSA—which had decisive influence on the Nazi atomic weapon developments during World War II—on the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group III/4 (supply of fuel).

#### **Schmidt, Dr.-Ing. Ernst**

Before 1945:  
Head of the Motor Institute at the German Research Laboratory for Aviation, aviation research. From 1933 supporting member of the SS.  
After 1945:  
Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission II (nuclear research).

#### **Spilker, Karl-Heinz**

Before 1945:  
Member of the SS Division "Deutschland", in 1940 participated in a course at the SS Junker school in Brunswick, later trained applicants for SS leadership.  
After 1945:  
Representative of Farbwerke Hoechst (I.G. Farben) on the (West) German Atomic Commission, Commission I (legal matters).

**Sünner, Hans**

Before 1945:

Government Counsellor in the Reich Patent Board, joined NSDAP in 1933 member of the Nazi Jurists' League, press spokesman and propagandist of the German Aviation Federation.

After 1945:

West German representative in EURATOM.

From 1933 member of the NSDAP, from 1934 member of the SA, Nazi Block leader, then political leader in the local branch in Heerstrasse, Berlin-Charlottenburg.

After 1945:

Responsible member of the Atomic Energy Board in South Africa. (see document No. 8)

**Weiss, Dr.-Ing. Georg**

Before 1945:

Senior Postal Counsellor. Member of the NSDAP, charged with radio affairs.

After 1945:

Member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group III/2 (fuels and materials for nuclear reactors), represents the interests of the Pintsch-Bamag AG.

**Winkhaus, Dr. Ing. Hermann**

Before 1945:

Member of the Board of Directors of the Mannesmann AG, vice chairman of the Ruhr district Economic

Group for Mining and chairman of the Technical Committee of the Economic Group for Mining, Pre-sidium member of the Reich Coal Association, chairman of the Committee for Raising Technical Productivity. Co-responsible for employing foreign slaves in the fascist armaments factories.

After 1945:

Member of the Supervisory Board of Mannesmann AG, the AEG and other large undertaking; member of the (West) German Atomic Commission.

**Zier, Fritz**

Before 1945:

Government counsellor. From 1933 member of the NSDAP, member of the SS, Unterscharführer in Sturm

After 1945:

Dept. 7/72 in Geislingen. Head of the Tax Dept. in Farbwerke Hoechst AG, member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group V/1 (state encouragement for nuclear engineering developments).

**van der Velde, Dr. Kurt**

Before 1945:

Government counsellor, From 1933 member of the NSDAP, SA Rottenführer.

After 1945:

Director of the AEG, Tax Dept.; member of the (West) German Atomic Commission, Working Group IV/5 (legal and administrative questions of health physics).

**Verleger, Dr. Heinz**

Before 1945:

At the Reich Physico-Technical Institute, Government counsellor.



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